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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the economics and institutional aspects of community wildlife 
conservation in the context of local communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe. A significant proportion of wildlife in Zimbabwe, and in Southern Africa in 
general, is managed as a common pool resource by communities under community-based natural 
resource management. Several challenges threaten conservation efforts at both local and higher 
levels, thus hindering its ability to bring about development that might improve the welfare of 
poor rural communities participating in wildlife conservation.  
 
The most pressing issues in the wildlife sector include: i. inability to extract resource rents from 
wildlife conservation that in turn affect household welfare in terms of total household income 
and reduction in poverty and inequality, ii. lack of capacity by local communities to solve 
collective action problems or lack of incentives to self-organise, and iii. lack of comparable 
successful outcomes in CBNRM communities such as the wildlife conservancy communities. 
Learning from other successful communities that use ‘community-based’ models, such as 
wildlife conservancies, might provide important insights for policy makers and development 
practitioners. These issues are explored in three substantial papers included in this thesis. The 
thesis consists of five chapters starting with an introduction, followed by three papers and finally 
conclusions and policy implications. The study makes use of purpose-collected primary data 
from local communities living adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. 
 
The first paper investigates the effects of wildlife resources on community welfare. Specifically, 
the paper examines the contribution of environmental income to i) total household income, ii) 
poverty reduction, and iii) reduction in income inequality. Furthermore, it investigates the impact 
of environmental income on households in different income categories, the role of wildlife in the 
portfolio of environmental income and the determinants of environmental income generated by 
different households. To achieve the objectives above, the paper makes use of income quintile 
analysis, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measure, Gini coefficient analysis, Gini 
decomposition analysis, ordered logit regression model and instrumental variables estimation 
using heteroskedasticity-based instruments.  
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The results show that the relative contribution of environmental income towards total household 
income is more pronounced in poor households, while the relative contribution of agricultural 
income is noticeable in wealthier households. In particular, wealthier households consumed more 
wildlife products in total than relatively poor households. However, poorer households derive 
greater benefit from the consumption of wildlife resources than wealthier households. Excluding 
wildlife compromised the relative contribution of environmental income and, at the same time, 
increased the relative contribution of farm and wage income. Environmental income has more 
impact in terms of poverty and inequality reduction in the lower income quintiles than in the 
upper quintiles. Wildlife income alone accounted for about 5.5% reduction in the proportion of 
households living below the poverty line. Furthermore, wildlife income had an equalizing effect, 
bringing about a 5.4% reduction in measured inequality.  
 
The results of the ordered logit model suggest that the likelihood of belonging to a wealthier 
category of income increases with an increase in environmental income. However, the marginal 
effect of environmental income is very small, suggesting that only households that are positioned 
on the boundary will be able to move to the next income quintile. Its impact may be less 
pronounced for households that are located further away from the boundary. As expected, 
household wealth significantly and positively affect environmental income generated by 
households. The results reveal some evidence of the relationship between benefits and the quality 
of the resource system. Households generated more environmental income in areas with good 
biodiversity than in areas where there is an unhealthy population of wild animals. 
 
The second paper examines the role of local institutions in community wildlife conservation in 
Zimbabwe. Using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-based instruments, the results confirm that sound institutions are an important 
ingredient for cooperation in the respective communities. The paper finds evidence that 
cooperation positively and significantly affects biodiversity conservation. Taken together, these 
two main results imply that institutions directly affect the ability of a community to self-
organise, which in turn affects the success of biodiversity conservation in a community. Group 
size, community trust, number of stakeholders and existence of punishment were the other 
important variables explaining cooperation. Besides cooperation, variables such as training, 
benefits, distance from the nearest urban canter, distance from the fence, social capital average 
iv 
 
age of household head, fence and information sharing were also found to be very important in 
explaining the success of biodiversity conservation ceteris paribus.  
 
The third paper develops a bio-economic model to analyse wildlife conservation in two habitats 
adjacent to a national park by two types of communities in the context of Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe. One community is made up of peasant farmers operating under a benefit-
sharing scheme (CAMPFIRE), while the other is made up of commercial farmers practising 
game farming in a conservancy (the Save Valley Conservancy). Both communities exploit 
wildlife by selling hunting licenses to foreign hunters but with different levels of success. The 
park agency plays a central role by authorizing the harvest quota for each community. The paper 
formulates a bio-economic model for the three agents, optimises the market problem for each 
agent and compares the outcomes of the different communities to the social planner’s solution.  
 
The results show that the size of wildlife stock recommended by social planner could be higher 
than the market solution for both the CAMPFIRE community and the conservancy. The level of 
anti-poaching enforcement employed by the park agency is suboptimal. The level of anti-
poaching enforcement exerted by the conservancy community achieves social optimality. This 
could drive the stock in the conservancy towards the social planner’s solution, starting from a 
lower level. CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching effort than what the social planner 
would recommend. As a result, the size of the shared stock roaming inside the national park and 
on communal land diverges from the social planner’s prescription over time.  
 
The thesis sets out to investigate how people are benefiting from wildlife conservation and what 
drives conservation in CAMPFIRE communities. Its main contribution to the resource 
economics literature is to examine the effects of wildlife income (in the context of environmental 
income) on household welfare, the application of the general framework for analysing complex 
social-ecological systems developed by Ostrom (2007a; 2007b) in the wildlife sector in the 
context of a developing country and use a bioeconomic model to evaluate the behaviour of 
various actors in order to propose institutional changes that might move individual decisions 
closer to the social optimum. Furthermore, Ostrom’s framework has been used extensively in 
areas such as forestry, fisheries, rangelands and water resources management, while little has 
been done in the wildlife sector, particularly in Southern Africa.  
v 
 
While other studies may have considered the role of wildlife in the income stream of 
CAMPFIRE, they limited themselves to the analysis of revenues of CAMPFIRE activities. Our 
study takes a step further by examining the subsistence values from wildlife. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the success of CBNRM hinges on the interaction between local communities and 
wildlife. This is why disaggregation can help to make an appropriate assessment of the extent to 
which wildlife income as a component of environmental income is a catalyst of the CAMPFIRE 
programme. From a policy perspective, this thesis sheds light on the processes governing the 
human-environment systems and provides results comparable to other studies. Furthermore, the 
findings of this thesis will allow policymakers to interrogate their policies and strategies while at 
the same time identifying areas that need to be improved. 
 
Several other important policy implications can be drawn from the analysis in this chapter. To 
begin with, wildlife conservation has an important role in mitigating poverty and income 
inequality in CAMPFIRE communities. There is therefore a need to design policies that increase 
access to wildlife income because this could have an impact on their welfare. In line with our 
goal of using wildlife resources to bring about community welfare, we believe that policy 
experiments of increasing wildlife income could highlight the importance of wildlife resources 
for redistributive policy targeting. Wildlife income can greatly reduce poverty, but not inequality 
because it is less responsive to policy induces increments in wildlife income. Reducing wildlife 
income slightly more 15% could reduce poverty in the whole population to zero. 
There is need for a policy shift away from the resource itself to encompass the broader local 
economy in order to enhance livelihoods. Quick policy interventions such employment creation 
are required to increase household earnings from wildlife conservation in the short to medium 
term. In the long-run, household welfare in CAMPFIRE communities could benefit through 
policies and programs that stimulate an increase in wildlife earnings from activities such as non-
consumptive tourism, tourism business ventures and investment in infrastructure. However, 
wildlife-based land reform also needs to empower poor households in the area of capital 
accumulation while imposing restraint on harvesting by well-off households. 
 
The wildlife sector should be re-configured to facilitate the implementation of collective 
strategies that are endogenous to the community aimed at providing public goods such as 
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wildlife through conservation. Government policy should recognize CAMPFIRE communities as 
important stakeholders with an important role to play, but not as beneficiaries of wildlife 
conservation. Future policy reforms should also consider further devolution of natural resource 
management function and full benefits from the Rural District Council to sub-district producer 
communities or increased autonomy. This will allow innovation among communities, while the 
government create an enabling environment for CAMPFIRE communities to operate. The 
capacity of CAMPFIRE to develop own rules, rather than just following externally-imposed 
rules, should not be undermined.  
 
Since wildlife is a fugitive resource that roams freely on communal land, there is therefore a 
need for coordination among CAMPFIRE communities in order to supply the public good, the 
required habitat and to benefit from collective. The government, NGOs and private sector should 
act as catalyst of collective action to ensure that there are incentives for CAMPFIRE 
communities to self-organize into multiple layers of nested organizations through policies and 
programmes that allow resource users to participate in decision making process. Development 
programmes or policy interventions with both a welfare and a conservation component should 
not be designed as ‘one size fits all’ but should recognize and understand the differences in 
community characteristics and incentives to self-organize in order to promote conservation and 
safeguard the livelihood interests of pro-poor communities. 
 
Government programmes can target capacity building and skills development in order to have a 
positive impact on biodiversity conservation. There is need to increase spending on training 
relevant to natural resource management, targeting not only community leadership or project 
committees, but also ordinary community members as a path way to conservation. Therefore, the 
capacity building efforts of government agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders should 
complement each other to ensure that the necessary resources are mobilised and all communities 
receive the necessary training and resources.  
 
Resolving the problem faced by CAMPFIRE communities will necessarily not require market 
based instrument alone, but also institutional reforms. This study calls for three main strategies to 
allow campfire communities to move from a seemingly inferior outcome to one that is optimal.  
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Firstly, this result calls for policy instruments that can facilitate the development of sound 
institutions that are tailored to suit local conditions and endogenous to the community. For 
sustainability of the programme, there is also need to investment in institutional building blocks 
such as governance structures at the local level, democracy, monitoring and enforcement, and 
community level trust, and to source additional funding in order to equip CAMPFIRE 
communities with much-needed resources. The government should therefore allow CAMPFIRE 
communities to learn through past experiences and mistakes, and to be innovative so that they 
can develop and experiment with new conservation models.  
 
Secondly, CAMPFIRE communities suffer double taxation from the premium charged by the 
safari operators and a significant proportion of wildlife income that remains in the hands of the 
Rural District Council. From a policy standpoint, CAMPFIRE communities would benefit 
immensely if they could operate with the same autonomy and self-sufficiency as the conservancy 
because both taxes could be avoided. This could be achieved by hiring a manager or building 
internal capacity to match that in the conservancy community. This implies a different model or 
an improvement of the current benefit-sharing scheme, instead of receiving cash transfers. 
Innovative policy instruments are required to assist CAMPFIRE communities in various 
activities of wildlife conservation so that they can integrate into the main stream economy and 
fully commercialize their operations. 
 
Thirdly, designing policy instruments that increases the risk premium could decrease the 
effective price of the illegal off-take. Reducing the effective price of the illegal off-take 
discourages the community from poaching by eroding the incentives. It is possible to integrate 
the risk premium into local institutions by carefully designing policy instruments that are adapted 
to local conditions. We recommend that these three strategies should be deployed simultaneously for an 
effective and fast solution to the challenges faced by CAMPFIRE projects. This implies that policy 
makers should use a combination of both market-based instruments and institutional reforms since they 
seem to complement each other. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
The management of common pool resources (CPR) such as rangelands, fisheries, forests, water 
and wildlife is a critical element in the promotion of rural livelihoods and environmental 
sustainability. Throughout the developing world, a significant proportion of natural resources are 
managed by poor rural households as CPRs. They provide income, food, fuel, clothing, furniture, 
medicines and construction material among other things. In the process of harvesting these 
resources, local people pose a serious threat to the environment when the resource extraction is 
not controlled (Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Dietz et al., 2003; 
Ostrom, 2007). Consequently, if the natural capital base is utterly decimated, then it implies that 
the means of livelihood for many poor rural households is at risk. This, in turn, exacerbates rural 
poverty and inequality. Two unique characteristics of CPRs, namely non-excludability and 
rivalryness, make them vulnerable to resource overexploitation and eventually to total collapse 
of the resource system (Ostrom, 2003).   
 
Despite over 30 years of notable effort, human ingenuity has failed to generate a plausible 
solution to the environmental sustainability problem (Harich, 2010). The sustainability problem 
suggests that human beings should extract or harvest from the environment in such a way that the 
ability of the resource system to provide the same goods and services in future is not 
compromised. As a result, there has been tremendous growth in research to understand the 
complex relationships between people and the environment. The human-environment 
relationship is multifaceted and includes both human and ecological dimensions which together 
forms what Ostrom (2007a) refers to as the ‘social-ecological system’ (SES). Just like any 
system, these two dimensions of a SES cannot be studied in isolation. 
 
When we consider Southern Africa and the different types of natural resources used by rural 
communities, we observe that wildlife is more threatened, despite its importance to the rural 
economies of Africa. Wildlife is very important in for most governments in Southen Africa 
because it generates revenues through both consumptive and non-consumptive tourism. In 
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Zimbabwe, tourism used to be the fourth foreign currents earner after tobacco, cotton and gold 
during the 1990s generating income in excess of US$857 million per annum and contributed 
more than 11.6% towards Gross Domestic Product. Wildlife conservation also employs 
thousands of people (over 98 500 jobs) in Zimbabwe and generates income for communities 
living adjacent to national parks. Since independence, over US$20 million has been distributed 
to local communities.  
 
The link between human beings and the wildlife system is a topical issue worth investigating 
from both a developmental and conservation objective. This thesis is motivated by the fact that 
very few studies done in the region have actually attempted to operationalise the theory 
developed by Ostrom (2007a) and considers the following: i. the effects of wildlife income in the 
portfolio of environmental income on household welfare for local communities living adjacent to 
protected areas, ii. the role of local institutions in managing common pool wildlife in the context 
of Southern Africa, and iii. the lack of comparable successful outcomes in CBNRM communities 
such as the wildlife conservancy communities to inform conservation and development policy. 
These issues are so pressing that they deserve to be looked at in greater detail in three separate 
papers.  
 
The first issue seeks to establish the extent to which the benefits generated by environmental 
resources (including wildlife) have made environmental income a part of the rural economy of 
local households. In particular, the study seeks to investigate the effects of wildlife resources on 
community welfare – total household income, poverty and income inequality. It is indisputable 
that environmental resources contribute significantly to rural economies in Southern Africa 
(Cavendish, 2000; Fisher, 2004; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006; Thondhlana et al., 2012; 
Thondhlana & Muchapondwa, 2014) and in other developing countries elsewhere in world 
(Lopez-Feldman et al., 2007; Uberhuaga et al., 2012).  
 
As part of the global research agenda addressing rural poverty and the environment in the past 
three decades, particular emphasis has been placed on improving the livelihoods of poor rural 
communities in most developing countries and conserving natural resources. As a result, 
previous studies have looked at environmental dependence (Uberhuaga et al., 2012; Thondhlana 
et al., 2012; Thondhlana & Muchapondwa, 2014) the contribution of environmental resources to 
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total household income (Cavendish, 1999; Cavendish, 2000; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006), 
the role of environmental income in reducing rural poverty (Cavendish, 1999; Lopez-Feldman et 
al., 2007; Thondhlana et al., 2012) and its effects on income inequality (Cavendish, 1999; Fisher, 
2004; Lopez-Feldman et al., 2007; Fonta & Ayuk, 2013).   
 
Harvesting, consuming and selling of environmental resources form part of rural livelihood 
diversification strategies in Southern Africa. Ellis (1998) defines livelihood diversification as the 
process by which rural households construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support 
capabilities in order to survive and to improve their standards of living. Viewed from a different 
angle, environmental income also acts as a safety net against income shocks associated with 
extreme weather conditions, crop failure, market shocks, health shocks and idiosyncratic shocks 
(Hegde & Bull, 2008; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006). Use of valuable natural resources such as 
wildlife should be incorporated into poverty and income inequality reduction strategies.  
 
In the process of mining the environmental or harvesting natural resources, there is also a threat 
posed by local communities to the environment (Hardin, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Baland & 
Platteau, 1996; Dietz et al., 2003). Scholars argue that one way of dealing with this challenge is 
through devolution and decentralization of natural resource management (NRM) functions and 
decision-making to the community’s grassroots level (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom, 2007; Berkes, 
2008). When we consider different types of environmental resources used by rural households in 
Southern Africa, we observe that wildlife is more threatened, despite its importance to local 
communities living adjacent to protected areas. This study argues that the utilization of wildlife 
resources has resulted in different contributions to livelihoods (Cavendish, 1999; Shackleton & 
Shackleton, 2006) and incentives to conserve resources. The different channels through which 
wildlife contributes to livelihoods need to be investigated in order to inform rural development 
policy. 
 
It is essentially a good outcome if poor households derive significant benefits from managing 
their own natural resources. However, when the community fails to adequately manage the 
resources, this always produces bad conservation outcomes. Therefore, the second issue address 
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the linkage between local institutions1 and biodiversity outcomes. When we consider the 
CAMPFIRE communities in Zimbabwe, we observe that conservation is not doing as it should. 
This leads us to a very important question, what drives community wildlife conservation? In 
theory, conservation is forged by cooperation and cooperation by institutions (Ostrom, 2007). 
The results in the literature are not quite conclusive. This is why this study seeks to investigate 
whether institutions affect biodiversity through cooperation.  
 
There is substantial evidence of the role played by community level institutions in forestry, 
fisheries and water resources management (Pomeroy, 1995; Agrawal, 2001; Sokile et al., 2003; 
Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; Mehringa et al., 2011). Institutions are required to safeguard the 
long term integrity of a SES. Since institutions act as a constraint to human behaviour, it 
therefore makes sense that institutions directly affect ability to self-organise or cooperation. The 
literature distinguishes between triggering institutions (i.e. institutions that are required to 
prompt cooperation) and those institutions that are required to sustain cooperation over time. 
However, both triggering and sustaining institutions are needed during the different phases of 
collective action. 
 
Furthermore, the CPR literature seems to suggest that the success of environmental outcomes 
depends directly on collective action (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001; Harris, 2003; 
Ostrom, 2010). This implies that institutions do not affect biodiversity outcomes directly, but 
instead work through the community’s ability to self-organise. This has a more direct impact on 
biodiversity. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), also referred to as 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in the literature, assume that it is 
possible to harmonise both conservation and development goals in such a way that local 
communities are able to self-organise in order to conserve resources, while at the same time 
deriving benefits from conservation (Alpert, 2015). The critical assumption behind the so called 
people oriented approaches is that local communities are interested and able to self-organise for a 
common purpose (Sorongorwa, 1999).  
 
                                                                 
1 Institutions define the set of operational rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some 
arena, what actions are allowed or constrained (Ostrom, 1990). 
5 
 
Ostrom (2003) argues that the property rights system might be responsible for generating 
incentives to self-organise and, hence, to conserve resources. From the CPR literature, the idea of 
protected areas is viewed as the only way to protect biodiversity in third world countries. High 
on the list of policy options is private ownership of natural resources, which is believed to 
generate adequate incentives to conserve resources (Bromely, 1991). Given this common 
assumption, the tenure system operating in communal areas has been the subject of considerable 
debate (Murombedzi, 1999). The common property system was viewed by some scholars as 
inferior, largely normative and based on ideological construct (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 
1972); while others view it as an alternative to both state control and privatization of CPRs 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1999; Agrawal, 2001). Due to other undesirable 
consequences associated with private and state ownership of CPRs, common property systems 
have been found to deliver superior results under certain conditions (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). 
 
Finally, the third issue looks at different communities with different outcomes in order to 
establish the conditions under which the outcomes of the two communities could be the same. 
For us to be able to deal effectively with institutions there is a need to talk about a different type 
of community other than the CAMPFIRE community. For the purposes of this study, we chose 
the Save Valley Conservancy community. Both communities are conserving wildlife in a 
community-based fashion, but their level of success is different. The performance of the 
CAMPFIRE community is much worse than the conservancy community. Perhaps there could be 
room for institutional reform in the community that is not performing well. There is need to 
investigate why conservancies perform better than CAMPFIRE communities and what policies 
need to be instituted in order for CAMPFIRE communities to achieve comparable results.  
 
In particular, the paper develops a bioeconomic model in order to compare wildlife conservation 
under private versus communal property systems in terms of management (stock size) and 
utilization (harvesting effort). Many studies have used bioeconomic modelling in the past to 
demonstrate the importance of local communities in wildlife and biodiversity conservation 
(Schulz & Skonhoft, 1996; Skonhoft, 1998; Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2004; Skonhoft & Schulz, 
2005; Bulte & Rondeau, 2007; Fischer et al., 2011; Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2014).  
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Fischer et al. (2011) formulated a bio-economic model to analyse community incentives for 
wildlife management under the benefit-sharing programs under the CAMPFIRE programme in 
Zimbabwe. They established that resource sharing does not necessarily improve community 
welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. They argued that the results depend on the exact 
design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the 
way in which the parks agency manages hunting quotas. Johannesen and Skonhoft (2004) 
developed a model for wildlife species migrating seasonally between a conservation area and a 
neighbouring area. Contrary to what is argued in the literature, their study demonstrated that 
handling the property rights over to the local people does not automatically translate into more 
wildlife and sustainable resource utilisation. They suggested that the reason might lie in the 
nuisance motive for harvesting. 
 
Skonhoft (1998) identified several ways through which the park agency and local communities 
can share wildlife benefits. It can be revenue sharing from tourism, safari hunting, establishing 
user rights through hunting quotas, or through local job creation in tourism. Another way of 
providing local people with park revenues is by compensating farmers for wildlife induced 
agricultural damages. However, damage compensation may typically work as an agricultural 
subsidy and possibly trigger agricultural land expansion, thereby reducing the size of wildlife 
habitat (Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2014). Bulte & Horan (2007) established that damage 
compensation stimulates habitat conversion (with negative effects on wildlife stock), but it also 
reallocates labour from wildlife hunting to agriculture (the effect works in the opposite 
direction). They also found that compensation is less likely to work as intended when 
agricultural land is a poor substitute for natural habitat for wildlife. 
 
The ICDPs literature suggests that benefit-sharing initiatives have been poorly linked to the 
conservation objective and, hence, such initiatives rarely work (Wells et al., 1999; Fischer et al., 
2011; Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2014). Common pool resource scholars stress the need to change 
incentives from indirect measures such as compensating farmers for wildlife induced agricultural 
damages to direct measures such as transfers conditional on the conservation target (Ferraro, 
2001; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). Zabel et al. (2011) analysed the impact of conditional revenue 
transfers conditional upon the size of the wildlife stock. Using a bio-economic model of wildlife 
harvesting and livestock herding, they found that conditional transfers based on the size of the 
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wildlife stock may reduce wildlife harvest and thus encourage wildlife conservation. 
Additionally, it may give incentives for the herders to better protect their livestock from the 
predation pressure.  
 
This work differs from previous studies in that it uses bio-economic modelling to compare 
wildlife management under two distinct communities where one produces superior results. There 
is overwhelming evidence showing that conservancies perform much better in terms of wildlife 
management and utilization compared to the CAMPFIRE projects in Zimbabwe where local 
communities have frequently been accused of destroying wildlife (Murombedzi, 1999). Both the 
land under conservation and wildlife population has increased tremendously in the conservancies 
(Kreuter et al., 2010). Furthermore, local communities have failed to adapt in such a way that 
they are able to extract resource rents through conservation while the private game farms have 
evolved into vehicles of extraction (Emerton, 2001). These observed outcomes could be a result 
of the discrepancies in community level institutions. As such, appropriate institutional reforms 
might be necessary for CAMPFIRE communities to benefit from and conserve wildlife 
resources.  
 
This thesis contributes to the resource economics literature by using purpose collected primary 
data to examine the effects of wildlife income (in the portfolio of environmental income) on 
household welfare, by operationalizing the framework for analysing complex SESs developed by 
Ostrom (2007a; 2007b) to investigate the role of institutions on community wildlife 
conservation, and by using a bioeconomic model to evaluate the behaviour of various actors in 
order to propose institutional changes that might move individual decisions closer to the social 
optimum. Furthermore, Ostrom’s framework has been used extensively in areas such as forestry, 
fisheries, rangelands and water resources management, while little has been done in the wildlife 
sector, particularly in Southern Africa.  
 
While other studies may have considered the role of wildlife in the income stream of 
CAMPFIRE, they limited themselves to the analysis of revenues of CAMPFIRE activities. Our 
study takes a step further by examining the subsistence values from wildlife. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the success of CBNRM hinges on the interaction between local communities and 
wildlife. This is why disaggregation can help to make an appropriate assessment of the extent to 
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which wildlife income as a component of environmental income is a catalyst of the CAMPFIRE 
programme. From a policy perspective, this thesis sheds light on the processes governing the 
human-environment systems and provides results comparable to other studies. Furthermore, the 
findings of this thesis will allow policymakers to interrogate their policies and strategies while at 
the same time identifying areas that need to be improved. 
 
1.2 Objective of the thesis 
 
Given the research issues articulated above, this thesis aims to achieve the following broader 
objectives: 
1. to examine the effects of wildlife resources on community welfare – household income, 
poverty and inequality;  
2. to investigate the role of institutions in community wildlife conservation using local 
communities living adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe as a case study; and 
3. to compare wildlife management on common property systems operating under the banner of 
the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources and the private 
game farming community in the Save Valley Conservancy. 
 
1.3. Description of study area and sampling 
 
This study collected primary data from 30 local communities in 13 wards around Gonarezhou 
National Park (GNP) in Zimbabwe that are participating in wildlife conservation. GNP is the 
second-largest game reserve in the country after Hwange National Park. It is located in south-
eastern Zimbabwe (coordinates 21⁰ 40′ S 31⁰ 40′ E) and covers about 5 053 km2. It forms part of 
the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park which links Gonarezhou with Kruger National Park in 
South Africa and Limpopo National Park in Mozambique. Owing to its vast size, rugged terrain 
and location away from the main tourist routes, large tracks of Gonarezhou still remain pristine 
wilderness. The national park is located in natural region five, which is very dry with very low 
agricultural potential. The mean annual rainfall for the area is about 499 mm, with a standard 
deviation of about 195 mm. The average maximum monthly temperature ranges from less than 
25.9⁰C in winter to over 36⁰C in summer, while the average monthly minimum ranges from 9⁰C 
to 24⁰C in winter and summer respectively (Gandiwa, 2011). The vegetation of the Gonarezhou 
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ecosystem is typical semi-arid savanna, dominated by Colophospermum mopane woodlands 
(Gandiwa & Kativhu, 2009). 
 
The area under study is located approximately 100km away from the nearest Chiredzi town, 
relatively sparsely populated and predominantly occupied by the Shangani people; other ethnic 
groups such as the Venda, Ndau, Shona and Ndebele people are also found in the area. Apart 
from the CAMPFIRE programme (which accounts for over 95% of the local communities 
involved in wildlife conservation), there are also peasant farmers operating under resettlement 
schemes (slightly less than 3%) and about four conservancies. The mode of production of 
peasant farmers is primarily subsistence in nature, while commercial farms are heavily 
capitalised. Although peasant farmers engage in a diversified portfolio of economic activities 
including wildlife conservation, the most dominant livelihood activities are livestock production 
and crop cultivation, e.g., maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts and cotton. The most important 
activity in the conservancy is wildlife conservation with little agriculture, particularly, livestock 
ranching. Figure 1.1 below shows the map of GNP (in dark green) and the communal areas (in 
grey) bordering the national park.  
Figure 1.1: Map of Gonarezhou National Park and the local communities 
 
Source: www.africahunting.com 
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The data for the analysis was drawn from a household survey conducted in June/July 2013. Local 
communities participating in wildlife conservation were identified with the help of community 
leadership, park authorities and the Rural District Council (RDC). From each community, the 
chairperson of the wildlife management committee was identified and interviewed as a key 
informant2. The survey employed a simple random sampling procedure using the list of 
beneficiaries from each community as the sampling frame. Initially, sampling was done using 
information gathered at district level from the RDC. There was a huge disparity between the 
information supplied at the district level and what was on the ground in terms of the number of 
community groups (projects) and number of households participating in community wildlife 
conservation as the RDC did not update its records regularly. As a result, the sampling procedure 
changed ex-post, i.e., information gathered from the chairperson of the respective community 
groups was used to update the initial calculation of the sample size, and this made some wards to 
be over-sampled. This complicated the exercise because the information needed to keep the same 
sample size among the areas was not readily available. Local communities around the 
Gonarezhou National Park share similar ecological conditions and perhaps similar culture, 
traditions or languages, which makes the results comparable across communities. 
 
Table 1.1 below shows the number of households interviewed by ward against the total number 
of households participating in wildlife conservation in each ward, and ward population expressed 
in terms of households. The sample size was further compromised by the fact that some 
enumerators did not meet the required target, particularly in areas that were sparsely populated. 
In addition, some questionnaires were not usable due to non-response or lack of critical 
information. Table 1.1 confirms that some Wards, particularly Ward 8 and Ward 15, were 
heavily sampled (i.e., heavily sampled more than others). Another explanation is that these two 
wards had the highest number of CAMPFIRE communities than any other ward, i.e., six and five 
groups respectively (refer to Table A2 in the appendices). Since the study purposefully targeted 
CAMPFIRE communities, a complete enumeration of all CAMPFIRE projects in each ward (full 
sample) was carried out. 
                                                                 
2 Local communities are required to organise and form wildlife management committees by the government in order 
to participate and to benefit from wildlife conservation. All the communities visited during the field work had 
committees in place. The only difference between them was the extent to which these committees are functional and 
involved in wildlife management.   
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Table 1.1: Number of households by ward 
Ward Interviews Household involved in CWM Ward Population 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Ward 10 20 5.95 820 7,82 1300 7,46 
Ward 12 7 2.08 43 0,41 43 0,25 
Ward 13 15 4.46 861 8,21 1000 5,74 
Ward 14 9 2.68 492 4,69 1750 10,04 
Ward 15 64 19.05 955 9,11 2000 11,47 
Ward 22 10 2.98 81 0,77 81 0,46 
Ward 23 13 3.87 181 1,73 181 1,04 
Ward 29 19 5.65 2000 19,08 2000 11,47 
Ward 30 29 8.63 960 9,16 1700 9,75 
Ward 4 10 2.98 350 3,34 1850 10,61 
Ward 5 32 9.52 1589 15,16 2100 12,04 
Ward 8 84 25.00 1235 11,78 1470 8,43 
Ward 9 24 7.14 917 8,79 1960 11,24 
Total 336 100.00 10484 100.0 17435 100,00 
Source: Survey data August 2013 
 
It is not likely that some of the household covariates used in the study and our results could be 
biased because the primary target for the study were CAMPFIRE projects, and the goal was to 
collected data from household in these communities in order to understand their resource 
extraction patterns in the first and second paper and in the third paper their conservation pattern. 
The idea was to sample households in CAMPFIRE communities – over and under-sampling is 
therefore taking place at project level and not community level. Given that we are controlling 
from community effects in order to capture resource heterogeneity and other spatial differences 
that influence incomes, we don’t believe there is going to be bias on account of over-sampling at 
project level.   
 
Out of the 30 communities visited, 25 are CAMPFIRE projects while the remainder, namely, 
Nyangambe, Chizvirizvi and Gonakudzingwa, are resettlement schemes (see Table 1.4 below). 
Although Gonakudzingwa has the least number of households (about 43), it had about three CPR 
groups, each with its own wildlife management committee, thereby bringing the total number of 
communities under resettlement schemes to five. Resettlement schemes differ from communal 
areas in that the land tenure system was based on written permits which allowed settlers to reside 
and use the land on which they settled in a setting overseen by resettlement officers rather than 
by established local authorities while the latter provides communal tenure. 
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Table 1.4: Number of communities involved in wildlife conservation by tenure 
Type of tenure Freq. Percent Cum. 
Communal 25 83.33 83.33 
Resettlement 5 16.67 100.00 
Total  30 100.0  
Source: survey data August 2013 
 
By design, all CAMPFIRE projects were supposed to operate at ward level. However, due to 
conflict and unequal distribution of resources within communities, they had to split in order to 
spread the benefits to every community member. About three communities were operating at 
ward level, namely, Mahenye, Mutandahwe and Nyangambe. The rest of the wards were divided 
into several community groups ranging from two to six different sub-groups in a single ward. In 
the case of communal areas, these different community groups were referred to as CAMPFIRE 
villages3. 
 
1.4. Organisation of the thesis 
 
This chapter introduced three primary issues of the study, gave an outline of the broader 
objectives of the thesis and a description of the study area. These research issues and objectives 
are closely intertwined but each deserves to be looked at in greater depth, and as such they shall 
be dealt with in three separate papers each constituting a thesis chapter. The first paper is 
presented in chapter 2, the second paper in chapter 3 and the third paper in chapter 4. Chapter 2 
examines the effects of environmental resources (including wildlife) on community welfare 
using income quintile analysis, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measure, Gini coefficient 
analysis, Gini decomposition analysis, ordered logit regression model and instrumental variables 
estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments. Chapter 3 relies on Ostrom’s framework 
for analysing complex social-ecological systems to examine the role of local institutions in 
community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 develops a bio-economic model with 
numerical illustrations to compare wildlife management under common property systems and the 
private game farms. It seeks to establish the possibility of wildlife tenure reforms or conditions 
under which local communities can behave like the private game farming community. Finally, 
chapter 5 presents conclusions and policy implications. 
                                                                 
3 By definition, a CAMPFIRE village comprises several political administrative villages , each with its own 
headman. Its primary objective is conservation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Effects of Wildlife Resources on Community Welfare: Income, Poverty and 
Inequality4 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There is increasing consciousness among policymakers, development practitioners and academic 
scholars about the importance and value of environmental resources5 in the livelihoods of poor 
rural communities, including the Southern Africa region (e.g., Cavendish, 2000; Fisher, 2004; 
Shackleton & Shackleton, 2004; Lopez-Feldman et al., 2007; Thondhlana et al., 2012; 
Uberhuaga et al., 2012; Fonta & Ayuk, 2013; Thondhlana & Muchapondwa, 2014). All these 
studies demonstrated considerable economic contribution made by environmental resources to 
rural livelihoods. However, based on the studies done in the Southern Africa region so far, it is 
still not clear how the analysis of environmental income and welfare6 is altered when wildlife 
and poor rural households living adjacent to national parks are considered. Furthermore, previous 
studies were conducted in areas where wildlife conservation is not an important activity in the 
community. This chapter argues that wildlife conservation is an important component of 
environmental income generation for communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe that are participating in the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
                                                                 
4 A version of this chapter has been desseminated as an EfD Discussion Paper No. DP 15 – 21 and ERSA Working 
Paper 554.  
5 We define environmental resources in this paper as goods that are freely provided by nature or “nature’s bounty” 
(Cavendish, 1999), accessible to everyone in the community, and which community members can collect without  
incurring any other cost except their own time. Ownership of assets such as carts and dogs help in the collection 
process of environmental resources. 
6 Household welfare is measured in terms of three dimensions: total household income, poverty and income 
inequality. 
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Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a program that seeks to balance both conservation and 
development goals by including local communities in wildlife management7. 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the economic contribution of wildlife 
resources (as part of the portfolio of environmental income) to household welfare and incentives 
to conserve resources. This study seeks to fill an important gap in the literature. Little is known 
about the effect of wildlife income on household welfare, i.e., total income, poverty and 
inequality. It is undeniable that unequal utilization of wildlife resources results in different 
contributions to livelihoods among the users of such resources. The different channels through 
which wildlife contributes to livelihoods need to be investigated in order to inform rural 
development and conservation policy in Southern Africa.  
 
In addition, little is known about the relative contribution of environmental income (with and 
without wildlife) when compared with other income sources. From a policy standpoint, it has 
become imperative to recognise the relative importance of different income sources in deriving 
inter-household poverty and inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2000). Using Gini decomposition, 
Leibbrandt et al. (2000) considered six income sources that include wage income, remittances, 
agriculture, capital income, transfers and self-employment for rural households in rural South 
Africa. They found that wage income is both the most important income component and the most 
important source of inequality. This chapter applies such a technique and includes environmental 
income in the analysis in addition to the six components of standard household income 
considered above. In doing so, the chapter extends existing knowledge about the human-
environmental resources nexus in the context of developing countries. This study is relevant 
given the occurrence of a major institutional reform in 2000 which affected both the land tenure 
system and wildlife policy in Zimbabwe. 
 
Analysis of the human-environment relationship is constrained by inadequate data encompassing 
both environmental and economic activities (Dasgupta, 1993; Deaton, 1997; Cavendish, 1999; 
                                                                 
7 The CAMPFIRE programme was established during the mid-1980s to accommodate peasant farmers in communal 
areas that are located in the vicinity of national parks (Balint & Mashinya, 2006). CAMPFIRE allows local 
communities to manage wildlife through their respective Rural District Councils and to get income from wildlife 
conservation. It is expected that villagers carryout anti-poaching enforcement in their communal areas because they 
now benefit from conservation. 
15 
 
Cavendish, 2000; Luckert et al., 2000). Cavendish (2000) argued that traditional studies 
miscalculated rural incomes and welfare measures simply because environmental income is 
ignored in the analyses. He argued further that measures of poverty and inequality are overstated 
in conventional studies. As a result, such measures do not reflect the true picture on the ground 
and policies based on these measures achieve limited success. The lack of appropriate and 
comprehensive household data-sets encompassing both economic and environmental aspects 
presented further stumbling blocks for past researchers to undertake such rigorous quantitative 
analysis (Cavendish & Campbell, 2002; and Cavendish, 2000). To overcome this challenge, this 
study made use of purposely-collected survey data capturing both economic and environmental 
aspects from local communities around the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. 
 
In light of the policy issues discussed above, a number of questions arise. How does the 
utilization of environmental resources affect welfare (total income, poverty and inequality) and 
incentives to conserve resources when wildlife is considered? Specifically, we ask: i. Does 
environmental income (including wildlife) contribute significantly toward total household 
income, reduction in rural poverty and reduction in income inequality? ii. How does 
environmental income compare with other sources of income? iii. What determines the different 
amounts of environmental income that households generate? 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides the background and reviews the 
literature, while Section 2.3 discusses data issues, defines key variables and gives an outline of 
the research methods, analytical framework and empirical model specifications. We then proceed 
to discuss the results in the Section 2.4 and wind up with conclusions and policy implications in 
Section 2.5. 
 
2.2. Background and Literature Review 
 
Poor rural households in Southern Africa depend heavily on the natural capital base to sustain 
their welfare through the provision of both consumptive and non-consumptive goods (Cavendish, 
2000; Fisher, 2004; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2004; Thondhlana et al., 2012; Thondhlana & 
Muchapondwa, 2014). Apart from land restitution programmes or any other justice objectives, 
the realization that the livelihoods of poor rural households in the region depend heavily on 
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environmental resources has led to devolution and decentralization of natural resource 
management, particularly wildlife resources, into the hands of local communities. Such a policy 
is believed to provide appropriate incentives to the communities in question to conserve natural 
resources, while at the same time making sure that they also benefit from managing their own 
resources (Balint & Mashinya, 2006). 
 
Demonstrating the complementarity between development and conservation goals, which were 
previously thought to be incompatible, has been on the agenda of regional and international 
policy since the mid-1980s, when devolution started in Southern Africa (Dubois, 2003; 
Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006). Zimbabwe was among the first countries in the region to 
implement the so-called ‘people-oriented approaches’ to natural resource management. 
CAMPFIRE is one good example of local communities that are managing natural resources to 
their own benefit (Murombedzi, 1999; Balint & Mashinya, 2006). The livelihood of local 
communities living adjacent to national parks is heavily dependent on natural resources, 
including wildlife. As a result, enhancing the utilization of environmental resources in the 
domestic and wider markets will not only increase livelihood security and reduce rural poverty 
and inequality, but will also provide incentives for conservation and sustainable utilization of 
resources (Wunder, 2001;  Thondlana et al., 2012).  
 
Considering the management side within the CAMPFIRE projects, some local communities have 
managed to put in place a wildlife management committee, develop sound common pool 
resource institutions in order to control resource extraction (i.e., the technology to use, when and 
where to harvest certain types of resources), and set aside a portion of their land for conservation 
or as wilderness area. These communities have a constitution in place, which spell out the rules 
and regulations that govern the utilization of resources in their area in addition to traditional 
institutions such as the village headmen and chiefs, and bylaws enacted by the Rural District 
Council and park authorities. For instance, some CAMPFIRE communities restrict unnecessary 
harvesting of trees either for firewood or as timber, thatch grass and other valuable non-wildlife 
resources. Although poaching is still persistent in the study area, it is illegal to harvest wildlife in 
all communities. 
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When we consider how individuals think about bylaws and household behaviour in terms of 
illegal harvesting there is great variations in the timing, harvesting place and technology used by 
CAMPFIRE communities. Most households prefer to hunt at night with dogs, while others hunt 
during the day with bows are arrows. Some households use wire snares and poison, but these 
technologies are not selective, i.e., both wildlife and domestic animals are killed. Some 
households prefer to hunt in the periphery of the community where they harvest small plains 
game, while others prefer the wilderness area far away from the community but immediately 
before the boundary of the national park where they harvest bigger game.  
 
Cavendish (2000) identified a number of channels through which environmental resources 
contribute to rural livelihoods. To begin with, a household can harvest natural resources such as 
wild vegetables, wild fruits, timber or firewood and consume them directly as part of its own 
consumption activities. This is in line with the notion of a standard rural household as both a 
production and consumption unit. It is also possible that a household might use environmental 
resources as inputs in another production activity, such as the use of firewood in beer brewing or 
brick making, in which case they are referred to as input goods. Environmental resources can 
also be used by rural households as output goods for sale, for example, households gather natural 
resources which they do not consume themselves and sell them in order to supplement total 
household income. Finally, rural households harvest resources from the environment to produce 
household durables such as furniture or keep stocks of environmental resources for future use. 
Timber and firewood are examples of resources that can be stored for future use. 
 
Closely related to the discussion above is the literature on forest income, which explores the 
three roles of environmental resources, that is, preventing poverty by acting as insurance or 
safety nets (Shackleton et al., 2008; Thondhlana & Muchapondwa, 2014), reducing poverty via 
increased earnings (Fisher, 2004; Vedeld et al., 2007), and, finally, playing a role in equalizing 
income (Cavendish, 1999; Fonta & Ayuk, 2013). Shackleton et al. (2008) argued that income 
derived from the environment acts as a safety net for poor rural households by mitigating 
agricultural risk through direct and indirect provisioning. Poor rural households use 
environmental income8 as a method of diversification to cushion themselves against shocks 
                                                                 
8 Environmental income is defined here as the sum of direct use values and cash income derived from environmental 
resources (Thondhlana et al., 2012). 
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associated with illness, crop failure, loss of employment, changes in food prices or extreme 
weather conditions.  
 
From the literature, a number of issues stand out with regard to the study of the human-
environment relationship. These issues relate to unequal utilization and differentiation in the 
types of environmental resources used in communal areas, the contribution of environmental 
resources to total household income, wealth differentiation and resource utilization, and whether 
environmental income reduces poverty and rural inequality. Environmental resources offer goods 
to rural households that have considerable differentiation in terms of their economic 
characteristics and utilization (Cavendish, 1999; 2000). Shackleton and Shackleton (2006) and 
Kar and Jacobson (2012) argued that, within any given community, there is significant socio-
economic differentiation and it is important to acknowledge such differentiation when 
considering policy formulation and management interventions in order to support rural 
livelihoods and promote sustainable utilization of natural resources. Thondhlana et al. (2012) and 
McGregor (1995) emphasised the role of contextual factors such as culture, social institutions, 
ecological conditions and infrastructure in influencing access and the ultimate utilization of 
resources. 
 
In Southern Africa, poorer households depend heavily on environmental resources, which 
contribute about 40% to their incomes, although richer households use greater quantities of these 
resources in total (Cavendish, 2000). Through a detailed examination of use and value of four 
non-timber forest products (NTFPs), Shackleton and Shackleton (2006) found evidence 
supporting Cavendish’s claim that poorer households benefit more than wealthier classes from 
environmental resource utilization in proportional terms. In addition, wealthier households 
purchase more NTFPs, while a greater proportion of poor households were actually involved in 
selling NTFPs (McGregor, 1995; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006). Richer households generated 
more environmental income in total than poorer households because they have more man-made 
assets for collecting resources (Cavendish, 1999; Uberhuaga et al., 2012; Ambrose-Oji, 2003).  
 
There are mixed results with regard to the effect of environmental income on poverty reduction. 
It is still not clear whether environmental income can actually move poor households across the 
poverty line, but there is agreement that such resources can mitigate poverty and, at least, make 
19 
 
some households less poor. For example, Cavendish (1999) reported that environmental income 
is important in mitigating poverty, but might not be responsible for lifting poor households out of 
poverty. In contrast, in a study of forest income and resource dependence in lowland Bolivia, 
Uberhuaga et al. (2012) reported that forest income has the potential to move households out of 
poverty, provided that the environmental resources are fully commercialised and the rural 
households are integrated into the mainstream economy. Fonta et al. (2011) and Lopez-Feldman 
et al. (2007) also found evidence that forest income reduces rural poverty in Nigeria and Mexico 
respectively. Using meta-analysis of 51 case studies from 17 countries, Vedeld et al. (2007) 
established that forest environmental income represents on average 22% of the total income in 
the sampled population. 
 
There is general consensus about the role of environmental income in reducing rural inequality 
(Cavendish, 2000; Cavendish & Campbell, 2002; Fisher, 2004; Vedeld et al. 2007; Fonta et al. 
2011). For example, using a sample of 213 households from rural Zimbabwe, Cavendish and 
Campbell (2002) found that environmental income is strongly and significantly equalizing9, 
bringing about a 30% reduction in inequality. A study by Fonta et al. (2011) found that forest 
income reduces income inequality in rural Nigeria. Using Gini decomposition, Fisher (2004) 
showed that access to forest income reduced measured income inequality in Malawi. Vedeld et 
al. (2007) found that forest environmental income has a strong equalizing effect on local income 
distribution. Most studies conducted so far are concerned with the broader environmental income 
category. This chapter contributes to the literature by defining two specific categories of 
environmental income (with and without wildlife benefits). 
 
2.3. Research Methods 
 
2.3.1 Empirical strategy 
The study is motivated by three specific questions. i) Does environmental income (including 
wildlife) contribute significantly toward total household income and reduction in rural poverty 
and income inequality? ii) How does environmental income (and specifically income from 
                                                                 
9 Environmental income has an equalizing effect on rural income distribution if it can result in a reduction in 
inequality. Therefore, access to environmental income improves social welfare through its role in both increasing 
and equalizing incomes.  
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wildlife) compare with other sources of income? iii) What determines environmental income 
generation among poor households living adjacent to protected areas? To address these 
questions, this chapter uses income quintile analysis, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty 
measure, Gini coefficient analysis, Gini decomposition analysis and regression analysis. A brief 
description of these analytical techniques is given in the next section.  
 
To answer these questions, we first define three different income measures used in this study. 
Standard household income (Y0) is defined as income derived when standard household budget 
surveys are implemented (Cavendish, 1999). This comprises all household economic activities 
(i.e., wage income, remittances, gifts and transfers, farm income, capital income and self-
employment), but excludes environmental income. We expect the results of the standard 
household income not to differ significantly from previous studies. Standard household income 
is used as the baseline against which we measure the relative contribution of environmental 
income. Environmental income includes both direct use values and cash income (i.e., direct 
consumption of resources by households, environmental-based labour income and sales of 
environmental resources).  
 
Because we are dealing with local communities living adjacent to a game park and whose 
livelihoods depend on wildlife conservation, the main goal of this chapter is therefore to examine 
the effects of wildlife resources on welfare. We are concerned with two scenarios, a scenario 
with wildlife benefits and a scenario without. As a result, a distinction is made between non-
wildlife and wildlife income. Wildlife income captures household consumption and sales of bush 
meat, small animals, fish and birds (illegal harvest), in addition to income generated from legal 
activities which includes the money and meat from wild animals killed through trophy hunting10 
in the community’s conservation area. It is important to note that the term ‘income’ as used in 
this chapter refers to income per adjusted adult equivalent unit and not per capita. Per capita is an 
extreme form of the adult equivalence scale that adjusts household income on a per person basis. 
The adjusted adult equivalent unit accounts for the different contributions between household 
members as per capita measurements underestimate individual contributions since they overlook 
differences in household composition (Cavendish, 1999; 2000). In computing income per 
                                                                 
10 Local communities get income from legal hunting activities by engaging a Safari operator or local professional 
hunter who utilises the quota on their behalf.  
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adjusted adult equivalent, we divide household income by the number of adults in that household 
and where there are children, we add some weights. The different incomes defined above were 
measured for the 12 month period spanning the 2012/2013 agricultural season. As a result, all the 
calculations and analysis in this chapter were done with reference to this period of time. 
 
We also differentiate partial environmental income or environmental income without wildlife 
resources (X0) from total environmental income (X1) derived from both non-wildlife and wildlife 
resources. As suggested earlier, a distinction is made between these two categories of 
environmental income because other studies concerned themselves with the broader 
environmental income category. We define total household income excluding wildlife (Y1) as the 
sum of standard household income (Y0) and environmental income without wildlife resources 
(X0). Finally, we define total household income (Y2) in terms of standard household income (Y0) 
and total environmental income (X1). Thus, the main difference between the two measures of 
total household income, i.e., Y1 and Y2, is that the former does not include wildlife income, 
while the latter includes wildlife income. Figure 2.1 below summarises the different measures of 
income computed in this chapter. 
Figure 2.1: Summary of income measures 
 
Cavendish (1999) highlighted a number of controversies in poverty research when it comes to 
measuring poverty and the choice of a measure of welfare. This chapter follows standard practice 
in poverty research, considers these issues and chooses income as a measure of welfare. There is 
also disagreement in the literature about whether the poverty line should be absolute (fixed), 
relative or subjective (e.g., Ravallion, 1992; Deaton, 1997). Cavendish (1999) argued that 
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deciding the exact position of the poverty line is not as important as comparing results for 
poverty measures under different assumptions about the location of the poverty line. For the 
purposes of this analysis, the robustness of poverty measures to different poverty lines is 
therefore more important than a point estimate of poverty. Following Cavendish (1999), this 
study uses poverty lines, fixed with reference to the standard income distribution, that span a 
wide range of incomes in our sample. The poverty lines correspond to the uppermost incomes of 
the income quintiles of the standard income distribution and are consistent with other studies. 
 
a) Income quintile analysis: To analyse the contribution of environmental income to total 
household income, the study used income quintile11 analysis. Based on this technique, the sample 
was divided into five income groups in such a way that 20% of the population lies in each group. 
This made it easier to examine the contribution of environmental income with and without 
wildlife to total household income by income category. The household questionnaires included 
quantitative questions about a wide range of environmental goods and their uses and values as 
part of household’s income, consumption and expenditure. As a result, household values were 
calculated on the basis of environmental use rather than resource availability. Mostly, economic 
transactions were valued at local market prices12 and value addition calculated for subsistence 
agricultural output. In cases where market prices could not be determined, household reported 
values were used to allow for a comparison of environmental income against a full accounting of 
the household’s other economic activities. 
 
Using standard principles for agricultural households involved in both market and non-market 
activities, the environmental resource use and non-environmental economic data were valued and 
aggregated to produce household income accounts (see Grootaert, 1982; Cavendish, 1999; 
Cavendish, 2000; Thondhlana et al. 2012). Therefore, the method employed for valuing 
environmental resource utilization was similar to all other economic transactions, i.e., 
household’s own reports of quantity, total value of resource utilization (consumption) or sales. 
However, there is a limitation to this method in that most environmental goods are not traded on 
the market. This is the main reason why environmental resources have been excluded from 
                                                                 
11 Quintiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative distribution function of a random variable such 
as income, where the sample is divided into fifths according to the neighbourhood socioeconomic status. 
12 Market prices are ideal because they represent clearing prices. 
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standard household income analysis in the past (Cavendish, 2000). To minimise this problem, the 
quantitative data was supplemented by qualitative data collected through key informant 
interviews. 
 
b) The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measure: The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
metric is used to examine whether environmental income (including wildlife) can reduce rural 
poverty. It is a generalised measure of poverty within an economy. We ask, is environmental 
income capable of lifting people out of poverty or, at least, making people less poor than they 
were without it? Hence, the FGT metric measures the income shortfall expressed as a share of 
the poverty line and is weighted by a “sensitivity parameter”  (Donaldson & Weymark, 1986). 
Algebraically, we have  
 
where is an agreed upon poverty line (e.g., the most common poverty line used for Africa by 
the World Bank is US$450.00 per person per annum, which corresponds to about US$ 1.25 per 
day adjusted for purchasing power parity), is the number of people in an economy, is the 
number of poor households (i.e., those with income at or lower), and are individual incomes. 
The interpretation of the sensitivity parameter draws its inspiration from Atkinson (1970). A low 
value of the sensitivity parameter ( ) implies that the FGT measure weights all the individuals 
with incomes less than roughly the same, while a high value puts more weight on those 
individuals with the lowest incomes (i.e. furthest below ). A very high FGT statistic implies 
more poverty in the economy. 
 
For specific values of , the FGT statistic corresponds to other measures of poverty. For 
example, if , the formula reduces to the Headcount ratio (H), which is the fraction of the 
population living below the poverty line. Mathematically, this is written as: 
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If , then the FGT metric reduces to the average poverty gap13, that is, the average amount of 
income required to move those in poverty up the poverty line. Thus, we have 
 
While a great deal of the literature on poverty uses these two versions of the FGT, other studies 
make use of the FGT statistic where , so that the index reduces to the poverty severity 
measure.  
 
Using such a tractable form, the statistic combines information on both poverty and income 
inequality14. Rewriting the FGT statistic, we obtain 
 
where  is the number of poor households as defined above, is the coefficient of variation 
among those with income such that , and   
The FGT class of decomposable poverty measures discussed above was first introduced by 
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). 
 
c) Gini coefficient analysis: To establish whether environmental income reduces rural 
inequality, the Gini coefficient method is employed. The Gini index is a summary statistic that 
measures how equitably or inequitably a resource, e.g., income, is distributed in a society. The 
advantage of using the Gini coefficient is that the statistic is a self-contained summary of 
economic data which is easy to compute and interpret (Farris, 2010). It can be defined 
mathematically based on the Lorenz curve15. Therefore, the Gini coefficient can be thought of as 
                                                                 
13 This is equivalent to the amount an average person in the economy would have to contribute in order for poverty 
to be barely eliminated. 
14 The FGT also considers inequality among the poor, but as the proper amount for is not defined (i.e. it is a 
normative question).We are thus not able to say that the Gini is part of the FGT. 
15 By definition, the Lorenz curve shows the distribution of a quantity in a population. For a resource , the Lorenz 
curve is the curve , where the -poorest fraction of the population has a fraction of the whole 
and the value of is called the percentile variable. If everyone in the economy had exactly the same amount of , 
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the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality (i.e., the 45⁰ line) and the Lorenz curve 
over the total area under the line of equality. The Gini index is thus defined as an integral that 
shows how much the Lorenz curve in question deviates from perfect equity, i.e., the 45⁰ line. 
Mathematically we have: 
 
where the factor 2 scales the area in such a way that the Gini index varies between 0, perfect 
equity where everyone in the economy has the same share of the good, and 1, where one person 
has everything. This is an indirect method of calculating the Gini coefficient through the 
construction of the Lorenz curve. However, the index can be computed through a direct method 
as follows: 
 
where is mean income, is the total number of observations, and are the dollar values of 
income for individuals and (Thomas et al., 2000). 
 
d) Gini decomposition analysis: This chapter uses the Gini decomposition approach to 
investigate the relative contribution of income components to income inequality for local 
communities living adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe.  In a South African 
study, Leibbrandt et al. (2000) considered income from six different sources i.e. wage income, 
remittances, agricultural income, capital income, state transfers and self-employment. In this 
study, we expand these variables and include environmental income in the analysis. By going 
deeper into each and every component, we ask whether there are any policy interventions that 
can either increase or decrease income generation.  
 
Following Leibbrandt et al. (2000) and Shorrocks (1993), we assume  households deriving 
income from K different sources. Let  represent the total household income and
represent total income for household  and source ; hence, . Assuming 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
then the order of our imaginary line-up would be completely arbitrary and , the curve of perfect 
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that the distribution of household income and the income components are represented by
 and respectively, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of total 
income within the group can be defined as:  
 
where represent mean household income,  is the cumulative distribution of total 
household income i.e. , and is the rank of divided by the 
number of observations . The key aspects of the Gini decomposition technique can then be 
summarised as in Leibbrandt et al. (2000) and Stark et al. (1986) as follows: 
 
Where  denotes the share of income source  in total group income, i.e., , 
represents  the Gini coefficient measuring inequality in the distribution of income component 
within the group and is the Gini correlation of income from source with total household 
income, defined as follows:    
 
To check for robustness of our results, we consider results from the Gini decomposition using the 
Rao’s (1969) analytical approach, the Shapley (1953) decomposition approach and the FGT 
decomposition approach. 
 
e) Econometric modelling of the relationship between poverty and environmental income: This 
section is concerned with modelling the relationship between environmental income and relative 
poverty using regression analysis techniques. The human-environment relationship raises two 
important questions that need attention. First, does environmental income affect households in 
various income quintiles in the same way? Second, what are the determinants of environmental 
income? Given these two questions, it is hypothesised that environmental income is capable of 
moving households across income categories, and that household wealth and the status of 
biodiversity in an area are key determinants of environmental income generation. If these 
assertions are correct, then it is conceivable through appropriate policy designs to improve 
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household welfare by increasing access to wildlife income by relatively poor households, while 
imposing restraints on wealthier households.  
 
To answer the first question, it is possible to capture the impact of environmental income (EI) on 
households in different income quintiles using an ordered logistic regression model. These 
quintiles were calculated based on standard household income and therefore exclude 
environmental income. Suppose the sampled population can be divided into five categories 
according to the level of income by calculating the first, second, third, fourth and fifth income 
quintiles; then, for  the dependent variable  is ordered and increasing. We can 
therefore rewrite the dependent variable as follows: 1=low income, 2= lower middle income, 
3=middle income, 4=upper middle income, and 5=high income. Thinking in terms of relative 
poverty, we can say that households in a lower quintile are relatively poorer than households in a 
higher quintile. Algebraically, we can write the following model. 
 
 
where the explanatory variables in equation 2.11 are defined as follows: age of household head 
(Age), area under crop cultivation (Areacult), environmental income (EI), household size 
(Hsize), household head employed (Employ), number of years living in the area (Lhead), and 
number of years in school of the household head (Educ). Theoretically, it is plausible to believe 
that most households tend to move from lower income quintiles to higher quintiles as the age of 
the household head, area under cultivation, household size, number of years living in the area 
and the level of education increase and as their employment status changes from unemployed to 
employed. This is so because opportunities to get employment and acquire more wealth 
(including farm land) and other assets come with age and education. As the number of years 
living in the area increase, people accumulate knowledge of their environment and become more 
away of the opportunities it offers through learning and experience. We use community level 
dummies to capture resource heterogeneity and other spatial differences that influence incomes. 
 
In a study of factors affecting poverty dynamics in rural Zambia, Chapoto et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that accumulation of assets, such as farm land, offer a pathway to sustained high 
levels of income. The results of Chapoto et al. (2011) underscore the importance of education 
5,4,3,2,1i iY
)11.2.........(...76543210 ii EducLheadEmployHhsizeEIAreacultAgeY  
28 
 
and employment, both for avoiding chronic poverty and for ensuring that livelihood earnings 
remain consistently above the poverty line. In a study of rural Nigeria, Apata et al. (2010) found 
a negative relationship between poverty and educational attainment of the household head. The 
study of Bogale et al. (2014) for rural Ethiopia established that the probability of a household 
being poor tends to diminish as household size and age of the household head increases using per 
capita household calorie consumption.  
 
In the second part, we find the determinants of the different amounts of environmental income 
that people generate, i.e., . So we propose a regression model of the form: 
 
where  represents environmental income;  denotes household characteristics such as the 
age of the household head, education, employment status, household size e.tc;  indicate 
household wealth; and  is the error term. As is common in the economics literature, a proxy 
for the wealth variable is recovered from household assets, livestock ownership, agricultural 
implements (Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006) and farm size16 using factors analysis.  
 
From empirical studies done in the developing countries, there is substantial evidence suggesting 
that households generate more environmental income as the age of the household head and 
household size increase (Godoy et al., 1997; Escobal & Aldana, 2003; Mamo et al., 2007; Fonta 
et al. 2011). On the other hand, there is also evidence showing that the household dependence on 
environmental income diminishes with the level of educational attainment and as the 
employment status of the head of the household changes from unemployed to being employed 
(Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Godoy & Contreras, 2001; Fisher, 2004; Mamo et al., 2007; 
Kamanga et al., 2009; Fonta et al. 2011). Shackleton and Shackleton (2006) found evidence of 
the association between household wealth status and environmental resource use in the Kat River 
Valley in South Africa. Contrary to the finding of Shackleton and Shackleton (2006), Vedeld et 
al. (2007) and Fisher (2004) reported a negative relationship between wealth and forest income. 
                                                                 
16 Farm size is included in this computation because it captures agricultural income from crops thereby marking our 
index a better proxy of the wealth index.  
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As before, we control for resource heterogeneity and other spatial differences that influence 
incomes using community level dummies.    
 
In this study, it is assumed that, as household wealth increases, people invest in technology, such 
as carts and draught power, to harvest more environmental resources. Conversely, as households 
obtain more environmental income, they use the excess income to accumulate more assets, 
thereby increasing their wealth status. Because of potential reverse causality between 
environmental income and wealth, we suspect that t endogeneity is an issue in this relationship. 
In such a case, the most appropriate way forward is using the standard instrumental variables 
regression model as our method of choice if instruments were available. However, this study 
could not find suitable external instruments for use in traditional instrumental variables 
estimation from the primary data collected. Because of this obstacle, this study makes use of 
instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments that 
methodologically deal with the endogeneity problem (Lewbel, 2012; Baum et al., 2013).  
 
Based on Lewbel (2012), this method estimates an instrumental variables regression model that 
provides the option to generate instruments and allows the identification of structural parameters 
in regression models with endogeneity or mismeasured regressors in the absence of traditional 
identification information such as external instruments. Identification is achieved in this context 
by having explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors, 
which are a key feature of models where the correlations in the error terms are due to an 
unobserved common factor (Baum et al., 2013). Because instruments are constructed as simple 
functions of the model’s data, the approach may be applied in cases where no external 
instruments are available, or may be used to supplement weak external instruments in order to 
improve the efficiency of the instrumental variables estimator (Lewbel, 2012).  
 
Thus the instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments is a good 
substitute of the standard IV approach in terms of addressing the problem of endogeneity. The 
choice one uses depends on the availability of sound external instruments. If good external 
instruments are available, then the standard IV approach is superior. If external instruments are 
either weak or not available, then the method of heteroskedasticity-based instruments is superior 
to the conventional IV approach. Accordingly, the standard IV did not add value in our case as it 
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is inferior to heteroskedasticity-based instruments. This method is gaining popularity and it is 
being used widely in many studies (e.g., Mishra & Smyth, 2015; Banerjee et al. 2013; Emran 
et al., 2012). Mishra & Smyth (2015) used two data sets from China to compare the 
identification strategy suggested by Lewbel (2012), which utilizes a heteroskedastic covariance 
restriction to construct an internal IV, and the standard IV. They found that Lewbel’s approach 
provides plausible estimates in datasets in which conventional IVs are not available.   
 
For a detailed description of the method for constructing instruments as simple functions of the 
model’s data, please refer to Appendix A. There are potential shortcomings of this approach. 
One of the major drawbacks of Lewbel’s approach is that identification relies upon higher 
moments, and is likely to be less reliable than identification based on coefficient zero 
restrictions. However, in the absence of plausible identifying restrictions like in our case, this 
approach may be the only reasonable strategy. 
 
2.3.2 Data sources 
The data for the analysis was drawn from a household survey conducted in June/July 2013 with 
local communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. Both formal 
and informal methods of primary data collection were employed e.g., structured interviews using 
questionnaires, semi-structured interviews such as key informant interviews diaries to record 
environmental resource utilization and income sources. The data was collected from 336 
randomly selected households, in 13 Wards and 31 communities involved in wildlife 
conservation. The household questionnaire collected information about a wide range of 
environmental resources utilization and economic characteristics (including wildlife resources) 
in addition to the usual household socio-economic characteristics and agricultural activities. 
Comparing households in communal areas and those in resettlement schemes seemed to be 
problematic because the sample for the latter tenure regime is quite small relative to the former17.  
 
 
                                                                 
17 We will not therefore compare the two tenure systems in most of the analysis , except in regression models where 
an attempt is made to control for the effects of tenure. This  implies that the poverty analysis will be based only on 
the pooled sample. 
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2.4. Results and discussion 
 
2.4.1 Household characteristics 
A total of 336 interviews were conducted. Since over 90% of peasant farmers involved in 
wildlife conservation are from the communal areas and less than 10% are found in the 
resettlement schemes, the interviews consisted of 306 households from the former and 30 
households from the latter. Table 2.1 shows some characteristics of the sampled households 
around the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. The mean age of the household heads, 
number of years in school, number of years living in the area, household size, area under crop 
cultivation, distance to the nearest town (i.e. some measure of market integration) and mean 
number of dogs18 owned for the sampled population are 48.9years, 5.52years, 36.6years, 6.4, 
2.7ha, 65.5km and 1.1 respectively. The proportion of household heads born in the area is about 
70.8%, while the proportion of household heads who are Christians is 59.2%. Using a scale from 
zero to one hundred, the mean wealth index (31.8) shows that the average household in the 
sampled population is generally poor, i.e., the index lies below half (50.0). 
Table 2.1: Household characteristics by tenure category 
Variables Ni Mean 
age of household head 336 48.88 
number of years in school 336 5.524 
number of years living in the area 336 36.64 
household head born in the area [0,1] 336 0.708 
religion of household head [0,1] 336 0.592 
household size 336 6.423 
area under crop cultivation 336 2.656 
distance to the nearest town 336 65.45 
wealth index 336 33.37 
number of dog 336 1.080 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Households were categorised in terms of income quintiles. Five categories of income 
corresponding to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintiles were defined as follows: low 
income, lower middle income, middle income, upper middle income and high income 
households. Table 2.2 presents the uppermost incomes of the income quintiles of the standard 
income distribution. 20% of the households lie below US$208.35 in the first income quintile, 
                                                                 
18 The number of dogs owned by a household matters in this analysis because dogs are used by local people for 
hunting purposes. 
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40% of the households lie below US$280.63 in the second quintile, and so on. The analysis 
makes use of two poverty lines widely used in the literature. Zimbabwe’s official poverty line of 
US$1 per day or US$360.00 per annum (adjusted for purchasing power parity) corresponds to 
the threshold of the third income quintile (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, 2014). The 
lowest poverty line used by the World Bank (1990) of US$1.25 per day or US$450.00 per annum 
(average line of the poorest 15 countries) corresponds to the threshold of the fourth income 
quintile. The poverty line for the World Bank was chosen for comparison purposes, to check for 
robustness of the results and the idea of basing the analysis on a relative poverty line rather than 
a fixed line. However, the interpretation of the results is based on Zimbabwe’s official poverty 
line. 
Table 2.2: Income quintiles 
Income quintiles Uppermost income 
1st quintile 208.35 
2nd quintile 280.63 
3rd quintile 376.23 
4th quintile 495.25 
5th quintile 668.63 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
2.4.2 Utilization of environmental resources 
There are a number of resources from which communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou 
National Park derive their livelihoods; these include rangelands, woodlands, watering points, 
rivers and dams. These resources sometimes form part of what the community refers to as its 
conservation area or wilderness. By law, communities living adjacent to national parks are 
required to set aside a piece of land or keep the land for conservation purpose, if they are to 
participate in wildlife conservation. The land usually lies between the community and the game 
park, but within the vicinity of the game park. This land traditionally belonged to the 
communities in question but, with the establishment of the game park in 1975, communities lost 
part of their land to the state. Households are not allowed to harvest wildlife directly from their 
conservation area, but they can do so as a community through trophy hunting and tourism 
activities done by the Safari operators, in which case the community receives some income.  
 
Table 2.3 below shows that households from the study site harvested and used an enormous 
range of environmental resources, which in turn provided a wide range of economic 
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characteristics. For example, wood can be used as firewood, fencing material, furniture or for 
construction purposes. Cavendish (2000) categorised these resources as consumption goods, 
input goods, output goods and durables or stocks, according to their economic functions. The 
resources can also be categorised as food and non-food items. As stated earlier, these resources 
come from a wide range of different ecological niches and are either owned communally or 
individually, depending on whether the resources are found on communal land or on an 
individual plot, such as in resettlement schemes. It is therefore common for access or use rules to 
exist for common pool resources, such as wildlife, in order to guide their utilization over time. If 
such institutions are not in place, then the resource system is subject to an open access regime.   
 
Table 2.3: Classification of Environmental Resources by Economic Function 
Consumption goods Inputs Output goods Durables & stocks 
Wild vegetables Firewood-brick making Wild vegetable sales Furniture 
Mushroom  Firewood-beer brewing Mushroom sales Timber 
Wild fruits Leaf litter Wild fruit sales Firewood store 
Bush meat (large animals) Thatching grass Bush meat sales  
Small animals Livestock fodder Wine sales  
Fish Termitaria* Firewood sales  
Wild medicines River sand Insect sales  
Insects Watering points Construction wood sales  
Wine Pastures Thatching grass sales  
Firewood (cooking & 
heating) 
 Carpentry/furniture 
sales 
 
Agricultural implements  Woven goods sales  
Household utensils  Pottery sales  
Woven goods - Baskets  Gold sales  
Pottery  Broom grass  
  Carving  
  Bricks  
Source: Adapted from Cavendish (1999) 
* A nest built by a colony of termites underground or above ground (usually as a mound). Poor rural households 
in Southern Africa use the soil from this nest to improve the soil nutrients in their fields. 
 
 
Considering major food items and non-food items consumed by local communities around the 
Gonarezhou National Park, the results show that richer households consume more environmental 
resources (both food and non-food items) in total than poorer households (see Table 2.4 below). 
This is consistent with the results of Cavendish (1999; 2000), Shackleton and Shackleton (2006), 
and Thondhlana and Muchapondwa (2014). In line with the study of Twine et al. (2003), richer 
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households consume more of valuable resources such bush meat, fish, timber, firewood and 
livestock fodder, while poorer households consume more of less valuable resources such as wild 
vegetables, wild fruits, insects and thatch grass. As one of the main motivations of this chapter, 
the results reveal that relatively wealthier households consume more wildlife products in the 
aggregate than do relatively poor households. Table A1 in the appendix shows the gender 
composition of the data, i.e., how gender influences resource extraction. The results illustrate that 
male headed households consume more valuable resources in aggregate such as wildlife products 
and other major non-food items than female headed households, while female headed households 
consume more of less valuable resources such as wild foods and thatch grass. 
 
Table 2.4: Quantity consumed by income quintile (kgs) 
Variables Income quintiles Total  
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
 
Quantity of major wild foods items consumed 
vegetables 9.14 7.843 7.455 6.306 4.537 7.056 
mushroom 0.485 0.56 0.179 0.761 0.946 0.586 
insects 11.75 10.6 8.881 7.34 7.981 9.310 
fruits 2.787 2.582 1.928 1.067 0.791 1.831 
honey 0.326 0.328 0.459 0.994 1.545 0.730 
Sub-total 24.49 21.91 18.90 16.46 15.80 19.51 
       
Wildlife products only 
bush meat 3.397 6.269 8.075 10.537 15.104 8.676 
small animals 4.787 4.299 4.903 3.903 3.881 4.355 
fish 1.809 4.515 5.254 8.313 10.851 6.148 
birds 1.934 1.687 1.858 1.082 0.724 1.457 
Sub-total 11.93 16.77 20.09 23.84 30.56 20.64 
Quantity of major non-food items consumed 
timber 19.55 19.85 24.94 26.25 46.04 27.33 
firewood 664.2 679.9 688.3 754.9 825.9 722.64 
thatch grass 61.49 59.49 52.84 44.1 39.78 51.54 
basket 1.897 2.045 2.612 3.343 3.851 2.750 
livestock fodder 3.235 9.552 9.848 12.16 20.3 11.02 
Sub-total 750.374 770.840 778.514 840.756 935.873 815.271 
Total consumed 
Total 786.794 809.522 817.535 881.062 982.235 855.437 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
The analysis in the table above may not be robust since per capita household income is a flow 
variable which is based on cross-sectional data to classify households and understand their 
natural resource consumption pattern. Household income may change over time due to shocks 
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such as loss of employment or remittances. Thus we need to check for robustness of our results 
using a stock variable that is constant over time such as livestock or farmland since farmers need 
more time to change the stock of land or livestock. Table A2 in the appendix uses farmland to 
check for robustness of our results.    
 
The results in Table 2.5 show that 53.1% of the households purchased environmental resources 
during the 2012/2013 agricultural season, while 59.7% sold environmental resources. Consistent 
with the study of Shackleton and Shackleton (2006), wealthier households purchased more 
environmental resources than did poorer households, while poorer households sold more 
environmental resources. Please note Table 2.5 is showing the number of households involved in 
selling environmental resources, but it does not say anything about the actual values. Table A.3 
shows that the most sold environmental resources are food items, which are less valuable and 
less bulky in nature compared to non-food items. Poorer households harvest and sell more food 
items than richer households. On the other hand, wealthier households retain most of the 
valuable resources they extract from the environment such as timber, firewood and livestock 
fodder. Consequently, wealthier households extract and consume more environmental resources 
in aggregate and in value.   
Table 2.5: Percent household purchased or sold environmental resources by income quintile 
Quintile % Household purchased or sold environmental resources 
Purchased Sold  
1st quintile 0.429 0.762 
2nd quintile 0.507 0.657 
3rd quintile 0.463 0.616 
4th quintile 0.582 0.582 
5th quintile 0.672 0.367 
Total 0.531 0.597 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
2.4.3 Contribution of environmental income (including wildlife) to total household income 
The household income accounts in Table 2.6 show that wage income, farm income and 
environmental income are the three most important sources of household income for 
communities around the Gonarezhou National Park. Although agricultural income (35.4%) 
dominates all the sources of income, the contribution of environmental income (28.7%) is also 
quite substantial. The environmental income is made up of environmental-based labour 
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income19, wildlife income and other environmental resources, each contributing 7.8%, 6.2% and 
14.7% respectively, to total household income.  
 
Table 2.6: Household income accounts per adjusted adult equivalent unit per annum 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Income share 
     
Full time employment 336 60.20 198.4 9.5 
Casual labour 336 34.48 43.45 5.4 
Self -employment  336 44.65 101.9 7.0 
Total wage income 336 139.3 228.8 21.9 
Crop sales 336 108.9 120.6 17.2 
Livestock sales 336 100.3 135.4 15.8 
Animal product sales 336 15.26 19.33 2.4 
Manure sales 336 0.0818 1.046 0.01 
Total farm income 336 224.5 216.0 35.4 
Income from land rented out 336 0.470 2.460 0.07 
Income from draught power hired out 336 41.20 41.66 6.5 
Capital income 336 41.67 42.02 6.6 
State transfers 336 3.237 16.47 0.5 
Community projects 336 2.755 14.02 0.4 
Food relief 336 6.929 6.902 1.1 
Net gifts 336 1.978 7.867 0.3 
Total transfers 336 14.90 30.18 2.3 
Remittances 336 32.59 44.32 5.1 
Environmental based labour income 336 49.33 83.25 7.8 
Wildlife income  336 39.19 46.29 6.2 
Environmental income (without wildlife) 336 93.19 91.47 14.7 
Environmental income  336 181.7 174.8 28.7 
Total household income 336 634.7 381.6 100.0 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
To examine the contribution of environmental income to total household income, the chapter 
used income quintile analysis. Three definitions of income are used to accomplish this objective: 
standard household income, total household income without wildlife (including standard 
household income and non-wildlife income), and total household income (including standard 
household income, non-wildlife income and wildlife income). Standard household income is 
used as the baseline in this analysis. Wildlife income is made up of income (including the actual 
                                                                 
19 Environmental-based labour income includes labour income derived from harvesting and processing 
environmental resources such as digging termitaria, thatching, brick moulding, etc. 
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consumption of game meat) from hunting and tourism activities done legally by the community 
through engaging Safari operators and illegal hunting activities (game meat consumed by the 
household out of its own production and income realized from selling game meat). 
 
In the aggregate, non-wildlife environmental resources contributed about 31.5% to total 
household income, while the total contribution of environmental resources including wildlife is 
40.1% implying a net effect of 6.6% from wildlife alone. Disaggregating the three measures of 
income by income quintiles, the results show that adding both non-wildlife and wildlife income 
to standard income increases total household income across income quintiles (see Table 2.7 
below). The increase in total household income resulting from the inclusion of non-wildlife and 
wildlife resources is much higher for households in lower income quintiles than it is for 
households in higher quintiles. This standard result confirms the findings of Cavendish (2000), 
Shackleton and Shackleton (2006) and Thondhlana and Muchapondwa (2014) that poor 
households derive greater relative benefits than richer households from utilizing environmental 
resources. The contribution is to show that, in particular, poorer households derive greater 
benefit from the consumption of wildlife resources than wealthier households. 
 Table 2.7: Income measures by quintile  
Quintile  Standard 
household income  
Total household income 
without wildlife  
Total household 
income 
Effect of 
wildlife  
Mean % change Mean % change % change 
1st quintile 204.6 279.9 36.9 300.1 45.7 7.2 
2nd quintile 301.1 405.6 34.7 432.6 45.0 6.6 
3rd quintile 367.8 502.4 34.6 542.8 43.6 6.5 
4th quintile 527.2 668.3 29.8 710.1 35.7 6.2 
5th quintile 867.9 1126.0 26.7 1194.0 32.6 6.0 
Total 453.0 595.5 31.5 634.7 40.1 6.6 
Source: survey results 2013 
2.4.4 Environmental income and poverty 
Table 2.8 below presents the results of the FGT poverty statistics. Three measures of poverty are 
used: the headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and the poverty severity measure. Overall, the results 
illustrate that the proportion of people in the full sample living below the poverty line is greatly 
reduced when we account for non-wildlife income initially and wildlife income later (i.e., from 
about 47.6% to 24.7% and then to 22.1%). The inclusion of non-wildlife resources accounts for 
approximately 48.1% reduction in poverty, while the inclusion of wildlife resources accounts for 
53.6% reduction in poverty (refer to Table A.4 in appendix A). The net effect of wildlife income 
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alone is about a 5.5% reduction in the proportion of people living below the poverty line. 
Comparing the results of the headcount ratio with the poverty gap and poverty severity indices, 
the reduction is massive. Poverty depth in the full sample is reduced from 16.6% to 5.5% with 
non-wildlife income and then 4.3% with wildlife income.  
 
Table 2.8: Comparison of FGT indices assuming a poverty line of US$360.00 per capita 
Units of analysis  Mean income Headcount ratio (%) Poverty gap Poverty severity 
Standard household income 
All households 
(N=336) 
452.97 47.6 16.6 7.4 
1st quintile 204.62 100.0 42.5 20.1 
2nd quintile 301.06 100.0 17.1 6.2 
3rd quintile 367.75 25.9 9.2 4.2 
4th quintile 527.22 0 0 0 
5th quintile 867.93 0 0 0 
     
Total household income without wildlife resources 
All households 
(N=336) 
595.50 24.7 5.5 1.7 
1st quintile 279.95 100.0 22.7 6.9 
2nd quintile 405.59 9.6 0.5 0 
3rd quintile 502.44 0 0 0 
4th quintile 668.29 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1125.96 0 0 0 
     
Total household income with wildlife resources 
All households 
(N=336) 
634.69 22.1 4.3 1.2 
1st quintile 300.12 100.0 17.9 4.8 
2nd quintile 432.59 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 542.76 0 0 0 
4th quintile 710.13 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1194.00 0 0 0 
Source: survey results 2013 
Analysis by income quintiles when the poverty line is US$360.00 revealed that only the first 
income quintile had 100% poverty counts with or without environmental income and with or 
without wildlife. The second quintile reduces from 100% poverty counts with standard 
household income to 9.6% poverty counts with non-wildlife income. With the inclusion of 
wildlife income, it further reduces to zero. The third quintile reduces from 25.9% with standard 
income to zero with or without wildlife income. No poverty is recorded for the fourth and fifth 
quintiles for all the three scenarios, suggesting that wealth in the area might be tied to 
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environmental income. Using a different poverty line (e.g., the average line of the poorest 15 
countries computed by the World Bank), there are still dramatic differences in measured poverty 
between standard income and total household income with and without wildlife. Table A.5 in 
appendix A shows that, when the poverty line is changed to US$450.00, the first two quintiles 
had 100% poverty counts throughout the scenarios. The third quintile reduces from 100% 
poverty counts in the baseline to 87.2% with non-wildlife, while the inclusion of wildlife reduces 
the headcounts to zero. The results are robust to different poverty measures and poverty lines. 
 
Table A.6 in the appendix shows the results of policy experiments by considering, for example, a 
5%, 10% and 15% increase in wildlife income from the base case on poverty measurements. The 
results show that increasing wildlife income reduces the headcounts to zero for households in the 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th income quintiles under all policy scenarios while the headcount ratios for 
households in the 1st income quintile reduced from 100% to 85.6%, 61.4% and 39.5% with a 5%, 
10% and 15% increase in wildlife income respectively. This is a significant improvement from 
the original results, where 100% of the households in the first quintile remained poor with and 
without wildlife income. Considering the full sample, increasing wildlife income by 5%, 10% 
and 15% reduces the headcounts from 47.6% to about 8.8%, 2.1% and 0.7% respectively. This 
result helps to highlight the importance of wildlife resources for redistributive policy targeting.     
2.4.5 Environmental income and inequality 
This section discusses the sample estimates of measured inequality for Rao’s (1969) approach, 
the Shapley (1953) decomposition and FGT decomposition approaches. It is intuitive to start by 
comparing inequality in the sample data against measured inequality in other studies. Comparing 
the Gini indices computed from the survey data with studies done in other countries, the results 
show similarities in terms of measured inequality to the figures reported by Cavendish (1999) for 
Zimbabwe and Morocco, but differ significantly from South Africa, Lesotho, Guinea and 
Zambia (see Table 2.9 below). 
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Table 2.9: Gini indices from other studies  
Country/study Indices % reduction 
in inequality Standard income Total household income 
Zimbabwe (Cavendish, 1999) 0.36 0.30 18.6 
Morocco 0.33 - - 
Guinea 0.47 - - 
Lesotho 0.56 - - 
South Africa 0.58 - - 
Zambia 0.46 - - 
 
Table 2.10 shows a significant reduction in measured inequality when environmental income is 
considered both with wildlife income (16.1%) and without wildlife income (11.3%). Thus, 
environmental income (with and without wildlife) appears to have a strong and significant 
equalizing effect on income. Surprisingly, wildlife income on its own also has an equalizing 
effect, bringing about a 5.4% reduction in measured inequality. As a result, policies that seek to 
increase access to wildlife income by poor rural communities through ICDP might help reduce 
income inequality in rural areas. These results are also supported in Figure A1 in appendix A.  
 
Table 2.10: Gini indices for standard income and total income with & without wildlife 
Standard income Total income (without wildlife) Total household income 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
0.333176 0.016490 0.295609 0.015028 0.279633 0.013661 
 
Effect of including non-wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total income (without wildlife) % reduction 
0.333176  0.295609  11.28 
 
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income % reduction 
0.333176  0.279633  16.07 
 
Contribution of wildlife resources  
Total income (without wildlife) Total household income % reduction 
0.295609  0.279633  5.4 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Table A.8 in the appendix shows the results of policy experiments by considering a 5%, 10% and 
15% increase in wildlife income from the base case on measured inequality. The results show a 
massive reduction in inequality as we move from standard household income to total household 
income of the magnitude of 21.3%, 25.4% and 32.6% for the respective policy scenarios 
compared to 11.3% in the original results when wildlife was factored in. The effect of wildlife 
income alone increased from 5.4% for the original case with wildlife income included to 11.3%, 
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15.9% and 24.7% when wildlife income increase by 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. Again, this 
result also supports the importance of wildlife resources for redistributive policy targeting. The 
results show that measured inequality is not as responsive as poverty to policy induced 
increments in wildlife income. Thus policies that aim to reduce poverty in rural areas should 
consider increasing access to wildlife income. 
 
Disaggregating the Gini indices for our three measures of income by income quintiles, we 
observe a tremendous reduction in inequality when we consider environmental income with and 
without wildlife, particularly for poorer households (refer to Table 2.11 below). The reduction in 
measured inequality when we consider total household income (accounting for wildlife 
resources) is approximately 73.0%, 61.6%, 51.2%, 33.4% and 27.1% for households in the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintile, against a reduction in inequality of 62.1%, 56.3%, 44.9%, 
27.4% and 21.8% respectively with non-wildlife resources included. Wildlife alone accounts for 
about 28.9%, 12.6%, 11.3%, 8.2% and 6.8% reduction in measured inequality. These findings 
seem to suggest that environmental income and, in particular, wildlife income has a stronger 
equalizing effect for relatively poor households than for wealthier households. This might be true 
because the ratio of environmental income to total household income is very high for relatively 
poor households compared to richer households, implying that there is heavy dependence on 
environmental resources by the former households. Moreover, poorer households do not have 
many alternative sources of income compared to their wealthier counterparts.  
Table 2.11: Comparison of the Gini indices by income quintile 
Group Standard 
income 
Total income 
(without wildlife) 
Total household 
income 
 Effect of 
wildlife 
Index  Index % 
reduction 
Index % 
reduction 
 % 
reduction 
1st quintile 0.156  0.059 62.1 0.042 73.0  28.9 
2nd quintile 0.137  0.060 56.3 0.053 61.6  12.6 
3rd quintile 0.144  0.079 44.9 0.070 51.2  11.3 
4th quintile 0.132  0.096 27.4 0.088 33.4  8.2 
5th quintile 0.275  0.176 21.8 0.164 27.1  6.8 
Population 0.333  0.296 11.1 0.280 15.9  5.4 
Source: survey results 2013 
2.4.6 Contribution of individual income sources to total household income 
Six income sources were considered: employment, agricultural income, capital, transfers, 
remittances and environmental income. As noted earlier, three different approaches were 
42 
 
employed to check for robustness of our results, i.e., Rao’s (1969) method, Shapely’s (1953) 
approach and FGT decomposition. Overall, the results in Table 2.12 below show that agriculture 
is not only the biggest contributor to total household income, but it is also the most important 
source of rural inequality. This finding diverges from the study of Leibbrandt et al. (2000) done 
in rural South Africa, which established that wage income is both the most important income 
component and also the most important source of inequality. This might be true because 
employment opportunities are scarcer in rural Zimbabwe than in South Africa, and because most 
households depend more heavily on agriculture (crop cultivation and livestock rearing) than on 
any other livelihood activities. Although employment is the second most important source of 
inequality in this study, the relative contribution of environmental income to total household 
income surpasses that of wage income.  
Table 2.12: Decomposition of the Gini Index by Income Sources - Rao's 1969 Approach 
Sources  With wildlife Without wildlife 
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employment 0.194 0.286 0.0554 0.145312 0.2581 0.328 0.0632 0.213219 
(0.0169) (0.0625) (0.0159) (0.0249) (0.0162) (0.0580) (0.0155) (0.0449) 
agriculture 0.401 0.385 0.155 0.552284 0.4093 0.415 0.166 0.579487 
(0.0153) (0.0251) (0.0131) (0.0429) (0.0146) (0.0235) (0.0124) (0.0409) 
capital 0.0732 0.232 0.0170 0.062878 0.0728 0.263 0.0192 0.06460 
(0.0034) (0.0255) (0.0019) (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0255) (0.0019) (0.0077) 
transfers 0.0194 0.00289 0.0000056 0.000208 0.0193 0.0450 0.00087 0.002935 
(0.0020) (0.0892) (0.0017) (0.0064) (0.0020) (0.0920) (0.0017) (0.0059) 
remittances 0.0580 0.0675 0.00392 0.014503 0.0577 0.0152 0.00088 0.002965 
(0.0044) (0.0404) (0.0024) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0439) (0.0025) (0.0086) 
environmental 0.204 0.0392 0.254 0.205232 0.1827 0.194 0.0500 0.168589 
(0.0242) (0.0068) (0.0111) (0.0520) (0.0068) (0.0184) (0.0047) (0.0125) 
Total 1.000 --- 0.270 1.000000 1.0000 --- 0.296 1.000000 
(0.0000) --- (0.0191) (0.0000) (0.0000) --- (0.0193) (0.0000) 
Source: survey results 2013 
NB: Standard errors are shown in brackets  
 
If we compare the two scenarios, with and without wildlife resources, we find that agriculture 
remains both the most important income component and also the most important source of rural 
inequality, though wage income quickly catches up as another important source of inequality if 
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wildlife is excluded from the analysis. The without-wildlife scenario severely compromises the 
relative contribution of environmental income, which is now completely overshadowed by 
employment or wage income. The results cast doubt on the credibility of capital income, 
transfers and remittances as important sources of income in the study area. Furthermore, the 
relative contribution of these income sources is not affected by the inclusion or removal of 
wildlife resources. The same conclusion is quickly arrived at if we consider the results of the 
Shapely decomposition technique in Table A10 in the appendices. 
 
The use of the FGT decomposition approach brings a different view to the analysis by making 
use of the idea of the relative poverty line, which is missing in the Rao decomposition approach. 
Table 2.13 presents the FTG decomposition results based on the relative poverty line with and 
without wildlife resources. The first column shows the income share of each income source. The 
results confirm that employment, agriculture and environmental income are the most important 
sources of income in the study area. Considering the headcount ratio and accounting for wildlife 
income, the results show striking similarities between the relative contribution of environmental 
income and agricultural income to total household income when the poverty line is pegged at 
US$360.00 per capita. However, the poverty gap and poverty severity measures indicate that the 
relative contribution of environmental income clearly surpasses that of agricultural income and 
employment. If we change the poverty line from US$360.00 to US$450.00 while holding other 
things constant, the relative contribution of agricultural income dominates that of environmental 
income only for the headcount ratio.  The results, however, remain the same under the other two 
measures of poverty.  
 
With the removal of wildlife, the relative contribution of agricultural income completely 
overshadows that of environmental income for all three measures of poverty. At the same time, 
the relative contribution of farm income increases tremendously, while that of environmental 
income worsens to lower levels. The contribution of wage income is also increased, but only 
slightly when compared to farm income, implying that, in the absence of wildlife income, 
employment also becomes an important contributor to total household income. These results 
seem to suggest that the exclusion of wildlife severely compromises the relative contribution of 
environmental resources to the livelihoods of poor rural communities living adjacent to the 
national park in the study area. The fact that the relative contribution of farm income completely 
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dominates that of environmental income as we move from a lower to a higher poverty line 
suggests that the relative contribution of environmental income to total household income might 
be more pronounced in poor households, while the relative contribution of agricultural income is 
noticeable in wealthy households. 
 
Table 2.13: Decomposition of the FGT index by income components 
Income Source Income share Relative contribution 
With wildlife Without wildlife  
Poverty line 
(360.00) 
Poverty line 
 (450.00) 
Poverty line 
(360.00) 
Poverty line 
 (450.00) 
 
Headcount (α=0)      
employment 0.194 0.178931 0.193688 0.192810 0.197343 
agricultural income 0.401 0.330893 0.401268 0.354966 0.383689 
capital income 0.073 0.072899 0.073194 0.085627 0.068350 
transfers 0.019 0.018698 0.019432 0.019648 0.019594 
remittances 0.058 0.069015 0.058009 0.075116 0.068026 
environmental income 0.254 0.339564 0.254409 0.271834 0.262998 
 
Poverty gap (α=1)      
employment 0.194 0.174060 0.175109 0.181909 0.184369 
agricultural income 0.401 0.266978 0.281742 0.278442 0.296615 
capital income 0.073 0.132913 0.118989 0.140351 0.127007 
transfers 0.019 0.035194 0.031898 0.036525 0.033463 
remittances 0.058 0.098059 0.091576 0.101748 0.095726 
environmental income 0.254 0.292795 0.300686 0.261024 0.262819 
 
Poverty severity (α=2)      
employment 0.194 0.170979 0.172269 0.176046 0.178615 
agricultural income 0.401 0.247143 0.257112 0.253930 0.266195 
capital income 0.073 0.150435 0.141412 0.154699 0.146971 
transfers 0.019 0.046950 0.042072 0.048110 0.043337 
remittances 0.058 0.110622 0.104853 0.11311 0.107878 
environmental income 0.254 0.273870 0.282281 0.254104 0.257004 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
2.4.7 Econometric modelling of relative poverty and environmental income 
To examine the nature of the relationship between poverty (measured in relative terms) and 
environmental income, we used regression analysis. Firstly, the ordered logit model is used to 
establish whether environmental income has a differential impact on households in different 
income quintiles. To derive the dependent variable, sampled households were grouped into five 
categories of income: low income, lower middle income, middle income, upper middle income, 
45 
 
and higher income20.  We can also think of these income categories in terms of relative poverty, 
that is, households in the first quintiles are relatively poorer than households in the second, third, 
fourth and fifth income quintiles, while households in the second quintile are relatively less poor 
than households in the first quintile but relatively poorer than those in upper quintiles, and so on.  
 
Secondly, the study use both the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique and instrumental 
variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments to model the determinants of 
environmental income generated by these poor households. We suspect that an endogeneity 
problem exists between environmental income and household wealth. The test for endogeneity 
revealed that the instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments 
could be better than the OLS results. However, for purposes of comparison, we present the 
results of both models, but do not interpret the OLS results. The VIF tests for the two models 
whose results are interpreted and discussed below rule out the possibility of multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables (see Table A.11 in the appendices). Table A.13 and Table A.14 
in Appendix A show the full results with community level dummies to control for resource 
heterogeneity and other spatial differences that influence incomes. 
 
The Brant test was used to test for the parallel regression assumption. We expect that the results 
of the Brant test to be non-significant as a rule of thumb suggest a significant test statistic 
provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated. The results in Table 
A.12 of the Brant test indicate that we have not violated the proportional odds assumption under 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the coefficients of the models.  If we had, we 
would want to run our model as a generalized ordered logistic or probit model. We calculated the 
marginal effects for each category and the results are reported in Appendix A. Standard tests for 
under-identification, weak identification, over-identification and heteroskedasticity show that it 
is safe to proceed with the instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based 
                                                                 
20 In calculating the dependent variable, we excluded environmental income from total household income so that it 
does not appear on the RHS. We then used partial household income (i.e., total household  income without 
environmental income) to group these households into relative poverty categories. We think that environmental 
income is more related to full income and not necessary to the standard income. Endogeneity is quite clear when we 
have environmental income versus full income. However, we can’t completely rule out the possibility of 
endogeneity between environmental income and income categories and to deal with this problem we need good 
external instruments or away of generating internal instruments. Unfortunately, we do not have good external 
instruments. Given that we are running a logit model, it is not possible to generate internal instruments. Accordingly, 
we acknowledge that there might be some bias in these results and hence we exercise caution in their interpretation.   
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instruments in both models. Because we are considering 30 communities (which imply about 30 
observation), there is a worry that we might be dealing with too few observations. One way to 
deal with that is bootstrapping. We applied the bootstrapping procedure to check for robustness 
of the standard errors and found that the results are consistent (see Table A.16 and Table A.17). 
 
Table 2.15 below presents the results of the ordered logistic model of the relationship between 
poverty (measured in relative terms) and environmental income, plus other household 
characteristics. The model is highly significant (at the 1% level) and tells us that the amount of 
environmental income generated by households, educational level of the household head, 
whether or not the household head is employed, household size, religion of the household head 
and tenure have an effect on households in the different income quintiles or relative poverty. 
There is no evidence of the effects on the dependent variable of the age of the household head 
and whether or not he or she was born in the area on the dependent variable. 
 
As anticipated, the coefficient of environmental income is positive and highly significant. The 
results suggest that the likelihood of households moving from lower income quintiles to higher 
quintiles increases with an increase in environmental income generated by households. In other 
words, the chance of belonging to a wealthier category of income increases with an increase in 
environmental income. Considering Table A.15 in the appendices, the marginal effect of 
environmental income is very small, suggesting that only households that are positioned on the 
boundary might be able to move to the next income quintile because of the increase in 
environmental income, while its impact may be less pronounced for households that are located 
farther away from the boundary. Although environmental income might not be able to push 
households farther away from the boundary into the next income class, we argue that such 
households are better off in that they are less poor with environmental income than without it.   
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Table 2.15: Ordered logit regression model 
 
 
 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
The coefficients of education, employment status and religion are also positive and significant, 
while household size and tenure have negative and significant coefficients. These results suggest 
that the likelihood of belonging to a wealthier category of income increases with educational 
attainment and employment. This might be true if wage income is substantial enough to 
positively impact on total household income. An educated household head finds it easier to 
secure employment than their uneducated counterparts. Being a Christian increases the 
likelihood of belonging to a wealthier class. The likelihood of belonging to a wealthier category 
of income diminishes with household size. This might be true because a larger household implies 
many mouths to feed. This is a problem especially when the majority of the household members 
are unemployed. The likelihood of belonging to a wealthier category also diminishes as we move 
from resettlement schemes to communal areas. Evidence gathered through qualitative interviews 
established that households in the former tenure regime are relatively richer than are households 
in the latter. 
 
The results of the determinants of environmental income generated by households living adjacent 
to the Gonarezhou National Park are presented in Table 2.16. The instrumental variables 
estimation model explains about 77.4% of the variation in our dependent variable. The 
endogeneity test suggests that instrumental variables estimation yields better results than OLS. 
Ordered logit estimates Number of obs = 336  
 LR chi2(8) = 99.41  
 Prob>chi2 = 0.000  
Log likelihood = -491.2 Pseudo R2 = 0.0922  
   
Quintile Coef. Std. Err. 
environmental income 0.00217 0.0026*** 
age of household head 0.00729 0.0328 
education of household head 0.582 0.2652*** 
household head employed [0, 1] 0.466 0.1474* 
household size -0.324 0.0253*** 
household head born in area [0, 1] -0.143 0.0636 
religion of household head [0, 1] 0.0580 0.2203** 
gender [0,1] 0.0042 0.0436 
Tenure [0, 1] -0.695 0.4577** 
 cut1 -2.236 0.8283 
 cut2 -0.878 0.7505 
 cut3 0.0567 0.8564 
 cut4 1.485 0.8402 
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Both the Kleibergen-Paap LM test for underidentification and the Hansen J statistic for 
overidentification show that it is safe to proceed with instrumental variables estimation. 
Moreover, the number of explanatory variables that are significant increases, and the value of R-
squared and the significance level also improve. All variables were significant except for 
whether or not the household head lives on the farm and whether or not the household head was 
born in the area.  
 
As expected, household wealth significantly and positively affects environmental income 
generated by households. The relationship between environmental income and wealth has some 
interesting policy implications given that wealthier households accumulate more assets that can 
be used to harvest more environmental resources. This implies that wildlife-based land reform 
also needs to empower poor households in the area of capital accumulation while imposing 
restraints on well-off households’ use of capital investments to harvest resources. We also expect 
the age of the household head and household size to have a positive relationship with 
environmental income. Thus, as the household head grows older, household size increases and 
the amount of environmental income generated by the household also increases because the 
number of people required to harvest environmental resources has increased. Interestingly 
enough, the results show a negative relationship between the educational attainment of the 
household head and environmental income. As the number of years in school increases, 
dependence on environmental income diminishes because the head of the household has more 
opportunities at his or her disposal due to this educational attainment. Employment reduces 
environmental income generated by the household ceteris paribus.  
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Table 2.16: Determinants of environmental income generation 
Environmental income 
Ordinary Least Squares IV Estimation 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
wealth index 8.649*** 3.472 7.26*** 3.813 
age of household head 3.265** 7.516 3.678*** 7.354 
education of the household head -62.82** 87.84 -73.70** 77.58 
household head employed [0, 1] -287.4** 165.0 -256.2*** 179.0 
household head live on the farm [0, 1] 7.053 52.56 4.435 44.02 
household head  born in this area [0, 1] 89.0 43.02 20.18 51.76 
household head is a Christian [0, 1] -117.3* 60.35 -125.2** 72.34 
household size 54.34** 20.57 47.63*** 33.21 
distance to the market 4.381** 2.139 5.565** 3.411 
number of dogs 31.36 49.18 53.07* 48.42 
biodiversity 125.6* 77.57 87.3** 98.73 
tenure [0, 1] -531.7*** 225.4 -535.3*** 242.6 
constant 346.1 541.6 324.0 653.5 
Observations 336 336 
R-squared 0.655 0.774 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): Chi-square 
P-value 
27.827 
0.0065 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):   F-statistic 9.1053 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Chi-square 
P-value 
9.2462 
0.6170 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Again, being a Christian reduces dependence on environmental resources. Blakemore (1975) 
established that Christian households in Ghana have better education and hence better 
employment opportunities than non-Christian households. The author further posits that 
allegiance to Christianity significantly reflects a shift toward the acceptance of formal education, 
suggesting that Christian households represent ‘family environments’ generally oriented towards 
success norms and educational achievement. As discussed above, better education and more 
employment opportunities will in turn lead to less dependence on the natural capital base. In 
addition, by virtue of belonging to an organised group, there is more social cohesion among 
group members. Also, when children leave the villages to find greener pastures elsewhere, they 
keep ties with their relatives and send back money in times of need.  
 
The results show that, as the distance to the market increases, environmental income generated 
by households also increases. This might be the case because rural households face fewer 
opportunities as we move farther away from the urban areas. If there are fewer opportunities for 
households, especially employment opportunities, then the natural capital base becomes the most 
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important source of livelihoods. Environmental income also increases as the number of dogs 
owned by household increases. Dogs are very important and form an integral part of the 
livelihoods of poor rural households in the study area because of their role in the provision of 
security at home (sometimes including protecting field crops) and hunting activities.  
 
The results reveal some evidence of the relationship between benefits and the quality of the 
resource system. As anticipated, environmental income increases as biodiversity increases21. 
This means that households generate more environmental income in areas with good biodiversity 
than in areas where there is an unhealthy population of wild animals (too few). Finally, the 
results also show that households in communal areas collect fewer environmental resources than 
do households in resettlement schemes. This might be true because households in resettlement 
schemes are relatively wealthier compared to those in communal areas. As a result, they possess 
better technology and more assets (e.g., carts, draught power and guns) that are useful in 
harvesting environmental resources. The policy implication of this result is that wildlife-based 
land reform also needs to empower poor households in communal areas while imposing restraint 
on harvesting well-off households in resettlement schemes. 
 
2.5. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Awareness of the importance and value of environmental resources in the livelihoods of poor 
rural households in developing countries has increased tremendously. As a result, there has been 
a growing body of literature attempting to quantify the value of environmental resources and 
their impact on poverty and inequality in the rural economies of Southern Africa. In particular, 
wildlife has become popular with policymakers and development practitioners as a vehicle for 
rural development. However, unequal utilisation of wildlife has resulted in different 
contributions to livelihoods. Therefore, the main objective of this study was to investigate the 
effects of environmental resources and, in particular, wildlife on household welfare. Specifically, 
we asked the following questions: i. Does environmental income (including wildlife) contribute 
significantly toward total household income and reduction in rural poverty and income 
inequality? ii. How does environmental income (specifically, wildlife income) compare with 
                                                                 
21 The Shannon index was used as a measure of the health of biodiversity in the study area. The index provides 
information about rarity and commonness of wildlife species in the area.  
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other sources of income? iii. What determines the different amounts of environmental income 
that households generate? 
 
To address these questions, the chapter made use of income quintile analysis, the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke poverty measure, Gini coefficient analysis, Gini decomposition analysis and 
instrumental variables estimation, using heteroskedasticity-based instruments on purposefully-
collected household data from local communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe, whose livelihoods depend on wildlife conservation. By so doing, the study 
expands the existing knowledge concerning the nexus between environmental income and 
poverty and inequality. From a policy standpoint, it has also become imperative for policymakers 
and development practitioners to understand the relative importance of wildlife income in 
driving rural poverty and inequality as they formulate strategies for operationalising wildlife-
based land reform.  
 
The households sampled in this study harvested and used an enormous range of environmental 
resources, which in turn provided a wide range of economic benefits. Considering major food 
items and non-food items consumed by local communities around the Gonarezhou National 
Park, the results show that richer households consume more environmental resources (both food 
and non-food items) in total than poorer households. Richer households consume more of 
valuable resources such bush meat, fish, timber, firewood and livestock fodder, while poorer 
households consume more of the less-valuable resources, such as wild vegetables, wild fruits, 
insects and thatch grass. As one of the main motivations of this study, the results suggest that 
relatively wealthier households consume more wildlife products in total than relatively poor 
households. However, poorer households derive proportionally greater benefit from the 
consumption of wildlife resources than wealthier households. Furthermore, wealthier households 
purchase more environmental resources than poorer households, while poorer households sold 
more environmental resources. 
 
Wage income, farm income and environmental income are the three most important sources of 
household income for the communities in question. Although agricultural income (35.4%) 
dominates all the sources of income, the contribution of environmental income (28.7%) is also 
quite substantial. The increase in total household income resulting from the inclusion of non-
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wildlife and wildlife resources is much higher for households in lower income quintiles than it is 
for households in higher quintiles. 
 
Overall, the results illustrate that the proportion of people in the full sample living below the 
poverty line is greatly reduced when we account for non-wildlife environmental resource income 
initially and wildlife income later. The inclusion of non-wildlife resources accounts for 
approximately a 48.1% reduction in poverty, while the inclusion of wildlife resources accounts 
for a 53.6% reduction in poverty. The net effect of wildlife income alone is about a 5.5% 
reduction in the proportion of people living below the poverty line. The separate consideration of 
wildlife and non-wildlife income is a key contribution of this chapter. 
 
The results show a significant reduction in measured inequality when environmental income is 
considered both with wildlife income (16.1%) and without wildlife (11.3%). Thus, 
environmental income (with and without wildlife) appears to have a strong and significant 
equalizing effect on income. In particular, wildlife income has an equalizing effect, bringing 
about a 5.4% reduction in measured inequality. Disaggregating the Gini indices for our three 
measures of income by income quintiles, we observe a tremendous reduction in inequality across 
income quintiles when we consider environmental income with and without wildlife. The 
reduction in inequality is greater for poorer households than for relatively wealthier households. 
Wildlife alone accounts for about 28.9%, 12.6%, 11.3%, 8.2% and 6.8% of the reduction in 
measured inequality. These findings seem to suggest that environmental income and, in 
particular, wildlife income has a stronger equalizing effect for relatively poor households than 
for wealthier households. As a result, policies that seek to increase access to wildlife income by 
poor rural communities through IDCP might reduce poverty and income inequality in rural areas. 
 
Agriculture is both the most important income component and also the most important source of 
rural inequality in the area studied. Considering the headcount ratio and accounting for wildlife 
income, the results show striking similarities between the relative contribution of environmental 
income and agricultural income to total household income when the poverty line is pegged at 
US$360.00 per capita. The without-wildlife scenario severely compromises the relative 
contribution of environmental income, which becomes completely overshadowed by both farm 
and wage income. At the same time, the relative contribution of farm income increases 
53 
 
tremendously in the without-wildlife scenario, while that of environmental income plunges to 
lower levels. 
 
In line with our goal of using wildlife resources to bring about community welfare, we believe 
that policy experiments of increasing wildlife income could highlight the importance of wildlife 
resource for redistributive policy targeting. So accordingly, we considered 5%, 10% and 15% 
policy induced increments in wildlife income from the baseline case. The result show that 
increases in wildlife income can greatly impact poverty, but not inequality because inequality is 
less responsive to policy induces increments in wildlife income. The results also show that we 
need an increase in wildlife income slightly greater 15% in order to complete reduce poverty in 
the whole sample to zero. However, it should be noted that the GINI decomposition method 
might not be suitable for changes as large as 10% to 15% as it is designed for marginal changes. 
 
The results of the ordered logit model suggest that the likelihood of belonging to a wealthier 
category of income increases with an increase in environmental income. The marginal effect of 
environmental income is very small, suggesting that only households that are positioned on the 
boundary will be able to move to the next income quintile because of an increase in 
environmental income, while the impact of environmental income in general and wildlife in 
particular may be less pronounced for households that are located farther away from the 
boundary. As expected, household wealth significantly and positively affects environmental 
income generated by households. Finally, the results reveal some evidence of the relationship 
between benefits and the quality of the resource system. Households generated more 
environmental income in areas with good biodiversity than in areas where there is an unhealthy 
population of wild animals. 
 
In this chapter, we conducted different kinds of analysis to examine the effects of wildlife 
resources on community welfare in the portfolio of environmental income. All the results in this 
analysis speak to each other since they address key policy issues pertaining to the effects of 
environmental income on household welfare and its role in alleviating rural poverty and income 
inequality through its contribution to livelihoods or total household income. The intended 
beneficiaries of the study are local communities, wildlife agencies, development practitioners 
and policy makers who will acquire relevant and empirically grounded evidence. Our research 
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findings will allow them to interrogate their wildlife management strategies and policies while at 
the same time identifying areas that need to be improved.  
 
The main policy message of the findings of this study to take home is that, wildlife conservation 
has an important role in mitigating poverty and income inequality in CAMPFIRE communities. 
Several other policy implications can be drawn from the analysis in this chapter. Reduced access 
to wildlife income could have substantial impact on welfare in CAMPFIRE communities and 
might potentially increase poverty and inequality in the study area. There is therefore a need to 
design policies that increase access to wildlife income by poor rural households living adjacent 
to national parks because this could have an impact on their welfare. To avoid further 
marginalization of the poor, attention to equity in resource management and access to resources 
should be a prime consideration, particularly with valuable resources such as wildlife. Increased 
devolution of wildlife management function from the Rural District Council into the hands of 
local communities could allow more access to wildlife income and potentially contribute towards 
reducing poverty and inequality. The relationship between environmental income and wealth has 
some interesting policy implications given that wealthier households accumulate more assets 
with which to harvest more environmental resources. This implies that wildlife-based land 
reform also needs to empower poor households in the area of capital accumulation while 
imposing restraint on harvesting by well-off households. 
 
In line with our goal of using wildlife resources to bring about community welfare, we believe 
that policy experiments of increasing wildlife income could highlight the importance of wildlife 
resources for redistributive policy targeting. The results illustrate that increases in wildlife 
income can greatly impact poverty, but not inequality because inequality is less responsive to 
policy induces increments in wildlife income. Thus policies which seek to reduce poverty in 
rural communities should consider increasing access to wildlife income by these communities. 
The results demonstrate that a policy induced increment in wildlife income of slightly more than 
15% is needed to reduce poverty in the whole population to zero.   
 
There is need for a policy shift away from the resource itself to encompass the broader local 
economy in order to enhance livelihoods. Quick policy interventions such as formal and informal 
employment in the craft industry are required to increase household earnings from wildlife 
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conservation in the short to medium term. In the long-run, household welfare in CAMPFIRE 
communities could benefit through policies and programs that stimulate an increase in wildlife 
earnings from activities such as non-consumptive tourism, tourism business ventures such as 
hotels or accommodation, investment in infrastructure, filming and live animal sales. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Role Institutions in Community Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe: A 
Social-Ecological Approach22 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Wildlife conservation has become popular with policymakers and development practitioners 
alike as a vehicle for rural development because of abundant tourism opportunities in Southern 
Africa. A significant proportion of wildlife is managed as a common pool resource (CPR) under 
various forms of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) arrangements 
involving both local communities and private game farms.23 Wildlife shares some characteristics 
with other CPRs, such as water, forests, rangelands and fisheries, thus making its management 
and utilization under joint-use arrangements a daunting task. For instance, conservation efforts 
are affected by global market trends, past and prevailing governance and institutional 
arrangements (Gibson & Marks, 1995). The situation is made even worse by the fugitive 
character of the resource, which makes it difficult to assign property rights to wildlife (Muir-
Leresche & Nelson, 2000). 
 
The challenges associated with the management and utilization of CPRs in most developing 
countries has resulted in a search for policy options in an effort to make social-ecological 
systems (SESs) sustainable24 over time. Following the publication of Hardin (1968), both state 
control and private ownership were embraced by colonial governments in the region as panaceas 
for all environmental problems. While both policy instruments have benefited minority groups 
and persisted even after independence, the colonial legacy created tension between wildlife 
authorities and local communities living adjacent to national parks (Songorwa, 1999). At the rate 
                                                                 
22 A version of this chapter has been desseminated as an EfD Discussion Paper No. DP 15 – 23. 
23
 Private game farms are normally organised into conservancies, which have dissolved their internal boundaries in 
order to manage wildlife as a common pool resource. Private game farms are referred to as landowner communities 
because each one usually comprises multiple private landholdings (Kreuter et al., 2010). 
24 Sustainability is defined as the ability of an ecosystem to provide goods and services today without compromising 
its ability to provide the same goods and services in the future (Brundtland et al., 1987).   
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at which wildlife is being decimated by local communities, the region could lose some of its 
prime wildlife species sooner than 2050 (Thuiller et al., 2006). This realization has led 
policymakers to shift attention to people-oriented approaches rather than the conventional top-
down governance systems.   
 
This chapter argues that the ability of a community to manage resources sustainably depends on 
the capacity of local communities to self-organise and that self-organisation depends on the 
nature of the institutions25 that are in place. Existing institutions have failed to protect wildlife 
and biodiversity, and hence there is a need for more ideas to feed into future policy or 
institutional reforms. The study was conducted in local communities around the Gonarezhou 
National Park in Zimbabwe that are participating in community wildlife conservation. The 
overall objective of this study is, therefore, to enhance our understanding of the role of local 
institutions in promoting sustainable management of CPRs and biodiversity conservation using 
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE nature conservation programme26 as a case study. Following the 
discussion above, three important questions arise. Are there any practical differences in terms of 
resource units, resource users, and quality of institutions in common pool wildlife systems within 
and across communities? Under what conditions will the users of common pool wildlife self-
organise? What attributes of resource units, resource users and local institutions are consistent 
with sound biodiversity outcomes? 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature on common pool resources by applying Ostrom’s 
framework and collecting primary data on a little-studied topic. The framework has been used 
extensively in areas such as forestry, fisheries, rangelands and water resources management, 
while little has been done in the wildlife sector, particularly in Southern Africa. From a policy 
perspective, this chapter sheds light on the processes governing human-environment systems and 
provides results comparable to other studies or ongoing projects. Furthermore, our research 
findings allow both policymakers and development practitioners to question their wildlife 
                                                                 
25 North (1991) defined institutions broadly as humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic an d 
social interactions. In this thesis, we define institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006), including community-level organisations.  
26 The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a benefit-sharing 
scheme that involves local communities that live in the vicinity of national game parks and suffer wildlife intrusions. 
The programme was instituted by the government of Zimbabwe during the mid -1980s in order to create incentives to 
conserve wildlife by directly transferring benefits from conservation to the local communities.   
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management strategies and policies while at the same time identifying areas that need to be 
improved. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a review of the theory of 
collective action and the conceptual framework. Section 3.3 gives an outline of the research 
methods, i.e., the analytical framework, empirical model specifications and data issues. We then 
proceed to present and discuss the results in Section 3.4 and end with conclusions and policy 
implications in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Review of Theory 
 
3.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
This study employs the general framework for analysing complex social-ecological systems 
(SESs) as developed by Ostrom (2007). Figure 3.1 shows eight core subsystems that have been 
observed to affect both the ability of a community to self-organise and the sustainability of a 
resource system. In empirical work, many variables have been observed to affect the patterns of 
interaction and outcomes. In an earlier study, Agrawal (2001) identified more than 30 variables 
that had been posited in major theoretical work to affect incentives, actors, and outcomes related 
to sustainable governance of a resource system. By unpacking the eight core subsystems and 
expanding on Agrawal’s work, Ostrom et al. (2007) went further to provide an even longer list of 
variables under each subsystem (see Table B.1 in appendix B). This framework helped to 
identify the variables that are relevant in studying community wildlife conservation, designing 
the research instrument and analysing findings about the sustainability of a SES. 
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Figure 3.1: The core subsystems in a framework for analysing social-ecological systems 
Source: Extracted from Ostrom (2007: 15182) 
By applying Ostrom’s framework, it is possible to analyse different environmental problems 
under different scenarios and predict the associated outcomes. Table 3.1 below shows how 
we can adapt this framework in the context of the wildlife sector in Southern Africa. For 
example, this study deals with a fugitive and finite renewable resource which is either 
harvested legally through trophy hunting activities by engaging a safari operator (in which 
case the community gets wildlife income, thereby maximizing societal welfare), or illegally 
by poachers, who maximise their individual short-term gains. Local communities are not 
allowed to hunt wildlife for their own purposes both inside and outside the national game 
park (i.e. in their own conservation area).  
 
The community does not benefit from tourism, research and wildlife photography or filming 
activities. This means that trophy hunting is their only means of generating revenue from 
conservation.  The community apply for a hunting quota from the Zimbabwe National Parks 
and Wildlife Authority, and generate income by selling the quota to safari operators who will, 
in turn, source clients at organised international events and sell the quota at a premium. The 
quota is eventually utilised by the client. The most important institutions involved in 
community wildlife conservation are the wildlife management committee, park authorities, 
Rural District Councils (RDCs, the main administrative organ and entry point into the 
community) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
 
Social, Economic and Political Setting (S) 
 
Related Ecosystems (ECO) 
Action Situation 
Interaction (I)                                   Outcomes 
(O) 
Resource Governance System (GS) 
Resource Unit (RU) Users (U) 
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Table 3.1: Second tier variables used in this paper 
Resource System Governance System 
RS1: Sector – wildlife sector GS1: Wildlife Management Committee 
RS2: Resource size – finite - Expected to continue with conservation outside park  
RS3: Renewable Resource GS2: Rural District Council  
 - enact bylaws and sometimes monitoring & enforcement 
- has the appropriation rights 
 - collect and distribute revenues  
 GS3: National Parks  
 - custodian of wildlife 
 - set hunting quotas 
 - monitoring & enforcement inside protected area 
  
Resource Units  Users 
RU1: Fugitive Resource U1: Large number of users 
- Wildlife destroy crops and livestock  U2: Conflict of Interest 
RU2: Legal harvesting by the PH  - Maximize community welfare (altruistic motive)  
- generate income to the community  - Maximize short-term gain (self-interest) 
RU3: Illegal harvesting by poachers - Nuisance motive for harvesting wildlife 
  
Interaction  Outcome 
I1: Maximum harvesting levels by poachers O1: Resource overexploitation   
I2: PH guided by quota O2: Destruction of the ecological system 
Source: adapted from Ostrom (2007) 
 
The interaction between the community and the resource system produces undesirable 
outcomes. For instance, harvesting levels by poachers exceed the maximum sustainable yield 
because they maximise personal gain. Therefore, if the communities in question do not have  
the means of controlling extraction, then the end result is resource overexploitation and, 
eventually, total collapse of the social-ecological system. The prediction of resource collapse 
usually comes true in a very large and highly valuable resource system under open-access 
conditions when users are diverse, do not communicate and have failed to develop 
institutions for managing resources (Berkes et al., 2006). 
 
3.2.2 The Collective Action Problem 
The theory of collective action27 has matured tremendously since the publication of Olson 
(1965), entitled ‘The Logic of Collective Action.’ It relates to the group or an individual’s 
lack of capacity (except under certain conditions) to solve what is referred to as the 
‘collective action problem.’ Resource economists and theorists ask questions about the 
                                                                 
27 Collective action is defined as any action taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance or 
achieve a common objective (Olson, 1965). 
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conditions under which those who face the ‘tragedy of the commons’ are able to organise a 
system of rules by which the tragedy is averted (Wade, 1987). The analytical framework in 
contemporary analysis is that of a rational, self-interested individual who maximises short-
term gain while the society maximises community welfare (Ostrom, 2003). Conflict of 
interest exists between the community’s objective function and that of an individual. Of 
particular interest to this study is the literature that focuses on creating incentives for 
collective action through designing sound CPR institutions. What causes communities to 
develop institutions is the scarcity of natural resources and the need to avoid tragedy in the 
commons.  
 
There is a great deal of literature focusing on the role of punishment and social sanctioning or 
ostracism in promoting cooperation among resource users. Much of this literature comes 
from the field of experimental economics (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Cardenas et al., 2000; 
Murphy & Cardenas, 2004; Akpalu & Martinsson, 2011). Agrawal (2001) emphasises the 
differences between a self-organised community and externally imposed collective action in 
terms of rule enforcement and sanctioning. Studies reveal that communities benefit when 
institutions are endogenised by the community, compared to the case when rules and 
regulations are externally enforced by the government (Murphy & Cardenas, 2004; Akpalu & 
Martinsson, 2011). Community-based wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe, for example, relies 
to a great extent on state authorities to monitor and enforce rules and regulations, but the 
capacity to do so is limited by the budget. Knowledge of local collective action and informal 
institutions in natural resource management provide crucial information for designing policy 
instruments or interventions aimed at simultaneously addressing both conservation and 
poverty issues. 
 
It is certainly inadequate to study collective action without recognizing the important concept 
of participatory development and good governance and the contributions made by Gandhi 
(1934), Chambers (1983) and Cernea, (1985). Chambers (1983) define participatory 
development as a process through which stakeholders can influence, share control over 
development initiatives, and make important decisions over resources that affect their 
livelihoods. The goal of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects is to engage local 
populations in development projects in such a way that development and conservation 
objectives are met, while at the same time setting in motion a process of self-reliant and 
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sustainable development28. Participatory development has taken a variety of forms, since its 
emergence in the 1970s, when it was introduced as an important part of the ‘basic needs 
approach’ to development and later formalized into various forms of Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) approaches29. Since then, broader participation and engagement of key 
stakeholders, public transparency, and institutional accountability have gained greater 
importance in participatory development. 
 
Local communities have, for a long time, been marginalized when it comes to the 
management and utilization of valuable natural resources in their jurisdiction such as wildlife. 
Blind policies that neglect the needs of local communities have exacerbated environmental 
crime or poaching and conflict in the past between local communities and the park authority 
or wildlife. Chambers (1983), argued that 'putting the last first' was the only way to halt the 
decimation of natural resources and to achieve rural development. The participatory 
development movement was important in applying people oriented approaches to 
small-scale development in ways that would allow the poor to be informed participants 
in development, with external agents acting mainly as facilitators and sources of funds. 
It is therefore imperative for policymakers to design policies and programmes that engage 
local communities in resource management, utilization and decision making at both local and 
higher levels, since they are the ones threatening the existence of wildlife in the Southern 
African region.  
 
3.3 Research Methods 
 
3.3.1 Analytical Framework 
The chapter utilises both household survey data and key informant interviews. We provide a 
detailed characterization (mapping) of local CPR institutions of 25 CAMPFIRE projects and 
                                                                 
28 Self-reliant development means building the endogenous mechanisms of society that will enable local 
communities ultimately to manage their natural resources to their own benefit. Sustainable development means 
continuing a stable growth pattern in such a way that development is in harmony with the environment. 
29 The term Participatory Rural Appraisal describes a growing body of approaches and methods to enable local 
communites to share, enhance and analyze information and knowledge of life circumstances in order to plan and 
act in an informed manner (Chambers, 1992).   
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5 communities from three resettlement schemes30. From a qualitative perspective, the 
analysis will articulate how institutions in different communities differ and why they differ 
given similar ecological conditions. This is followed by empirical model estimations to 
investigate the link between institutions and cooperation, and the relationship between 
cooperation and success of biodiversity outcomes. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Methods 
Model 1 - Participation in Community-Based Wildlife Management Programs: A variable 
measuring ability to self-organise or a signal of cooperation is used as a dependent variable in 
our first model. This could be participation of individuals in community wildlife projects or 
activities at a community level. Following McCarthy et al. (2002) and Pennings and Leuthold 
(2000), ability to self-organise (cooperation) is assumed to be a latent variable. Factor 
analysis of variables thought to be associated with cooperative capacity is employed in order 
to recover the latent variable. Indicators of cooperation are drawn from two main categories, 
namely, networks and organisational performance variables. Network indicators include the 
density of organisations and density of household participation, while organisational 
performance indicators include number of rules, regulation, activities and meetings. By 
definition, density is a measure of the size of a network (e.g., how many organizations are 
found in a particular community) while participation is a measure of the quality or strength of 
a network (e.g., membership of these organizations, how frequent people attend meetings or 
interact with each other, and whether they share information important for the organization). 
Mathematically, we write: 
 
 
where iC  is a variable measuring the level of cooperation in the community and the other 
variables in the model stand for community institutions, group size, the level of trust in the 
community, number of ethnic groups, an asset index used as a proxy for wealth, the year the 
project was established, whether punishment is endogenized by the community, the size of 
                                                                 
30 Peasant farmers around the Gonarezhou National Park are found under two different types of land tenure 
systems, namely, communal areas and resettlement schemes. The resettlement scheme is a product of the 
government of Zimbabwe’s land reform program created after independence in 1980 when the country 
embarked on a land redistribution exercise in which some of the land that belonged to large-scale commercial 
farmers was transferred to poor households from the overcrowded communal areas (Mushunje et al., 2003). 
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the resources system and number of stakeholders working with the community to conserve 
wildlife resources respectively.  
 
To measure the quality of institutions in a community, we made use of the extended version 
of Ostrom’s (2010) design principles for stable local common pool resource institutions (refer 
to Table 3.2 below). A complete enumeration of CPR institutions in each community 
provided vital information for calculating an index of the quality of institutions. We then used 
this index plus other explanatory variables to explain cooperation as described in Model 1 
above.  
Table 3.2: Design principles for CPR institutions  
Variable Description 
P1: Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external non-entitled parties) 
P2 Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to 
local conditions 
P3 Collective choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in the 
decision making process 
P4 Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators   
P5 A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules 
P6 Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and easy to access 
P7 Self-determination of the community recognised by higher-level authorities 
P8 In the case of larger common-pool resources, organisations in the form of multiple layers 
of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level 
Source: Ostrom (2010) - Analysing Collective Action 
 
Model 2 - Success of Biodiversity Outcomes: To measure the success of biodiversity 
outcomes across communities, a measure of relative abundance or diversity was used. The 
relative abundance of a species in a community is defined as the proportion of individual 
organisms in the community that belongs to that species. Let for  be the 
relative abundance of species and the number of species. We can define the Shannon 
index as:  
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The Shannon index (S) provides important information about rarity and commonness of 
species in a community. Mouillot and Lepretre (1999) and Nagendra (2002) suggest that a 
good measure of species diversity should be able to capture two important dimensions of 
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65 
 
biodiversity, namely, species richness and species evenness. Thus, the Shannon index is a 
quantitative measure that reflects how many different groups, types or species there are in a 
data set. The value of S rarely exceeds 4 in most ecological studies and increases when the 
number of types (species richness) and evenness increases. Although the index does not tell 
us anything about the endangeredness of a species, it is sufficient for the purposes of this 
analysis since it incorporates both components of biodiversity. Moreover, endangered species 
such as rhinos are not found in the communities in question.  
 
To calculate the Shannon index, we used information about commercial count of animal 
species31 done by the RDC and the respective communities. Each year, communities keep 
information by type and species about the number of wild animals traversing their 
conservation area32. The records are kept at the RDC offices and this information is then used 
by the community as justification when applying for a quota. Wild animal counting is done at 
the community level by a team of people that includes members from local communities, the 
RDC and sometimes park authorities. So, algebraically, we have the following equation 
linking biodiversity and cooperation: 
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where iS  is the Shannon index representing a measure of biodiversity in the community, 
while the other variables represent the level of cooperation in the community, benefits from 
wildlife conservation, distance to the market, distance from the fence of the national park, an 
index for social capital, whether the community has been affected by the electric fence 
separating the community from the national park, average age of the household head in the 
community, mean number of years in school for the household head, whether the head of the 
household is resident on the farm or not and number of years living in the area respectively. 
                                                                 
31 In calculating the Shannon index, we included the major commercial aninal species found in the area (both 
prey and predators) and these are: elephants, buffalos, giraffe, zebra, wilddogs, eland, kudu, antelope, impala, 
nyala, waterbuck, bushbuck, springboks, warthogs, lion, leopard, hyena, cheater, hippos, crocodile, duiker, and 
baboons.  
32 The community’s conservation area (CA) is an area set aside by the community for the purpose of 
conservation. This is a requirement by the state for the community to participate in the CAMPFIRE programme. 
In addition, local communities are tasked to continue with conservation work in order to keep their land 
bordering the National Park. Failing to comply with this requirement means that the community could risk 
losing part of their land. 
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The models presented in this chapter are based on the idea or theory which suggests that 
institutions act as a constraint on human behavior and this will in turn have an influence on 
biodiversity outcomes (Ostrom, 2007a; Ostrom, 2007b). This theory puts emphasis on the 
development of sound local institutions to govern people’s behavior so that people can 
manage their resources sustainably. In this chapter, human behaviour is measured in terms of 
cooperation or rule compliance. We can think of institutions as a treatment and cooperation 
as an outcome variable in the first model, while in the second model, cooperation becomes a 
treatment and biodiversity conservation the outcome variable so that the relationships 
between our key variables is unidirectional and the variables maintain a certain order (i.e., 
outcometybiodiversincooperationsInstitutio  ). This order is very important in this chapter 
because it supports the two models that we have developed based on the theory stated above, 
and for this reason, we will maintain this kind or reasoning throughout the chapter. However, 
we will relax the assumption that the relationship between the variables is unidirectional to 
make the model more realistic.  
 
Based on this theory, we can deduce a structural model, which explains wildlife or 
biodiversity conservation and that structural model consist of two equations where in the first 
round institutions determine cooperation and in the second round cooperation determine 
biodiversity. Thus it is appropriate to assume that institutions indirectly affect biodiversity 
based on this structural model. So from our view, it is misleading to assume that the 
institutional variable enters the biodiversity equation as it ignores the nature of things in a 
natural system such as in wildlife conservation. 
 
Table 3.3 below describe the explanatory variables that are used in the two models. The last 
column shows the expected signs of the variables. Factors that have been studied in the 
collective action literature include group size, group heterogeneity and inequality, ethnicity, 
trust, resource size and punishment (Wade, 1978; Runge; 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Baland & 
Platteau, 1996; Agrawal, 2001).  These variables were analysed in theoretical, empirical and 
experimental studies in third world counties. From an empirical and theoretical perspective, 
we expect our measure of institutions, trust and number of stakeholders in the community, in 
the first model, and our measure of cooperation, benefits from wildlife conservation, distance 
to the market, distance from the fence of the park, educational level of the head of the 
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household, number of years living in the area, whether community members received 
training, whether community members share information, in the second model, to carry a 
positive sign. We expected group size, ethnicity and punishment, in the first model, to carry a 
negative sign (e.g., Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 2007a). 
However, the expected signs of some variables could not be determined theoretically or from 
the literature review. These variables included in the model were identified in a framework to 
analyse social-ecological systems developed by Ostrom (2007a; 2007b) as important for 
collective action and sustainable management of common pool resources.  
 
 Table 3.3: Nature of variables and expected signs      
Variable Nature of variable Expected sign 
Variables for the first model 
 
Cooperation index Dependent variable measuring ability to self-organise or 
cooperation 
 
Institutions Institutional index (continuous) + 
  Clarity Clarity of institutions + 
  Fairness Fairness of institutions + 
  Enforcement Monitoring & enforcement + 
  Governance Governance & Democracy + 
Groupsize Group size (continuous) ± 
Trust Measured on a scale from 0 – 10 (continuous) + 
Ethnicity Number of ethnic groups (continuous) - 
Wealth  Wealth index (continuous) ± 
Projectyear Year project was established (continuous) + 
Punishment Punishment [0=punishment exogenous 1=endogenised] + 
Resource size Resource size in ha (continuous) ± 
Stakeholders Number of stakeholders (continuous)  undetermined 
Variables for the second model  
Biodiversity index Dependent variable measuring success of biodiversity 
outcomes 
 
Benefits Benefits from wildlife conservation (continuous) + 
Market Distance to the nearest urban centre in km (continuous) + 
Distfence Distance to the fence (continuous) undetermined 
Social capital Social capital index (continuous) ± 
Fence New electric fence undetermined 
Age Average age of household head (continuous) ± 
School Average number of years in school (continuous) ± 
Training Received training (number of training courses) + 
Yearsliving Average number of years living in the area (continuous) + 
Information Information sharing index + 
 
Cooperation is used in this study as a signal for self-organization. Social capital is a measure 
of the relationships, networks or linkages (bond and bridging linkages) between people, i.e., 
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how relatives, neighbours, colleagues and friends work together in a community. Defined this 
way, social capital can be viewed as an asset. The institutional variable is disaggregated 
further into four components: clarity, fairness, enforcement and enforcement, and governance 
and democracy. Clarity of institutions and fairness are attributes that measure how people 
perceive community institutions in terms of whether rules are clear, easy to understand and 
fair to everybody. The information index tries to measure the flow of information in the 
community and at meeting and the type of information that is conveyed and whether the 
information is relevant in managing their natural resources. Training is measured in terms of 
number of training workshops or courses received, participation and type of training, i.e., the 
relevance of the training received in natural resource management.   
 
Like cooperation, institutions and biodiversity, all other indices (i.e., trust, clarity, fairness, 
governance and democracy, monitoring and enforcement, information and social capital) 
were also recovered using factor analysis. A battery of questions related to each variable was 
asked to respondents and this information was then used to compute the index. The most 
appropriate variables for factor analysis are binary in nature since it is easy to interpretation 
the index (e.g., the yes or no type of variables). Continuous type variables (including a scale 
from 0 to 10 to indicate the presence or absence of an attribute) were also collected 
depending on the type of question being asked and level of difficulty in soliciting a response. 
The main idea is not to interpret the index, but to use the variable in a regression model. The 
institutional index was disaggregated into five different components and each component was 
measured separately. The overall institutional index was then recovered using factor analysis 
from the five components. For the specific type of questions that were asked, we refer the 
reader to the questionnaire in the appendix section. 
 
We suspect the problem of endogeneity in both models, particularly in the relationship 
between cooperation and biodiversity. This is because the theory posits that there is reverse 
causality between biodiversity outcomes and cooperation. In other words, less biodiversity 
(scarcity) translates into more cooperation in order to avoid the tragedy of the commons, and 
vice versa. As a result, some scholars argue that the incentive to self-organise does not 
always hold, especially when resources occur in abundance (Ostrom, 1990). However, this is 
not the case in Zimbabwe because wildlife resources have declined tremendously since the 
turn of the 21st century. To put this into perspective, the wildlife management policy in the 
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country speaks to the scarcity of resources. This is also the reason that the government 
institutionalised the CAMPFIRE programme in order to enhance the stock of wildlife.  
 
Ostrom (2007a; 2007b) argue that institutions come first and cooperation later, since people 
need to conform to some behavioural standards (i.e., rules, values or norms) commonly 
referred to as institutions in the common pool resources literature. In the absence of 
institutions (rules, values, and norms) it is difficult to measure cooperation since there is no 
reference point (or standards) against which we can compare people’s behaviour. So we need 
these standards for us to be able to talk about either compliance or deviation from the rules, 
norms or cultural values set by the community. Based on this idea, we might assume the 
relationship between institutions and cooperation is unidirectional, particularly for 
communities in which relevant institutions are not yet capable of addressing their current 
needs for resource management. 
 
In a different paper, Ostrom et al. (1994) distinguished between triggering institutions, which 
trigger cooperation among community members, and sustaining institutions, which are 
responsible for sustaining cooperation over time, thereby leading to sustainability of a SES. 
In this case, the problem of endogeneity between cooperation on institutions comes into play 
when community members demand better institutions in a later phase of development in 
order to sustain cooperation after realizing the benefits of accruing to the group as a whole.  
 
The literature on conditional cooperation seems to support the idea that institutions come 
first, followed by cooperation and finally biodiversity outcomes. This literature suggests that 
users of a common pool resource cooperate conditional on punishment (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 
2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2008), and on 
cooperation of others (Rustagi et al., 2011; Fischbacher & Gachter 2010;  Fischbacher et al., 
2001). This might imply that punishment triggers and sustains cooperation in order to achieve 
some desired objectives. Punishment is part of a community’s institutions. It is administered 
to offenders so that people will cooperate with the rules, values or norms of the group. 
 
We acknowledged that both cooperation and institutions might not be the only endogenous 
variables in our models. Because of the endogeneity issues discussed above, we first estimate 
the models using ordinary least squares (OLS), ignoring any issues of endogeneity. We then 
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employ instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments, which 
methodologically deal with the problem of endogeneity, and compare the results. Following 
Lewbel (2012), this method estimates an instrumental variables regression model providing 
the option to generate instruments and allows the identification of structural parameters in 
regression models with endogeneity or mismeasured regressors in the absence of traditional 
identification information such as external instruments. For a detailed description of Lewbel’s 
approach and the mathematics of constructing instruments as simple functions of the data, 
please refer to Section 2.3 and Appendix A.  
 
Lewbel (2012) proposed a novel identification strategy, which utilizes a heteroskedastic 
covariance restriction to construct an internal IV. Identification is achieved in this context by 
having explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic 
errors.33 Correlation in the error terms due to an unobserved common factor is a key feature 
in many models (Baum et al., 2013). According to Lewbel (2012), instruments may be 
constructed as simple functions of the model’s data. As a result, the approach may be applied 
in cases where no external instruments are available or used to supplement weak external 
instruments in order to improve the efficiency of the instrumental variables estimator. 
 
We acknowledge that the benefits from wildlife conservation might cause the problem of 
endogeneity in the biodiversity model and, therefore, should not be used directly. We use the 
predicted values of the variable to isolate the independent effects of benefits on our measure 
of biodiversity. The new variable benefits-hat is obtained by running a linear regression 
model with benefits or environmental income as a function of other covariates that are not 
part of the biodiversity equation and then proceed to generated predict values. These 
predicted values are then used in the biodiversity model. We hope that the problem of 
endogeneity would be reduced by performing this procedure.    
 
3.3.3 Data sources 
Through household surveys and key informant interviews, the study collected data from a 
sample of 336 households and 30 key informants. The household questionnaire collected 
                                                                 
33 The greater the degree of scale heterosckedasticity in the error process, the higher will be the correlation of 
the generated instruments with included endogenous variables , which are the regressands in the auxiliary (first 
stage) regression (Lewbel, 2012). 
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information about the household’s socio-economic characteristics, such as demographics, 
agricultural activities, assets, income, expenditure and involvement in community wildlife 
activities, while the key informant questionnaire collected information at the community level 
about the community’s involvement in wildlife activities. Secondary data was also collected 
from the respective RDCs to complement the survey data.  
 
3.4.Results and Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Characterization of the Community and its Institutions  
The data shows great variability in terms of household, community and institutional 
characteristics. Table 3.4 shows that the average group size is about 451.6 and ranges from 6 
to about 2000 households, depending on whether the community is operating at ward level 
and whether we are talking about CAMPFIRE projects or resettlement schemes34. The 
average number of ethnic groups for the communities in question is 2.6. The data shows that 
the average age of the head of the household is 48.9 and ranges from about 22 to 89 years. 
About 50.0% of the communities have managed to endogenise punishment; they have 
systems in place for monitoring and enforcing rules and regulations, but the degree to which 
punishment is internalised varies as we move from one community to another. Whether 
monitoring and enforcement are externally done by a third party or internalised by local 
communities has implications for cooperation, which in turn affects the success of 
biodiversity outcomes. 
 
The benefits from wildlife conservation range from 0 to US$68 880.00 during the survey 
period, with a mean of US$20 047.00, while the average size of the conservation area is 
14 186 hectares (ha), ranging from about 7 614 ha to 26 000 ha. In some communities, the 
conservation area has been greatly reduced because the fence of the national park has recently 
expanded its boundaries, partly due to pressure from the state to increase land under 
conservation and the availability of donor funding. This affected the benefits flow because 
some communities are no longer entitled to benefits. About 62.5% of the committee members 
in the respective communities have received some form of training related to wildlife 
management. A number of stakeholders were involved in administering the training, 
                                                                 
34 As part of the land reform programme during the 1990s, peasant farmers were allocated plots around the 
Gonarezhou National Park which was previously reserved for white commercial farmers. 
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including the RDC, Zimbabwe National Parks and Wildlife Authority and several NGOs35. 
The average number of stakeholders was 4.2 per community, which is quite substantial given 
the size of the area under consideration (refer to Table B.3 in appendix B). 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric model 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Group size 336 451.6 461.4 6 2000 
Trust [scale from 0 - 10] 336 4.896 2.192 1 10 
Number of ethnic groups 336 2.631 0.901 1 5 
Year project was established 336 12.99 7.157 4 31 
Nature of punishment [0=Endo, 1=Exo] 336 0.506 0.501 0 1 
Resource size (ha) 336 14186 7614 0 26000 
Training (0=no 1=yes) 336 0.628 0.484 0 1 
Benefits 336 20047 17290 0 68880 
Benefits-hat 336 0.528 0.335 0 0.852 
Distance to the market (km) 336 65.45 25.88 33 133 
Distance to the fence (km)  336 9.843 16.77 0.100 80 
Number of poaching incidents 336 7.955 6.192 0 22 
Average age of household head 336 48.88 13.62 22 89 
Average number of years in school 336 5.524 4.257 0 15 
Residence status for the head 336 0.848 0.359 0 1 
Head born in this area 336 0.708 0.455 0 1 
Average number of years living in the area 336 36.64 13.57 6 73 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
 
Table 3.5 below shows that the performance of most communities in the study area is well 
below the desirable level in terms of many characteristics that matter for conservation. On a 
scale from 0 to 100, where 0 signifies the complete absence and 100 the complete presence of 
an attribute, all community attributes in Table 3.5 fall below half (50.0), except for 
information sharing, which has a mean of about 60.56. Most communities share vital 
information such as financial matters, past actions and knowledge of the SES, mainly through 
village meetings. The mean level of cooperation is about 39.26, while the mean for the 
overall institutional index is 34.06. Disaggregating the institutional index into four attributes, 
namely, clarity of institutions, fairness, governance (including participation and democracy) 
and monitoring and enforcement (including formal punishment and social sanctioning), we 
observe that the mean of each attribute is still worrisome, especially for the governance, 
participation and democracy index. This seems to suggest that, in most communities, the 
                                                                 
35 Training offered by these organisations ranges from basic courses, such as bookkeeping or record keeping, to 
specialised courses, such as constitution development, leadership courses, veldt fire management , training for 
armed game guards (including the use of firearms) and general wildlife management (including animal 
counting, provision of watering points, trophy quality, live animal cropping, etc.). 
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quality of local institutions is very poor. This could have implications for cooperation in a 
community and, by extension, to the whole CAMPFIRE programme. 
 
Table 3.5: Summary of indices 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Cooperation index 336 39.26 28.47 0 100 
institutional index 336 34.06 22.05 0 100 
clarity index* 336 40.97 23.62 0 100 
fairness index* 336 40.81 20.85 0 100 
governance index* 336 34.96 20.82 0 100 
monitoring index* 336 37.67 24.40 0 100 
wealth index 336 31.84 24.18 0 100 
social capital index 336 18.18 14.49 0 100 
information index 336 60.56 22.95 0 100 
biodiversity index** 336 1.520 0.950 0.06 3.14 
Source: Survey data Aug 2013  
* Indices for institutional characteristics are combined using factor analysis to give an overall index of 34.06 
** The Shannon index for biodiversity 
 
In general, qualitative interviews revealed that communities that joined the CAMPFIRE 
programme earlier had better institutions in place compared to communities that either joined 
later or are operating outside the programme, except for Nyangambe.36 The discrepancies in 
institutional characteristics across communities can be attributed to the fact that communities 
that started earlier, such as the Mahenye CAMPFIRE project, enjoyed a lot of donor funding 
and privileges from the state, which led to their success. This also meant that the relationship 
between earlier communities and state authorities improved over time because of the 
attention they got from the international community. Furthermore, these communities had 
ample time to learn from their own mistakes, experiences and past achievements, and hence 
adapted accordingly. In addition to this, such communities also received adequate training to 
build their own institutional capacity from the CAMPFIRE programme itself, state apparatus 
and various other local and international non-governmental organisations that were involved 
in wildlife conservation at that time. 
 
Table B.4 in the appendices shows that community involvement in wildlife conservation in 
the study area varied significantly across communities. Most respondents (96.7%) indicated 
that the community uses awareness campaigns as a vehicle to fight illegal harvesting of 
                                                                 
36 Its success came from the fact that the community was part of the Save Valley Conservancy from its 
establishment and was involved in wildlife conservation from 1990 until 2004, when Nyangambe temporarily 
pulled out due to political interference in the conservancy. 
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wildlife, to educate the community and to foster cooperation, while 59.5% indicated that they 
actually carry out anti-poaching activities. About 42.3% indicated that they have a veldt fire 
management committee in place, while 36.3% use whistle-blowers to alert the authorities to 
any illegal activities happening in their community. Fewer respondents indicated that the 
community participates in quota setting (32.4%) and game cropping37 (12.5%).  
 
About 38.7% of the respondents stated that they enjoyed use rights, while 33.6% indicated 
decision making rights (refer to Table B.5 in the appendices). When asked about the extent to 
which the communities enjoyed both use and decision making rights on a scale from 0 to 10, 
there was great variation in the observations across projects, with means of 1.97 for use rights 
and 1.55 for decision making. About 91.3% of the respondents indicated that the option to 
enter or exit is not available for community members, while 66.4% indicated that the 
community is not able to exclude external or untitled parties. Many respondents (about 
86.0%) were aware of the existence of a constitution for the community, while fewer 
respondents (25.6%) were aware of the existence of a wildlife management plan. It is 
essential at this stage to highlight that wildlife management committees exist for all 
communities (100.0%), since this is a requirement for local communities to be recognised by 
the state as a conservation group and for them to benefit from wildlife conservation. 
 
Table B.6 in the appendices shows the number of rules, meetings and activities, and the 
participation rates for each. On average, using a scale from 0 – 10, the extent to which 
community rules are recognised by community members and higher level authorities is 3.51 
and 6.10, respectively. This indicates that a number of communities still have problems in 
terms of rule compliance. This is also supported by the high number of poaching incidents 
(about 7.9 per year) in the study area. 
 
3.4.2 Results of the Regression Models 
This chapter argues that institutions directly affect cooperation (defined as the ability to self-
organise) and indirectly influence the success of biodiversity outcomes through cooperation. 
                                                                 
37 Eltringam (1994) defines game cropping as the taking of a sustainable yield from a completely wild 
population. This definition implies regular harvest from a wild population. Cropping would have the objective 
of either wild animal population control or harvesting to provide bushmeat and other wild animal products for 
local consumption and/or for income generation. 
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Using regression analysis, we analyse the association between institutions and cooperation 
and the relationship between cooperation and success of biodiversity outcomes. As stated 
earlier, we are aware of the endogeneity problem; although we did not expect our data to 
suffer from it, it has to be corrected. First, we ignore any endogeneity issues and use ordinary 
least squares regression analysis, and then we use instrumental variables estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-based instruments to methodologically deal with the problem. For 
robustness check, an experiment of introducing the institutional variable directly in the 
biodiversity model, i.e., equation 3.3 is done. As expected, the variable was insignificant see 
results in Table B.13 Appendix B. This is consistent with the structural model deduced by the 
researcher. 
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity (refer to Table B.7 in the appendices) seem 
to suggest that OLS yields better results in the first model (relationship between cooperation 
and institutions), while the instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based 
instruments yields superior results in the second model (relationship between biodiversity and 
cooperation). The VIF tests show that multicollinearity is not a severe problem for both 
models (please refer to Table B.8 in the appendices). The rule of thumb suggests that the VIF 
should be less than 10; otherwise, we have multicollinearity issues (Menard 1995; Neter et 
al., 1989; O’Brien 2007). Furthermore, the correlation results in Table B.14 and Table B.15 
in the appendices also support the results of the VIF test above. 
 
The results of the under-identification, weak identification, over-identification and 
heteroskedasticity tests obtained from the instrumental variables estimation models are 
presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 below. Under the null hypothesis that the equation is 
under-identified, the Kleibergen-Paap test shows that it is safe to proceed with the 
instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments in both models. 
Usually, the p-value should be very small in order to reject the null hypothesis in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis that the equation is not under-identified. The rule of thumb for the 
weak identification test using the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic suggests that we reject the 
null hypothesis of weak identification if the F-statistic is large. Weak identification arises 
when the excluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. 
Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak.  
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The Hansen J statistics for testing over-identification of all instruments also reveals that it is 
safe to use instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments in 
both models under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. 
Therefore, the p-value must be very large in order not to reject our null hypothesis.  
 
Because we are considering 30 communities (which imply about 30 observations), there is a 
worry that we might be dealing with too few observations. One way to deal with that is 
bootstrapping. We applied the bootstrapping procedure to check for robustness of the 
standard errors and found that the results are consistent with each other. The results in Table 
B.10 through Table B.12 in the appendices do not vary significantly from the original results. 
We take this to be a validation of the results and, henceforth, we will interpret them. In the 
section below, we present both OLS and instrumental variables estimation results for both 
models. 
 
Regression Model 1 - Relationship between Cooperation and Institutions: The results in 
Table 3.6 below show that both OLS regression model and instrumental variables estimation 
are highly significant and explain over 80.0% of the variation in the dependent variable. We 
consider two models, a model with the overall institutional index and another with 
disaggregated institutional indices.38 Replacing the overall institutional index with 
disaggregated institutional indices does not affect the signs of the explanatory variables in the 
model and so the interpretation remains the same. Comparing OLS and the IV results, we 
observe that most variables are highly significant, except for group size, ethnicity, resource 
size and wealth. The variable ethnicity measured heterogeneity in a community or group, but 
the variable is insignificant in both models, suggesting that ethnicity is not an important 
variable explaining cooperation in the area. However, with disaggregated institutional 
indices, group size, resource size and wealth become significant under both OLS and IV 
estimation, implying that cooperation is explained better with the latter model than with the 
former. 
                                                                 
38 As highlighted earlier, the overall institutional index can be disaggregated into four institutional 
characteristics: clarity of institutions, fairness, governance and monitoring, and enforcement. The objective of 
disaggregating the overall institutional index into these four attributes is to establish those characteristics of 
institutions that matter most for cooperation. 
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The results show that the institutional variable is positive and significant at the 1% level of 
significance. This suggests that an improvement in the quality of institutions increases 
cooperation in the respective communities. This result is consistent with theory and confirms 
our hypothesis that institutions matter for self-organisation, i.e., good institutions translate 
into higher levels of cooperation and vice versa. It is important to note at this point that all 
communities in the study area have some form of institutions, but these institutions differ in 
terms of their characteristics as we move from one community to another. Hence, we can rule 
out the possibility of an open access regime where members of the community can access 
resources at any time without restraint, i.e., a system where there are no rules governing 
access to and utilization of resources. 
 
When we consider the model with the disaggregated institutional index, we observe that both 
the governance index and the monitoring and enforcement index are highly significant and 
positive, implying that an improvement in these variables might increase cooperation. The 
results suggest that governance, monitoring and enforcement are more important for 
cooperation than fairness and clarity of institutions. The results underscore the need for 
institutional arrangements that allow local communities to fully participate in wildlife 
conservation, govern their resources in a democratic way, monitor each other, and enforce 
rules and regulations internally, since this is more likely to encourage higher levels of 
cooperation with possible implications for biodiversity outcomes.  
 
However, the fairness index is highly significant and carries a negative sign. This result 
seems counter-intuitive, but there is an explanation for this. Because we collected qualitative 
data, a possible explanation for this anomaly could be that beneficiaries closer to the park 
fence frequently suffer from wildlife intrusion and hence feel that they should be treated 
differently from those farther away from the fence. Pooling beneficiaries in the same ward 
together and treating them as equal is problematic because of the difference in their 
experience with wildlife since some of them are located near the boundary and hence suffer 
more from intrusion while other live far away from the border and hence experience less 
disturbances from wildlife. This also explains why group size is very unstable at ward level 
and why communities frequently divide into smaller groups in order to ensure that 
communities that suffer more from wildlife intrusion benefit more than those farther away. 
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Table 3.6: Relationship between cooperation and institutions 
Cooperation Model with overall 
institutional variable 
Model with institutional 
attributes 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Number of obs 336 336 336 336 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.8542 - 0.8854 - 
F (10, 325) - 223.22 - 320.2 
Centered R2 - 0.8191 - 0.844 
Uncentered R2 - 0.9378 - 0.946 
 
overall institutional index 0.129*** 
(0.0487) 
0.557*** 
(0.177) 
  
clarity index   0.117* 
(0.0696) 
0.195 
(0.137) 
fairness index   -0.160*** 
(0.0537) 
-0.515** 
(0.150) 
governance index   0.192*** 
(0.0732) 
0.603*** 
(0.168) 
monitoring and enforcement index   0.360*** 
(0.0512) 
0.245*** 
(0.103) 
group size 
 
0.00121 
(0.00181) 
0.00472* 
(0.00197) 
0.00309* 
(0.00161) 
0.00205** 
(0.00152) 
Trust 
 
3.120*** 
(0.574) 
1.151*** 
(0.893) 
1.800*** 
(0.554) 
1.496*** 
(0.756) 
Ethnicity 
 
-1.172 
(0.767) 
0.231 
(1.135) 
-0.626 
(0.714) 
-0.594 
(0.960) 
wealth index 
 
0.0673** 
(0.0268) 
0.0254 
(0.0342) 
0.0555** 
(0.0239) 
0.0642** 
(0.0278) 
year of establishment 
 
1.672*** 
(0.202) 
1.181*** 
(0.328) 
1.255*** 
(0.187) 
1.166*** 
(0.267) 
punishment [0 = Exo, 1 = Endo] 
 
12.99*** 
(1.843) 
11.23*** 
(2.170) 
7.195*** 
(1.831) 
9.815*** 
(2.528) 
resource size 
 
-0.000150 
(9.22e-05) 
-0.000287*** 
(9.84e-05) 
-0.000265** 
(0.000111) 
-0.000366*** 
(0.000157) 
number of stakeholders  
 
1.552*** 
(0.564) 
1.741** 
(0.702) 
0.912* 
(0.533) 
0.557*** 
(0.596) 
Tenure 
 
-8.657*** 
(2.883) 
-7.465*** 
(2.153) 
-6.617** 
(3.271) 
-12.17*** 
(4.855) 
 Cons -12.04*** 
(3.635) 
-12.62** 
(5.121) 
-9.085*** 
(3.360) 
-3.016 
(4.072) 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):  72.208  54.450 
 Chi-sq(10) P-val = 0.0000 = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):  19.373  16.281 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):  10.574  9.5841 
 Chi-sq(9) P-val = 0.2308 = 0.2623 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1) = 18.543 = 29.172 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 = 0.0000 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
NB: Standard errors shown in brackets  
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Community level trust, year of establishment, punishment and number of stakeholders have 
positive and significant impacts on cooperation. This seems to suggest that cooperation is 
better in communities where members trust each other than in communities where trust is 
lacking. As suggested in the previous section, cooperation is higher in communities that 
joined wildlife conservation earlier than in communities that joined later. This makes sense 
because the longer a community is involved in wildlife conservation, the more likely it is for 
that community to develop robust institutions that are adapted to local conditions. 
Cooperation is also higher in communities that have endogenised punishment as opposed to 
communities that still rely on external force in order to enforce adherence to rules and 
regulations. 
 
Policymakers and development practitioners should seriously consider institutional reforms 
that convey greater control of natural resources through devolution and decentralization of 
managerial functions, decision making and authority into the hands of local communities, 
while the state maintains regulatory functions. Ostrom et al. (2007) argue that it is cheaper for 
local communities to engage in monitoring and enforcement activities than it is for state 
apparatus to do so, due to budgetary and information constraints. The results also reveal that 
cooperation increases with an increase in the number of stakeholders. This is true in the study 
area because there are a number of NGOs working with local communities in wildlife 
conservation, particularly in providing training or capacity building.  
 
The tenure variable is negative and highly significant (at 1%) under both models, implying a 
negative relationship between tenure and cooperation. This suggests that cooperation declines 
as we move from communal areas into the resettlement schemes. This is true for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the households in resettlement schemes are permit holders operating on 
individual plots, who are in most cases maximizing individual objectives at the farm level but 
not as a community as the scope of joint activities is small. Given the nature of resettlement 
schemes, it is difficult for park authorities to monitor and enforce rules unless farm owners 
come together and act as a community in order to achieve a common objective of 
conservation. Secondly, the areas of collaboration tend to be fewer in resettlement areas to 
the extent that farmers act individually and no one knows what the other farmer is doing in 
most instances; hence, their institutions are not as well developed as for communal areas. 
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Furthermore, with the introduction of disaggregated institutional indices, group size, the size 
of the resource system and wealth become significant under both models, although the 
interpretation is not immediately intuitive. The results show that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between group size and cooperation. In general, the theory posits that 
the effect of group size on self-organisation tends to be negative, given the higher transaction 
costs associated with getting people together and agreeing on important issues (Ostrom, 
2009; Wade, 1994). However, if the tasks of managing a resource system are very costly 
(e.g., monitoring an extensive resource system), larger groups are in a better position to 
mobilise the necessary resources required for such undertakings. Wildlife systems are 
typically extensive and impose a huge burden on the communities because they require more 
human capital in addition to other resources. Hence, the size of the group is always relevant, 
but its influence on the ability of a community to self-organise is contingent on other 
variables of the SES (Ostrom, 2009). 
 
The results also show that the level of cooperation in a community declines as the size of a 
resource system increases. Chhatre and Agrawal (2008) argue that self-organisation is more 
unlikely in very large and very small resource systems. The reason could be that very large 
resource systems are associated with high costs of defining boundaries, monitoring and 
enforcement, and gaining ecological knowledge, while very small resource systems do not 
generate substantial flows of valuable products. Hence, a moderate-sized resource system is 
most conducive to self-organisation. We therefore argue that, for most communities 
considered in the study area, the resource systems are big enough to generate tangible 
benefits, and communities with reasonable conservation areas are better off in terms of 
fostering cooperation than communities with larger conservation area. 
 
The wealth index becomes significant and carries a positive sign under both models when the 
disaggregated institutional attributes are introduced, suggesting more cooperation in wealthier 
communities than in poor communities. The conventional wisdom from field experiments 
suggests that, at the group level, both average group wealth and variance in the distribution of 
wealth decrease the level of cooperation or social efficiency achieved by the group (Ostrom 
et al., 1994; Cardenas, 2003). However, in this case, the burden imposed by an extensive 
resource system (e.g., monitoring) can better be handled by communities with greater mean 
than relatively poor ones.  
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Regression Model 2 - Relationship between Biodiversity and Cooperation: Both OLS and 
IV estimation models are significant at the 1% level and explain over 72.2% of the variation 
in our dependent variable. Although the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests suggest that IV 
estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments is superior to its OLS counterpart, all 
variables in both models are significant and do not vary much in terms of their coefficients, 
standard errors and the level of significance for the two models.  
 
Table 3.7 below shows that cooperation is positive and highly significant. This implies that 
cooperation is an important variable explaining biodiversity outcomes, as suggested in the 
CPR literature. Hence, we expect to find more sound ecological outcomes in those 
communities with high levels of cooperation and strong institutions than in communities with 
less cooperation and weak institutions. We maintain that institutions affect biodiversity 
outcomes indirectly through their ability to self-organise or cooperation. Alternatively, we 
might think of cooperation as refraining from illegal harvesting of wildlife resources, so that, 
in areas where the level of cooperation is very low and poaching activities are rife, wildlife is 
either quickly decimated due to overharvesting, or may respond to higher levels of poaching 
by retreating back into the park, thereby leaving few wild animals in the community’s 
conservation area. As a result, a community that is less poached has more animals in its 
vicinity than a community that is heavily poached. 
As expected, training is positive and highly significant, implying that this variable is an 
important factor explaining the success of biodiversity outcomes. This suggests that 
communities that received training are better off in terms of managing and conserving 
wildlife than communities where training has not been administered. However, not all 
communities have received training relevant to wildlife management. The number of 
households and communities involved in wildlife conservation is growing, signalling the 
need for more training in the study area. Qualitative interviews also revealed that committee 
membership changes quite frequently and, at times, there is a total overhaul of the entire 
management committee which may severely affect operations. There is, therefore, a need for 
continuous training so that the institutional memory, entrepreneurial and leadership skills 
acquired through training are not lost when such a dramatic change occurs. From this 
perspective, government programmes should target capacity building in terms of institutional 
capacity and skills development in order to have a positive and significant impact on 
biodiversity. 
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Table 3.7: Model 2 - Relationship between biodiversity and cooperation 
Biodiversity OLS IV 
Number of obs 336 336 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.7223 - 
F (10, 325) - 283.38 
Centered R2 - 0.807 
Uncentered R2 - 0.9224 
 
Cooperation 0.00595*** 
(0.00246) 
0.00758*** 
0.00215 
training [0=yes, 1=no] 0.215*** 
(0.0745) 
0.208*** 
(0.07620) 
Benefits-hat 0.5165*** 
(3.56e-06) 
0.2651*** 
(3.37e-06) 
distance to nearest urban centre 0.0122*** 
(0.00151) 
0.0126*** 
(0.00130) 
distance to the fence 0.0148*** 
(0.00212) 
0.0131*** 
(0.00205) 
social capital index 0.00704*** 
(0.00200) 
0.00710*** 
(0.00202) 
average age of household head -0.357*** 
(0.12374) 
-0.381*** 
(0.13522) 
average number of years in school -0.0926*** 
(0.02271) 
-0.0892*** 
(0.02345) 
average number of years living in the area -0.00538** 
(0.00218) 
-0.00597** 
(0.00247) 
Fence -0.00345*** 
(0.00129) 
-0.00490*** 
(0.00182) 
Information sharing index 0.242*** 
(0.04296) 
0.210*** 
(0.04558) 
Cons 9.631*** 
(3.02523) 
10.34*** 
(3.34761) 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 139.319 
  Chi-sq(10) P-val          = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 25.420 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.0430 
  Chi-sq(9) P-val            = 0.8352 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                         = 21.94 
 Prob > chi2                  = 0.0000 
Source: survey data August 2013 
NB: Standard errors shown in brackets  
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 
As expected, the benefits from wildlife conservation significantly and positively affect 
biodiversity outcomes in a community. If the resource system is very important in the eyes of 
the users and generates a substantial flow of benefits, then users attach high value to 
sustainability of the resource (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008); otherwise, 
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the cost of organising and maintaining a self-organised system may not be worth the effort 
(National Research Council, 2002). Communities from the study area have came to realise 
that using the proceeds from wildlife conservation to invest in public goods, such as schools, 
clinics, water, grinding mills, and electricity, is much more beneficial than getting dividends 
at the household level. Viewed from this angle, the benefits from wildlife conservation are 
tangible in the eyes of the community and thus community wildlife conservation, from this 
perspective, is successful. This line of reasoning differs from previous studies which 
considered benefits in terms of income flowing directly into the household. 
 
Market integration and global market trends are viewed worldwide as potential threats to 
wildlife conservation in developing countries. In this chapter, we used distance to the nearest 
urban centre as a proxy for market integration. The variable distance to the nearest urban 
centre is positive and highly significant, suggesting that biodiversity outcomes improve as the 
distance to the market increases. We argue that the incentives for poaching are much stronger 
for those communities that are located closer to urban centres or main routes linking rural 
communities to urban areas, because animals and game fetch higher prices in wider markets. 
Qualitative interviews with key informants revealed substantial evidence of game meat being 
sold on the black market in almost all the communities visited during the survey period and, 
under certain circumstances, poachers transporting game meat to distant markets such as 
growth points and urban centres.  
 
On the other hand, communities that are located closer to the fences are less likely to 
conserve biodiversity because they suffer more from wildlife intrusion and interact with 
wildlife frequently. This is confirmed by the results: the variable measuring distance to the 
fence is positive and highly significant. In other words, as the distance to the fence increases, 
biodiversity outcomes improve significantly. The results seem to suggest that biodiversity 
outcomes are more successful for those communities that are located far away from urban 
centres or routes connecting rural communities to urban centres, but are not very close to the 
boundary of the game park.  
 
Social capital is also an important variable explaining the success of biodiversity outcomes. 
The variable is positive and significant. Social capital may either help to conserve or destroy 
biodiversity depending on the nature of the relationship. If social capital is high in a 
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community, such that households have links both inside and outside the community, then 
these households are more likely to get assistance in times of need and hence, less likely to 
depend on illegal harvesting of wildlife resources. This is true for some communities in the 
study area because they have more children or relatives working in urban areas or abroad in 
South Africa. If households are connected at the community level (through common 
understanding, common interests, respect for each other and the need to maintain a long-term 
relationship that is beneficial to everyone), they are more likely to make decisions as a 
community. This minimises the possibility of social deviance while, at the same time, 
enhancing society’s welfare. 
 
The average age of the household head is significant and negatively related to the success of 
biodiversity outcomes. This implies that older household heads tend to be associated with 
worse biodiversity outcomes. This also suggests a positive relationship between the age of the 
household head and income based on resource use. Godoy et al. (1997) reported that the age 
of household head may be positively related to resource-based income until a point where 
resource use declines with age, coupled with children moving away to seek new opportunities 
and start their own households elsewhere. Including a quadratic term for the average age of 
the household head does not affect the results much. Table B.9 demonstrates that, as the age 
of the household head increases, biodiversity outcomes deteriorate up to a certain age (51.4 
years), when poaching ceases to be an important livelihood activity for the household head 
due to old age.  
 
The number of years in school and number of years living in the area for the household head 
are both significant and negatively related to biodiversity outcomes. Again, these results are 
not immediately intuitive. Expectations were that, as the number of years in school and the 
number of years living in the area increases, biodiversity outcomes improve. However, that is 
only realistic in areas with strong institutions. As the descriptive statistics indicated, there is a 
general weakness of institutions in the study area. The results with respect to age are 
therefore capturing resource-based income activities only. Highly educated households who 
have stayed in the area for long seem to be bent on exploiting the resource for income 
generation in a manner which do not necessarily benefit biodiversity. These trends can be 
sustained in the medium term through dispersal of wildlife from the park to the communal 
lands. In the long-run, it is not sustainable and, therefore, needs to be curbed.       
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An interesting development in the study area is the idea of putting an electric fence around 
Gonarezhou National Park in order to conserve wildlife and reduce human-wildlife conflict. 
The project has already started with support from donor funding. Its completion depends 
heavily on the availability of these funds. Most communities have lost part of their 
conservation area to the national park and the number is growing with an increase in the area 
of the park covered by the electric fence. Beneficiaries of conservation payments view this 
development as a potential threat to the CAMPFIRE project. The results show that the fence 
reduces biodiversity in the community’s conservation area. This is true for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the fence greatly reduces the number of wild animals moving into the community’s 
conservation area from the park. Secondly, the electric fence greatly reduces the benefits 
from wildlife conservation, thereby eroding the community’s incentives to conserve wildlife 
resources. As a result, the local community might fight back by increasing their poaching 
effort. This might lead to resource overexploitation and, finally, exhaustion of all resident 
species as well as those that cross the fence.39     
 
According to Ostrom (2007), information sharing is one of the most important variables that 
can affect ecological outcomes. During meetings, communities share vital information about 
past actions, progress updates, general finance matters, fire outbreaks, watering points, 
poaching and knowledge of the SES, in addition to their usual community agendas. The 
results show that biodiversity improves when the community is able to share information. 
Sharing information entails both responsibility and accountability of community leadership. 
This, in turn, facilitates the development of a relationship based on trust and honesty. In 
addition, the communities perceive lower cost of organising when users share common 
knowledge of relevant SES attributes, rules and regulations, and how their actions affect each 
other (Ostrom, 2009; Berkes & Folke, 1998). 
 
 
 
                                                                 
39 Predators and small plains game that can sneak under the fence in rugged terrain are still able to move inside 
and outside the park and interact with human beings. Furthermore, elephants can still damage the electric fence 
if they have mastered the technique of doing so.     
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3.5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This study used a sample of 336 households and community-level data from 30 communities 
to analyse i) the relationship between ability to self-organise and institutions, among other 
variables identified as affecting collective action; and ii) the relationship between success of 
biodiversity outcomes and cooperation among variables, identified as enhancing the 
sustainability of a resource system. To achieve this, the study relied heavily on Ostrom’s 
general framework for analysing complex social-ecological systems. We used ordinary least 
squares regression analysis and instrumental variables estimation with heteroskedasticity-
based instruments. This approach methodologically deals with the endogeneity problem 
associated with the relationships above.  
 
The results confirmed that sound institutions are indeed an important ingredient for 
cooperation. Improvements in institutional attributes such as governance (participation and 
democracy), monitoring and enforcement might lead to increased cooperation, while fairness 
and clarity of institutions were found to be less important. Community level trust, 
punishment, number of stakeholders and tenure were also found to be important variables 
explaining cooperation. With the introduction of disaggregated institutional indices, group 
size, the size of the resource system and wealth become significant.  
 
Furthermore, cooperation had a positive and significant impact on biodiversity outcomes, 
suggesting that higher levels of cooperation might translate into a healthy wildlife population. 
We, therefore, argue that institutions directly affect cooperation, and indirectly influence 
biodiversity outcomes through cooperation. Cooperation, training, benefits, distance from the 
nearest urban centre, distance from the park fence, social capital, and information sharing 
were found to have a positive and significant impact on biodiversity outcomes. The average 
age of the household head, number of years in school, number of years living in the area and 
proximity to the park fence had a negative and significant impact on biodiversity. 
 
Both the extent to which communities benefit from wildlife conservation and the extent to 
which they are allowed to make important decisions about how benefits are distributed and 
used by the community affect incentives to conserve wildlife. Fencing the national park has a 
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detrimental effect on the CAMPFIRE project and the lives of people whose livelihoods 
depend on wildlife conservation. 
The results of this study helped to shed light on the processes explaining complex social-
ecological systems. A number of policy implications obtain from this analysis. The wildlife 
sector should be re-configured in order to favour the implementation of collective strategies 
that are endogenous to the community aimed at providing public goods such as wildlife 
through conservation. Government policy should recognize CAMPFIRE communities as 
important stakeholders with an important role to play, but not as beneficiaries of wildlife 
conservation simply because they live, interact with wildlife almost on a daily basis and 
suffer in the process. There is therefore need for future policy to define the roles of each 
stakeholder and demarcate boundaries within which each stakeholder can operate.  
 
Future policy reforms should also consider further devolution of natural resource 
management function from the Rural District Council to CAMPFIRE communities or 
increased autonomy so that they community members can monitor each other and internalise 
enforcement, while the state maintains regulation functions. This will allow innovation 
among communities, while the government create an enabling environment for other 
stakeholders to operate. For example, the capacity of CAMPFIRE to develop their own rules, 
rather than just following externally-imposed rules, should not be undermined. The results 
show that external enforcement of rules and regulations does not necessarily translate into 
sound ecological outcomes; rather, better outcomes are attainable when punishment is 
endogenised by local communities. This seems to suggest that communities should be 
supported in a way that promotes the emergence of robust institutions that are tailor-made to 
suit local needs. This will, in turn, facilitate good environmental husbandry. 
 
Since wildlife is a fugitive resource that roams freely on communal land, there is therefore a 
need for coordination among CAMPFIRE communities in order to supply the public good, 
the required habitat and to benefit from collective. The government, NGOs and private sector 
should act as catalyst of collective action to ensure that there are incentives for CAMPFIRE 
communities to self-organize into multiple layers of nested organizations through policies 
and programmes that allow resource users to participate in decision making process. 
Development programmes or policy interventions with both a welfare and a conservation 
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component should not be designed as ‘one size fits all’ but should recognize and understand 
the differences in community characteristics and incentives to self-organize through policy 
and development programmes in order to promote conservation and safeguard the livelihood 
interests of pro-poor communities. 
 
Government programmes can target capacity building in terms of institutional capacity and 
skills development in order to have a positive impact on biodiversity conservation. Increase 
spending on training relevant to natural resource management, and particularly wildlife 
conservation, targeting not only community leadership or project committees but also 
ordinary community members as a path way to conservation. Therefore, the capacity building 
efforts of government agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders should complement each other 
to ensure that the necessary resources are mobilised and all communities receive the 
necessary training and resources.  State authorities should reconsider the way in which they 
engage with farmers under resettlement schemes, because biodiversity suffers more under 
this type of arrangement than in communal areas. There is a need for appropriate institutional 
reforms that allow park authorities to work closely with resettlement schemes, while at the 
same time giving incentives for plot holders to work together for the improvement of the 
common pool resource. For example, farmers in resettlement schemes could set aside land for 
conservation by pooling resources instead of operating at plot level, which works against 
conservation efforts. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Bioeconomic Model of Community wildlife Conservation: CAMPFIRE 
Community versus the Conservancy Community40 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), commonly referred to as 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), are central to future rural 
development in Southern Africa (Munthali, 2007; and Thomson et al., 2013). Conceptually, 
CBNRM is a sound idea and seems likely to encourage conservation of wildlife resources and 
to improve the livelihoods of poor rural households if resources are exploited legally and 
commercially by local communities. Nevertheless, despite such arrangements, community 
wildlife conservation in the region still faces some serious challenges, one of them being 
illegal harvesting41 of wildlife resources by local people living adjacent to protected areas 
(Murombedzi, 1999; Fischer et al., 2011; and Gandiwa, 2011).  
 
This paper considers two communities that are involved in wildlife conservation under two 
different CBNRM arrangements around the Gonarezhou National Park (GNP) in Zimbabwe, 
but are experiencing very different wildlife conservation outcomes. Moreover, both 
communities exploit wildlife by selling hunting licenses to foreign hunters but again with 
different levels of success. For purposes of our analysis, we consider the Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) communities and the 
                                                                 
40 A version of this chapter has been desseminated as an EfD Discussion Paper No. DP 15 – 28 and ERSA 
Working Paper 560. 
41 A distinction is made in this paper between commercial and subsistence poaching. Commercial poaching is 
presumed to be an open access business usually conducted by outsiders wit h the help of local communities, 
while subsistence poaching is mainly done for subsistence by the local communities themselves (Fischer et al., 
2011). Local communities contribute to commercial poaching or illegal trophy hunting by supplying 
information to outsiders about the movements of wild animals in their wilderness area and sometimes provide 
escort services for a very small fee. The paper studies subsistence poaching by CAMPFIRE communities. 
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private game farms in the Save Valley Conservancy (SVC) 42. The park agency plays a 
central role by authorizing the harvest quota for each community. 
 
Campbell and Shackleton (2001) reported that the conservancy community performs much 
better than traditional CBNRM arrangements involving local communities with respect to 
biodiversity conservation and livelihood outcomes. It is argued that the design of benefit-
sharing schemes, such as the CAMPFIRE programme, could be responsible for eroding the 
incentives of local communities to conserve wildlife (e.g., Fischer et al., 2011; and 
Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2014). In principle, CAMPFIRE aimed at giving indigenous 
communities co-ownership of local natural resources, particularly wildlife, so that they could 
generate income through leasing trophy hunting concessions, harvesting resources, game 
cropping and tourism activities (Fischer et al., 2011; Bond and Frost, 2005; and Balint and 
Mashinya, 2006). However, this goal has not been achieved, as CAMPFIRE only managed to 
devolve authority over natural resources from the central government to the Rural District 
Council (RDC). Murombedzi (1999) argues that, if CAMPFIRE is to be effective, a further 
devolution of authority is required so that producer communities, those who live directly 
beside wildlife, are given full control of the natural resources on their land. 
 
Therefore, the main objectives of this paper are to develop a bioeconomic model for each of 
the three agents identified above (i.e., the park agency, conservancy and CAMPFIRE 
community); optimize the market problem for each agent and compare the outcomes with the 
social planner’s solution; and finally to suggest appropriate reforms that might encourage the 
CAMPFIRE community to move from a seemingly suboptimal regime to one that is optimal. 
Unlike previous studies, this paper seeks to establish the conditions under which the 
CAMPFIRE community can be incentivized to behave like the conservancy community, 
which is more successful in revenue generation and stewardship practice. Given the 
background above, three important questions arise: i) What are the significant differences 
between the two types of communities that interact with wildlife in Zimbabwe? ii) How and 
why do their differences affect livelihoods and stewardship practice? iii) Given the apparent 
superiority of conservancy outcomes in terms of livelihoods and conservation, how can we 
                                                                 
42 The SVC is chosen due to its proximity to the GNP, the fact that the conservancy interacts with neighbouring 
communities and farmers in the SVC are operating as a community, just as in CAMPFIRE projects. Although 
the paper utilizes the GNP area as a case study, the results would generally apply to other areas in Zimbabwe. 
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incentive CAMPFIRE communities to behave like the conservancy community, i.e., what 
reforms are necessary in CAMPFIRE for it to achieve equivalent outcomes?  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 analyses the similarities and 
differences between the CAMPFIRE and conservancy communities. Section 4.3 develops the 
bio-economic model and computes estimates of some key parameters of the bio-economic 
model using data collected from communities around the Gonarezhou National Park (GNP) 
in Zimbabwe. Section 4.4 presents some comparative statics, including their policy 
implications, and discusses the results of the optimization problems and model simulation. 
Finally, section 5.5 concludes. 
 
4.2. A History of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe 
 
In Zimbabwe, community-based wildlife conservation takes place mainly under two different 
CBNRM arrangements: conservancies and the CAMPFIRE programme. Zimbabwe has about 
eight conservancies with over 100 registered private game farms43, and 37 CAMPFIRE 
districts, managed by 37 RDCs that comprise 118 wards with over 121,500 households 
participating in wildlife conservation. The eight conservancies cover an area of 1,140,688 ha 
in total, while the CAMPFIRE wards cover approximately 2,478,000 ha in total. The 
potential for crop cultivation is extremely low due to harsh climatic conditions (Gandiwa et 
al., 2014). This makes livestock rearing and wildlife conservation the most viable private 
investment options for both the conservancy and CAMPFIRE communities. 
 
According to Bell (1984), emphasis on formal protected areas shifted during the 1970s with 
the recognition that islands of protection were inadequate for maintaining spatially 
heterogeneous biodiversity. The Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) gave landowners property 
rights to wildlife on their land (Murombedzi, 1999). Kreuter et al. (2010) identified groups of 
landowners within the bounds of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area that 
have incorporated their properties into conservancies or private nature reserves, thereby 
expanding the management scale of common pool wildlife resources. Due to its fugitive 
character, wildlife is managed as a community, rather than on individual farms, in order to 
                                                                 
43 Because of the FTLRP, the actual number of private game farms and land area is not known due to farm 
inversions. 
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supply the required habitat size. This also allows individual farms to specialize in offering 
services and products that are in line with the resources found on their properties. 
Conservancies have played a crucial role in protecting wildlife and biodiversity on private 
farmland outside of formal protected areas since their establishment in Southern Africa 
during the early 1970s (Muir-Leresche and Nelson, 2000).  
 
The SVC is used in our paper as a case study of CBNRM arrangements involving private 
game farms in Zimbabwe. Its establishment was meant to rectify the ecological imbalances 
and environmental degradation caused by excessive cattle ranching during the 1920s, which 
subsequently forced wildlife to the outskirts of the valley (Fitzgerald, 2012). As a matter of 
policy, it was suggested that decreasing the number of cattle and introducing the original 
wildlife back to the area would help to restore the natural balance. The SVC was formed by 
combining 24 adjoining farms measuring about 3200 km². It is involved in intensive 
protection of rhinos, private game safaris, limited hunting concession and multi-species 
research. Farmers in the conservancy receive most of their income from high-quality and 
low-density tourism, including accommodation for travelers. Furthermore, it supports local 
communities by supplying jobs, allowing them to sell their arts and crafts, and improving and 
upgrading the Save Valley area. 
 
Because of this intervention, the environment slowly recovered. Many of the indigenous 
plants and vegetation have been rehabilitated and the area has been successfully restocked 
with wildlife. Muir-Leresche and Nelson (2000) reported an increase in the area under 
conservation and wildlife population on private land. Moreover, the conservancy community 
exhibits characteristics that enhance CBNRM and coordinated decision-making for wildlife 
conservation (Krug, 2001; and Kreuter et al., 2010). 
 
Upon independence, the government enacted a new law, the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1982, 
which gave birth to the CAMPFIRE programme - a benefit-sharing scheme involving local 
communities. The law aimed to provide democratically elected RDCs the appropriate 
authority for managing wildlife within their geographical boundaries. This new paradigm 
entails conferring on local communities, through their respective RDCs, (i) greater control 
over formerly public wildlife in communal areas in defined territories, (ii) enhanced 
capacities to add value to local wildlife, and (iii) specific financial rewards linked to the 
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estimated conservation value of wildlife within their territories (Gadgil and Rao, 1994; and 
Murombedzi, 1999). Provided these commitments are forthcoming, the park agency steps 
back into the role of regulator and adviser, retaining the right to control wildlife harvesting 
quotas (Fischer et al., 2011).  
 
Previous studies have described the CAMPFIRE programme as a role model for CBNRM in 
Southern Africa (Murombedzi, 1999; Logan and Moseley, 2002; Muchapondwa, 2003; and 
Balint and Mashinya, 2006). The fundamental idea behind such initiatives is that benefits 
from wildlife conservation should strengthen the incentives of local people in such a way that 
they treat wildlife as a valuable asset (Songorwa, 1999; Songorwa, 2000; and Balint and 
Mashinya, 2006). Viewed as an asset, wildlife has the potential to provide local communities 
with a hedge against agricultural risk associated with extreme weather conditions, by creating 
employment and generating revenues (Muchapondwa and Sterner, 2012; and Poshiwa et al., 
2013). 
 
 
However, the CAMPFIRE programme has enjoyed very limited success over the entire 
course of its establishment. Poaching subsided only temporarily after its commencement, as 
neighbouring communities started to reap economic benefits from legal wildlife utilization, 
and then rebounded a few years later (Fischer et al., 2011). Evidence of human-wildlife 
conflict and poaching of elephants and rhinos is well documented by both scholars and 
International Development Agencies that are involved in wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe 
such as DFID WWF, UNEP and IUCN. Recent evidence reveals that over 200 elephants were 
killed by local communities using cyanide poisoning within the past two years. This year 
alone, fourteen elephants were poisoned by cyanide in Zimbabwe in three separate incidents 
in Matusadona National Park in the Kariba and most recently 26 elephants in Hwange 
National Park.  
 
Evidence also shows that CAMPFIRE areas close to human settlements in the northern GNP 
have low populations of large herbivores such as buffalo, giraffe, and zebra compared to 
areas further inside the park, possibly due to illegal hunting and competition for forage with 
livestock (Gandiwa et al., 2013a; Dunham et al., 2013). This evidence demonstrates that 
poaching incidences have been on the increase for more than a decade now. Considering the 
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same period, poaching incidences in conservancies have stalled due to effective monitoring 
and enforcement. This has actually seen the population of endangered species such as rhinos 
and wild dogs improving in some conservancies but not all. The Save Valley Conservancy 
has reported an increase in the population of white rhinos which is almost facing extinction in 
Africa. Effective monitoring under the Save Valley Conservancy is made possible by the 
used of well-trained game guards with firearms and donor support. 
 
Lindsey et al. (2009) documented that from August 2001 to July 2009 in Save Valley 
Conservancy 10,520 illegal hunting incidents were recorded, 84,396 wire snares removed, 
4,148 hunters caught, 2,126 hunting dogs eliminated and at least 6,454 wild animals killed. 
However, there are no similar reports about CAMPFIRE communities due to lack of 
coordination, resource need to collect such type of information and local politics or political 
will but the levels of crime could double or triple thesis figure considering the same period. 
Furthermore, there are no reports about anti-poaching enforcement exerted by both 
communities as measured in terms of fines collected from the poachers. Poachers in 
Zimbabwe are usually surrendered to the police where the possible sentences are: to pay a 
paltry fine regardless of the crime committed, community service or released free. 
 
Furthermore, both human-wildlife conflict and poaching incidents escalated during the fast-
track land reform programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe, which spanned more than a decade 
starting in the year 2000 (Gandiwa et al., 2013b). The FTLRP was also accompanied by 
severe economic hardships and human settlements encroaching on wildlife habitat. Thus, the 
CAMPFIRE programme experienced two major setbacks. The increase in poaching incidents 
seems to suggest that the CAMPFIRE programme failed to generate adequate incentives for 
local communities to conserve wildlife and that the FTLRP was disruptive, in the sense that it 
brought in settlers who were not interested in conservation. It is also hard to separate the 
economic incentives of CAMPFIRE from the general difficulties of the land reforms. 
 
This phenomenon is not unique to Zimbabwe; it has occurred in many other countries in the 
Southern Africa region (Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2005). To this end, scholars argue that the 
impact of benefit-sharing schemes such as CAMPFIRE is limited by possible dilemmas in the 
actual design of the scheme or trade-offs inherent in linking development and conservation 
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objectives (Wells et al., 1999; Fischer et al., 2011; and Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2014). 
These dilemmas are also closely intertwined with the nature of the community (i.e., the 
quality of local institutions that are in place) and the benefit-cost structure (incentives) 
associated with the property rights system. 
 
It is the intention of most governments in the region to improve the living standards of poor 
rural households living adjacent to national protected areas through wildlife-based land 
reform. Given this, it is imperative to understand how different types of CBNRM regimes or 
conservation models work and to use this information not only to take appropriate action to 
enhance wildlife conservation in existing communal areas but also to undertake reforms to 
safeguard good stewardship practices in conservancies.44 
 
Comparing how communities under CAMPFIRE operate with the conservancy community, 
we observe both similarities and striking differences in community attributes such as 
institutions, management and utilization of common pool resources. The differences in 
characteristics between the CAMPFIRE community and the conservancy could be 
responsible for driving the discrepancies in outcomes between the two communities. Table 
C.1 in the Appendix C summarizes some of these differences and similarities.  
 
However, in this paper we will model only those key attributes that we believe matter for 
conservation and welfare. The main difference between the conservancy and CAMPFIRE 
community is that the former community is able to exercise anti-poaching enforcement, while 
the latter community can only engage in poaching. A community that derives benefits from 
wildlife conservation has adequate incentives to conservation wildlife. It is therefore rational 
for that community to abstracting from poaching and even engaging in anti-poaching 
activities. Anti-poaching effort exerted by the park agency and the conservancy has 
implications on the growth of the wildlife stock on communal and private land, and 
consequently on the welfare of the communities in question. In contrast, if a community lacks 
incentives to conserve wildlife, then it is unable to exercise anti-poaching enforcement. As a 
result, the community might chose to invest its effort in poaching rather than in developing 
                                                                 
44 While there is no statutory definition of a conservancy in Zimbabwe, the working defin ition is: “Any number 
of properties, which are amalgamated into a single complex in order to enable more effective management, 
utilization and protection of the natural resources” (Fitzgerald, 2012). 
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sound common pool resource institutions, which affects the community’s conservation and 
welfare outcomes45. Excessive poaching could have a negative impact on the stock of wildlife 
on communal land and inside the national park due to the absence of a fence.  
 
Since the park agency is the custodian of wildlife in the country, it cares about the stock of 
wildlife on both communal and private land, in addition to the stock inside the national park. 
Potentially, both communities will benefit if they are able to grow the stocks on private and 
communal land. Based on the knowledge and overall impressions about the community’s 
conservation effort, the park agency plays a central role in deciding the harvest quota for each 
community. In the next section, we use a bioeconomic model to evaluate the behaviour of 
various actors in order to propose institutional changes that might move individual decisions 
closer to the social optimum. Basically, moving from a suboptimal level requires each of 
these agents to follow the commands of the social planner. Though they have different 
starting points, there are additional requirements that the social planner also consider in order 
to differentiate them. Hence, the difference between price taking and price making in this 
model constitutes one of the differences in institutions. Accordingly, resolving this problem 
will necessarily not require some market based instrument only, but also institutional reforms. 
 
4.3. The bio-economic model 
 
The analysis focuses on comparing conservation and welfare outcomes for two different 
communities involved in wildlife management adjacent a formal protected area: the 
CAMPFIRE community gets part of the proceeds from wildlife conservation which are 
distributed to them as cash transfers, while the conservancy community manages wildlife and 
generates revenues directly through hunting and tourism activities. There are three agents: the 
park agency, the conservancy and the CAMPFIRE community. We formulate optimization 
problems for each agent representing the baseline scenarios in terms of wildlife management 
(stock size and anti-poaching enforcement), and wildlife utilization (harvesting effort and 
subsistence poaching effort). We then compare the outcomes with those of the social planner 
                                                                 
45 The park authorities are unable to carry out anti-poaching enforcement on communal land due to limited 
resources. As a result, local communities are now tasked to continue with the conservation work in their 
jurisdictions outside the formal protected areas. Anti-poaching enforcement under the CAMPFIRE programme 
is not effective because it is carried out on a part-time basis by either volunteers in the community (resource 
monitors) or the wildlife management committee, who usually face resource and time limitations , particularly 
during the agricultural season. 
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and suggest reforms required to induce the CAMPFIRE community to behave like the 
conservancy community, which produces better conservation and welfare outcomes. 
 
We adopt the standard assumption of a homogenous community where decisions are made at 
a group level, i.e., a community can choose to put effort into either poaching or anti-poaching 
enforcement, depending on how it weighs the benefits and costs from wildlife conservation. 
This is a plausible assumption given the nature of decision-making we observe. Local 
communities use traditional institutions, which normally involve the chief or village 
headmen, where they meet under a tree and make decisions together as a group. Even though 
rebellion often occurs in the community, social norms help ensure the prevalence of a certain 
course of action by all members of the community. The conservancy community has 
committees and boards in place that make the crucial decisions on behalf of the group. 
 
We assume that agents are managing a single wildlife species (e.g., African elephant) whose 
stock size is denoted by iX , where the subscript  1,0i  denotes a patch of land. We agree 
that the issue of relative sizes of the park and various communities is an important 
consideration, but we do not think that our key results are dependent on relative size46. Given 
the ineffectiveness of the fence between the park and communal lands, we assume that 
wildlife on that patch is managed as one stock. Intuitively, one could envisage the stock 
leaving the national park and roaming on communal land during the agricultural season 
(being attracted by crops) and returning to the protected areas after the season. Let 
0X  denote 
the stock of wildlife shared by the park agency and CAMPFIRE communities and 
1X  the 
stock managed by the conservancy. The following additional implicit assumptions apply:
0)( tX i , )0(iX  at time t=0 is given and )(iX , i.e., the stock of wildlife will not 
explode or grow toward infinity as time tends toward infinity because of the carrying capacity 
of the habitat. Please refer to the appendix for a summary of definitions of symbols and the 
functional forms used in this paper.  
 
No hunting takes place inside the national park, but it is allowed in areas outside the park. 
Therefore, in the absence of natural growth, 
0X  potentially shrinks when the stock roams on 
                                                                 
46 We abstract from reality and assume that the size of the park is independent of the stock of wildlife, poaching 
effort and anti-poaching enforcement, so that the variable does not affect our key results. This is a reasonable 
assumption to make because of the nature of the resource, i.e., its fugitive character. 
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communal land and is allowed to recover when it returns to the protected areas. Assuming a 
particular biomass at a specific point in time, )(tX i , the stock grows according to natural 
growth ),( iXF  and shrinks due to trophy hunting ih  and poaching )(i . 
1.4...........................................................................)........(),(   iiii hXFX 
  
Stock dynamics of wildlife roaming on communal land 
)(1.4...................................................................................)........,(),( 00000 aTLhLXFX
p  
Stock dynamics inside the conservancy  
)(1.4.........................................................................).........1,1(11)1,1(1 b
pTeTheTXFX   
where L  is anti-poaching effort exerted by the park agency, 
eT1  denotes anti-poaching effort 
exerted by the conservancy, 
pT0  represents the poaching effort employed by the CAMPFIRE 
community and pT1  represents the poaching effort of the local communities bordering the 
conservancy. We assume that the growth function depends not only on stock size, but also on 
anti-poaching effort, which facilitates growth of the wildlife stock. The natural growth 
function obeys the usual conditions: 
0
),(
and0
),(
,0
),(
,0
),(
1
110
2
2











 
e
e
i
i
i
i
T
TXF
L
LXF
X
XF
X
XF
 
In addition, we assume that  so that there is no growth if the stock size is 
either zero or reaches the carrying capacity of the resources system (Fischer et al., 2011).  
 
Unlike Fischer et al. (2011), who emphasized commercial poaching by outsiders but with 
assistance from the local community and anti-poaching enforcement by a few successful 
CAMPFIRE communities, we emphasize subsistence poaching activities by the majority of 
CAMPFIRE communities living adjacent to protected areas47. Our approach is in line with 
Johannesen and Skonhoft (2014). Accordingly, we assume that it is only the park agency that 
carries out anti-poaching enforcement both inside the park and in the communal areas 
adjacent to the protected area, but with limited resources at its disposal. The conservancy is 
                                                                 
47 Another point of departure between these two studies is that we are comparing two distinct CBNRM 
communities or habitats, while Fischer et al. (2011) looked at anti-poaching effort in the CAMPFIRE 
community 
),(0),0(   KFF
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responsible for anti-poaching effort in its area. The CAMPFIRE community perpetrates 
poaching on communal land, while poaching inside the conservancy is carried out by the 
non-CAMPFIRE communities living adjacent to the SVC – this is motivated by the need to 
defray costs from the nuisance effect of wildlife (Johannesen & Skohoft, 2014), for selfish 
reasons, i.e., hunting for meat and trophies (Marks, 1984; Barrett & Arcese, 1998; Fischer et 
al., 2011) and also to protest the establishment of conservancies in areas viewed as 
traditionally belonging to local communities (Wels, 2000).  
 
Poachers do not take into consideration the impact of their actions on the future stock of 
wildlife. It is natural to assume that the poaching function increases with poaching effort and 
decreases with anti-poaching enforcement exerted by the park agency and conservancy 
community, i.e., 
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The second-order derivatives are such that the poaching function is concave with respect to 
poaching effort and convex with respect to anti-poaching effort. The marginal productivity of 
poaching effort decreases with anti-poaching enforcement. 
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It is assumed that there is no relationship between the stock of wildlife in the conservancy 
and in the national park because the conservancy is enclosed such that wildlife cannot move 
across borders.48 The conservancy purchased live animals only once, when it was established, 
in order to boost its wildlife stock, and thereafter restocking ceased. By contrast, the stock of 
wildlife on communal land is linked to the population of wild animals in the national park 
due to the absence of an effective fence. Thus, the wildlife stock on communal land 
replenishes itself because of its relationship with the park (i.e., wildlife is ordinarily harvested 
when roaming on communal land and recovers when it returns to the national park).  
 
                                                                 
48 Of course, in exceptional cases, the conservancy can purchase live animals from the national park when 
restocking is required due to exogenous forces like severe drought or floods. 
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Currently, property rights in wildlife belong to the state, both inside and outside the national 
park (Child, 1996; Murombedzi, 1999). Therefore, both the CAMPFIRE communities and 
the conservancy landowners have only use rights to wildlife. From this perspective, land 
tenure ceases to be an important variable in this analysis. For purposes of this model, we can 
assume that the property rights in wildlife “belong” to the park manager.  
 
The park agency is responsible for allocating hunting quota 
ih  to other players in the wildlife 
sector. Let 
1h  and 0h  be the quota allocated to the conservancy and CAMPFIRE 
communities respectively. We assume a modified version of the fixed quota rule49. In 
practice, this could be implemented as iii hh  , where average quota is adjusted on the 
basis of overall impressions about the community’s conservation effort, rather than the actual 
stock size, because the park agency usually lacks vital information such as animal counts and 
trophy quality in the study area.  
 
The state has the right to grant appropriation authority (this includes both the right to use and 
right to income) to any individual or community (Murombedzi, 2003). In the case of the 
CAMPFIRE programme, the state gave the appropriation rights to the RDC instead of the 
local communities directly. Therefore, the RDC collects the revenues and makes the 
decisions about how the proceeds from wildlife conservation are allocated. The RDC 
generates wildlife income by selling hunting licenses to safari operators who, in turn, sell the 
licenses at a premium )(s  to clients from overseas. The RDC’s gross wildlife income is given 
by the following expression: 
)2.4....(....................................................................................................)()( 0
*
0 hsPhWW 
 
The parameter )(s  can be interpreted as a premium charged by the safari operator above the 
fee paid to the RDC and includes his time spent looking for clients, time spent with clients 
during the actual hunting sessions, his skills, guns, etc. *P  is the fixed price per unit of 
harvest paid by the trophy hunters, and is exogenous to the communities because there is a 
competitive environment in the wildlife sector, such that no single community can influence 
the trophy price. Moreover, the fact that Zimbabwe is only one of the many countries offering 
                                                                 
49 In practice, CAMPFIRE communities have generally complained that the quota does not change much and 
seems irresponsive to stock dynamics. This perception could be true, as quotas for selective or trophy hunting do 
not change much (Muchapondwa, 2003). Fischer et al. (2011) defined the fixed quotas rule ii hh  , which 
reflects the behaviour of an agency that is understaffed and does not dare take new initiatives. 
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sport-hunting opportunities motivates the price-taking assumption (Fischer et al., 2011). A 
fraction of the income )10(   goes into the hands of local communities, while the 
remainder )1(   is retained by the RDC. Hence, the community receives  
)3.4.........(..........................................................................................)()( 0
*
0 hsPhWW  
 
The CAMPFIRE community is involved in different production activities, for example, 
agricultural production, poaching, anti-poaching enforcement and selling hunting licenses. 
Because the property rights of the park manager are not effectively enforced on communal 
land, the local people are not effectively prevented from illegally harvesting wildlife. The 
harvesting of wildlife resources takes place legally through trophy hunting and illegally 
through poaching. The legal harvesting of wildlife is not carried out by the respective 
CAMPFIRE communities themselves, but the RDC sell hunting licenses to the safari 
operators who, in turn, sell them to overseas clients who eventually utilise the quota.  
 
Both communities allocate a fixed amount of effort )( iT  between the two activities, namely 
agricultural production )( aiT  and wildlife activities (i.e., either anti-poaching enforcement or 
illegal harvesting). Assuming a binding time constraint, we have: 
 
where the superscripts  epj ,  represent poaching effort 
pT0  by the CAMPFIRE 
communities and anti-poaching enforcement 
eT1  exerted by the conservancy.  
 
For a fixed size of agricultural land and hence neglecting the possible loss of wildlife habitat 
through agricultural expansion (Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2014), the agricultural yield 
function in the absence of wildlife damage depends on effort when all other variable inputs 
are assumed to be fixed. The agricultural technology is given by: 
 
The agricultural production function satisfies the usual concavity assumptions, i.e., , 
and . More wildlife means more nuisances, so that damages are 
proportional to the amount of wildlife (Carlso & Wetzsten, 1994; Hueth et al., 1998), i.e.,  
 
0h
(4.4) ..…......................................................................................................……ji
a
ii TTT 
(4.5) .…….......................................................................…………)()( jiii
a
iii TTATAA 
0)0( A
0(.) A 0(.) A
(4.6) ……….........................................................................................……iiii XDXD 
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where is a fixed constant and . Ideally,  captures the nuisance effect of the 
wildlife stock (see also Zivin et al., 2000). If the quantity of crops not damaged is
, then the net crop benefits are given by  
 
Below we discuss the optimization problems of the three agents (i.e., the park agency, 
conservancy community and the CAMPFIRE community) and the social planner separately. 
 
4.3.1 The park agency 
We assume that the park agency gets most of its income from non-consumptive tourism and 
budget allocation from the state, but not from selling hunting licenses, because trophy 
hunting is not permitted inside the national park. The park agency employs a small fraction of 
its anti-poaching effort L  outside the national park so that there is a small probability of being 
caught, )(0  , if the community decides to harvest wildlife illegally. We assume further that 
the probability of detection is a function of poaching effort and anti-poaching effort of the 
park agency. The probability of being detected when hunting illegally is assumed to be an 
increasing function of the time spent hunting illegally, as well as the level of law enforcement 
exerted by the park agency, i.e., 0/)( and 0/)( 000   LT
P  . In addition, we have
0),0()0,( 000 
PTL  . The marginal probability of detection increases with the level of anti-
poaching effort 0/)( 00  
PLT . 
 
The park agency receives four types of benefits: i) budget from the state, M ; ii) revenue from 
benign tourism )( 0XR ; iii) the public goods value of wildlife )(G ; and iv) proceeds from 
poaching fines 
00 )( c  imposed on detected perpetrators. It is assumed that 
 ,0)(,0)(0  GG 0)( and  G . The total cost of managing the park is given by Lv0 , where 
0v is the fixed cost per unit of anti-poaching effort. The park agency chooses hunting quotas 
to allocate to different communities and the level of anti-poaching effort to employ, which is 
split according to the land sizes inside and outside the park. The agency maximizes net 
benefits from different sources of income discussed above, subject to stock dynamics of wild 
animals shared by the park agency and CAMPFIRE community, the stock of wildlife 
0 ]1,0[D 
ii XD  11
(4.7) ..…….........................................……]1)[()()( i
j
iiii
a
ii
a
iii XTTAXTATAQ  
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roaming the conservancy, the budget constraints and the participation constraints of the two 
communities, where the discount rate is given by 0 . 
 
 
As in Mukanjari et al. (2013) and Johannesen and Skonhoft (2014), the park agency bases its 
decision on inter-temporal considerations because it has the property rights to wildlife on 
both public and private land, and chooses both an optimal amount of effort toward anti-
poaching activities and optimal quotas to give to CAMPFIRE communities and the 
conservancy. However, before park managers can calculate the quota, they need to know the 
wildlife stock in each community. The current value Hamiltonian is given by:  
 
with 
1h , 0h  and L  as the control variables; iX  as state variables; 0 and 0    as 
shadow prices50 for the shared stock 0X and the stock inside the conservancy 1X respectively; 
and i  as Lagrange multipliers. The following expressions can be obtained from the first-
order condition:    
 
According to Equation 4.8(b) above, the park agency employs anti-poaching effort until the 
benefits of stopping crime and growing the shared stock 0X  equals the value of reduced 
poaching plus the marginal cost of employing anti-poaching enforcement. Equations 4.8(c) 
                                                                 
50 The shadow price measures the approximate decrease in the present value of net benefits resulting fro m a unit 
decrease in the wildlife stock. 
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and 4.8(d) tells us that the park agency allocates hunting quotas until the shadow price of the 
stock equals the market value.  
)(8.4...........................................................................................................).........(
)(8.4.............................................................................................................................
*
2
*
1
dsP
cP




 
The portfolio conditions (Equation 4.8(e) and 4.8(f) below) indicates that the sum of the 
wildlife gain and the net stock effect resulting from maintaining one unit of wildlife must be 
equal to the marginal benefit of harvesting and putting the proceeds into the bank.  
 
On the assumption of the functional forms reported in the appendix, the market equilibrium 
levels of anti-poaching effort by the park agency and the respective stocks of wildlife 
roaming inside the national park and on communal land and in the conservancy can be 
computed from the first-order conditions given above. The steady-state off-take of wildlife 
can be solved for by substituting the optimal wildlife stock and anti-poaching effort into the 
harvesting function. For comparison purposes, all solutions to the maximization problems 
presented in this analysis are shown at the end of this section. 
 
4.3.2 The conservancy community 
The private game farms employ aT1  in agricultural production and anti-poaching effort eT1  in 
order to grow the wildlife stock. Benefits enjoyed by the private game farms come from 
agricultural production )(1 A , selling hunting licenses 1h , revenues from tourism activities 
)(R and proceeds from poaching fines 11 )( c  imposed on detected perpetrators on their land. 
Anti-poaching enforcement is costly, with 
1v  as the fixed cost per unit of anti-poaching effort. 
It is assumed that revenue from non-consumptive tourism )( 1XR  increases with the stock of 
wildlife; that is, 0)0( R , 0/)( 1   XR  and 0/)( 212   XR .  
 
The decision to be made by the conservancy community is how much anti-poaching effort eT1  
to invest in, while taking the off-take as given, because this is determined by the park agency 
through quota allocation 
1h . We make a crucial assumption that the legal harvest can’t exceed 
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quota because it is guided by the quota. However, the overall harvest can exceed the quota, but the 
extra harvest is illegal. Because the conservancy community has appropriation rights (legal 
rights to exploit wildlife), they have a long-term view and therefore take the stock dynamics 
into consideration. For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate used by the park agency 
is the same as the discount rate used by the conservancy community and the social planner. 
Thus, the conservancy community’s net benefits from agriculture and wildlife conservation 
are given by: 
 
 
The production activities inside the conservancy are constrained by stock dynamics, the 
hunting quota and labour effort. The current value Hamiltonian is given by:  
 
 
The first-order condition with respect to anti-poaching effort is therefore given by: 
 
Equation 4.9(b) tells us that the conservancy community will employ eT1  until the benefit of 
catching a poacher and the value of growing the stock of wildlife as a result of a marginal 
increase in effort equals the value of losing agricultural harvest as a result of employing anti-
poaching enforcement, the marginal cost of anti-poaching enforcement and the value of 
reduced poaching. In other words, the conservancy community allocates time toward anti-
poaching activities until the loss from agriculture and anti-poaching equals the value of the 
growth in stock plus marginal benefits from collecting fines. According to equation 4.9(c), 
the conservancy community would maintain the stock of wildlife at a level that equates the 
return from trophy hunting and tourism activities with the return from alternative assets. 
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On the assumption of the functional forms shown in the appendix, the market equilibrium 
levels of anti-poaching effort by the conservancy community can be computed from the first-
order conditions. The optimal wildlife stock is the same whether computed by the park 
agency or conservancy. 
 
4.3.3 The CAMPFIRE community 
We assume that the CAMPFIRE community takes both stock size and legal off-take 0h  as 
given. This is consistent with the behaviour we discovered in the survey, which suggests that 
community institutions are not strong enough to be proactive in conservation. The local 
community allocates its fixed endowment of labour effort 0T  between two production 
activities, namely agriculture 
aT0  and poaching 
pT0 , with 0  as the fixed per unit cost of 
poaching effort. As a result, there is a probability of being caught, denoted by )(0  , if 
community members engage in illegal harvesting of wildlife resources. If caught, the 
community is levied a fixed fine 
00 )( c , paid to the park agency.  
 
As usual, the unit price of agricultural output
aP and illegal wildlife off-take   are assumed 
to be fixed, where   *P  and   is the discount associated with illegal sales. It is 
reasonable to assume that the price of the illegal off-take could be far less that the market 
price )..( *Pei  because of institutional constraints associated with selling on the black 
market. Poachers sell their trophies at a lower price because they want to attract buyers and 
dispose of the trophies as quickly as possible to reduce the risk of being caught. The legal 
benefits from wildlife conservation 0
* )( hsP   are exogenous to the local community. We 
assume that   is fixed over time and is decided on by the RDC at the beginning of the 
CAMPFIRE programme. In a way, this also removes the decision power of the RDC in 
deciding how much revenue to allocate to CAMPFIRE communities, where all elements are 
given and not at its discretion. The CAMPFIRE community is taxed twice, first by the safari 
operator, who charges a total commission of 0sh  for the specialised services offered, and 
then a second tax amount of 0
*)1( hP  by the RDC for general programme administration.  
 
We assume that the CAMPFIRE community maximise short-run gains. Johannesen and 
Skonhoft (2014) argue that this myopic behaviour is reasonable because, in most cases, the 
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legal benefits from conservation going into the hands of local communities are too small 
relative to the cost of living with wildlife. Therefore, it is rational for the CAMPFIRE 
community to harvest as much as possible today, because of perceived risk and uncertainty in 
the future, i.e., they do not know if they may be effectively prevented from harvesting 
tomorrow due to, say, improved law enforcement. The issue of time preference or risk affect 
behaviour, decision marking and the planning horizon of CAMPFIRE communities. Future 
wildlife stock depends on the current wildlife hunting, which in turn hinges on the agent’s 
time preference and planning horizon.  
 
Furthermore, the benefits derived from wildlife resources are subject to uncertainty 
associated with production and market risks and variability of benefits from wildlife 
conservation might affect the decision of the community to exert more effort towards illegal 
harvesting of wildlife resource or to conserve the resource, depending on the attitude of 
agents towards risk and how the community perceive wildlife. Wildlife does not generate 
income for CAMPFIRE communities every hunting season. This depends on a number of 
factors. For example, the park agent might not to allocate a quota to a particular community, 
or the animals in a community might not be of good trophy quality. As already alluded to 
above, if the benefits are small relative to the costs, the community might find it reasonable to 
invest effort in poaching rather than conserve the resource. 
Thus, the CAMPFIRE community chooses poaching effort in order to maximise current net 
benefits from agriculture and poaching shown in Equation (4.10) subject to the labour 
constraint. 
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The first order conditions are given by 
 
 
The local communities employ 
PT0  until the benefits from employing an additional unit of 
poaching effort equates to the loss in agriculture, the cost of poaching effort and marginal 
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loss due to paying fines. On the assumption of the functional forms indicated in the appendix, 
the market equilibrium level of poaching effort by the local communities can be computed 
from the first-order conditions.  
 
If benefits from wildlife conservation increase, then the welfare of the local community as a 
whole also increases. This could be achieved when the poaching effort exerted by the 
CAMPFIRE community is reduced and the population of wildlife on communal land 
increases, such that the quota allocation given to the local community also increases. Using 
proceeds from wildlife conservation, local communities around the GNP invest in public 
goods that benefit the society as whole, such as schools, clinics, electricity and grinding mills, 
rather than distributing the income to households. Investing in public goods could have a 
significant impact on community welfare. 
 
4.3.4 The social planner’s problem 
The social planner chooses anti-poaching enforcement, poaching effort and hunting quotas in 
order to maximise the present value of net benefits from the activities of all the three agents 
(e.g., agricultural production, trophy hunting, tourism activities, state budget, the public good 
value of the wildlife stock and proceeds from poaching fines) subject to stock dynamics, 
budget, participation and harvesting constraints. The existence value or cultural value of the 
public goods might be different from what the park agency assumes. The social planner 
knows about the existence value   that the local community places on the wildlife stock in 
their area and, hence, incorporates it in his valuation. The social planner is confronted with 
the following maximization problem: 
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The current value Hamiltonian is, therefore, given by equation 4.11(a) where and are the 
shadow values (co-state variables) for the wildlife stock in the park, outside the park and in 
the conservancy. 
  
The first-order conditions with respect to anti-poaching effort are given by:  
 
 
According to Equation 4.11(b), the social planner employs anti-poaching effort until the 
benefit of growing the stock in and outside the park equals the value of reduced poaching, 
plus the cost of employing the anti-poaching effort. Equation 4.11(c) says that the social 
planner will allocate labour between agriculture and anti-poaching enforcement in the 
conservancy until the benefit of catching a poacher and the value of growing the wildlife 
stock as a result of a marginal increase in anti-poaching effort equate to the value of losing 
agricultural harvest as a result of employing anti-poaching enforcement, the marginal cost of 
anti-poaching enforcement and the value of forgone poaching. 
 
The first-order condition with respect to poaching effort is given by:  
 
The social planner would allocate labour between agriculture and poaching until the benefits 
of reduced poaching due to an additional unit of poaching effort (corrected for market 
distortions) equates to the loss in agriculture and the cost of poaching effort. Equation 4.11(e) 
and 4.11(f) states that the social planner will allocate hunting licenses until the shadow price 
and market price are equated, again correcting for market distortions.  
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Equations 4.11(g) and 4.11(h) show the evolution of the co-state variables over time. The 
social planner would, therefore, maintain the wildlife stock at a level that equates the return 
from wildlife conservation with the return from alternative assets. The return from the stock 
of wildlife is in terms of the change in the marginal valuation of the stock and stock effects 
on revenue from wildlife tourism (in the case of wildlife stock in the conservancy) and 
natural growth of the wildlife stock. 
 
 
The social planner’s explicit solution can be computed from the first-order conditions using 
the functional forms assumed and presented in the appendix. From the maximization 
problems discussed above, one can solve for the optimal anti-poaching effort by the park 
agency and conservancy community, 
*e
1
* T and  i.e.L , respectively; poaching effort exerted by 
the CAMPFIRE communities, 
p*
0T i.e. ; the steady state wildlife stock, 
*
1
*
0  and  i.e. XX ; and 
the optimal quota allocation, 
*
0
*
1 h and  i.e. h , from all the equations presented in section 4.3.1 
through 4.3.4. Table 4.2 shows the comparison between the market equilibrium and the social 
planner’s solution.  
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the market solution and the social planner’s solution 
Market Solution Sign Social Planner 
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4.4. Discussion of the results 
 
In this section, we start by commenting on the differences in Table 4.2 and then narrow them 
down to the key roles of poaching and institutions in influencing biodiversity outcomes. We 
also consider some comparative statics, including the related policy implications, and 
numerical illustrations of the theoretical model.  
4.4.1 Comparative statics 
The results are consistent with theoretical expectations. The results above show that the stock 
of wildlife roaming in and outside the protected area, i.e., the shared stock *
0X  and the stock 
managed by the conservancy *
1X , could be less than what the social planner would prescribe. 
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This also implies that the optimal harvest on communal land and in the conservancy is less 
than that of the social planner; see Table 2 above. The solution of anti-poaching enforcement 
by the park agency *L  is ambiguous. The market solution is greater than the social planner’s 
prescription if 000 bcg   and vice versa. The fact that the market solution differs from the 
social planner’s outcome suggests that anti-poaching effort exerted by the park agency is 
suboptimal. Duffy (1999) reported some inefficiency associated with anti-poaching 
enforcement in Zimbabwe. Anti-poaching effort exerted by the park agency decreases with 
the cost of employing that effort, i.e., 0/*  ovL , while increasing anti-poaching 
enforcement increases the probability of being caught, i.e., 0/*  ogL . Given the latter 
result, it might be beneficial for the park agency to increase L  in order to grow the shared 
wildlife stock *
0X .  
 
If the conservancy community values wildlife as much as the social planner does, then the 
level of anti-poaching enforcement *
1
eT  exerted by the conservancy achieves social optimality, 
i.e., both the market and the social planner’s solution are the same. This is the case when a 
market efficient outcome is equal to a socially optimal level. With this level of anti-poaching 
enforcement, poaching activities are kept at their lowest level and, hence, the stock inside the 
conservancy will grow. We argue that the off-take inside the conservancy is efficient because 
harvesting is determined by the quota set by the park agency, and poaching is contained 
through the employment of an efficient level of effort, which increases the probability of 
being caught, i.e., 0/ 1*1  gT e . Therefore, starting from a lower level of stock, if the anti-
poaching effort exerted by the conservancy is both efficient and socially optimal, then this 
could drive the wildlife stock inside the conservancy toward optimality, provided that 
harvesting does not exceed the maximum sustainable yield.  
 
The CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching effort than the level the social planner 
would recommend. The role of poaching is to reduce the stock of wildlife when it is roaming 
on communal land. The off-take on communal lands is suboptimal, since harvesting is not 
only determined by the quota set by the park agency, but also by communities through 
poaching. Again, starting from a lower level, the wildlife stock in the community could 
diverge from the social planner’s recommendation due to resource overexploitation. The 
differences between the market and the social planner’s solutions are driven by externalities. 
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Given the fact that we are considering non-marketed goods, the market solution suffers from 
externalities, while the social planner takes externalities into account. To capture the 
deviation between the market and social equilibria, a parameter   is included in the model to 
take into account the potential for the divergence to worsen under market equilibrium. Thus, 
as the price of the illegal harvest increases, the community increases its poaching effort (i.e., 
0/*0  
pT ) in order to increase net benefits. This behaviour could lead to overexploitation 
of wildlife resources on communal land as the community seeks to maximize net benefits. 
 
The results show a negative relationship between poaching effort and the price of agricultural 
output 0/*0  a
p PT , the discount associated with illegal sales 0/*0  
pT  and the  
probability of being caught 0/ 0
*
0  gT
p
. From the analysis, it is evident that the 
CAMPFIRE communities suffer a double tax; initially, the safari operator charges a 
commission s  for the services rendered, and then the community loses a fraction, 1 , 
which goes to the RDC. Effectively, the price faced by the local community becomes 
)( * sP  , while the conservancy community gets *P . Consequently, anything that deviates 
from the social planner’s solution is not optimal and, thus, must be corrected. 
 
The real result from this analysis is the uncovering of the policy instrument to improve 
outcomes in the CAMPFIRE communities. That policy instrument should not be imposed 
exogenously. We focus on policy because it is crucial on the conservation side through its 
effect on stock dynamics, and also crucial on the welfare side through its effect on economic 
benefits. The following policy interventions could potentially benefit the CAMPFIRE 
communities if they were to be implemented. 
 
i. Reducing taxation on CAMPFIRE communities: From a policy standpoint, local 
communities would benefit if they could operate with the same self-sufficiency as the 
conservancy community because both taxes could be avoided. This could be achieved by 
hiring a manager or building internal capacity to match that in the conservancy community. 
The differences in the level of education between these two communities are revealing: the 
average number of years in school in the CAMPFIRE community is 7 compared to 15 in the 
conservancy. 
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ii. Reduce the price of illegal offtake: Likewise, a policy instrument that increases the risk 
premium   could decrease the effective price of the illegal off-take and, hence, poaching 
effort, i.e., 0/*0  
pT . Reducing the effective price of the illegal off-take discourages the 
community from poaching by eroding the incentives, because 0/*0  
pT . It is possible to 
integrate the risk premium into CPR institutions by carefully designing policy instruments 
that are adapted to local conditions. 
 
iii. Appropriate institutional reforms: As reported earlier, the survey results for the 
CAMPFRE community point to weak institutions that are not supportive of proactive 
conservation. This is dramatically opposite to the behaviour observed in the conservancy 
community. As a result, it motivates us to explore whether an institutional reform in the 
CAMPFIRE community could move its welfare and conservation outcomes closer to those of 
the seemingly successful conservancy community. Because the CAMPFIRE community 
exerts more poaching effort in the market solution than the level that is socially optimal, we 
investigate the transition to social optimality by introducing an institutional variable which 
portrays a constraint on poaching behaviour. We argue that institutions affect biodiversity 
indirectly through constraining human behaviour (see chapter 3).  
 
Thus, we introduce an institutional variable  , which enters the model through the poaching 
function )(0  . For this purpose, we will consider a variable   that measures lack of 
cooperation, such that, when   is zero, the community has sound institutions and 
cooperation is also high. When   is one, then institutions are very weak and there is no 
cooperation in the community. Accordingly, 0  produces zero poaching, while 1  
produces maximum poaching. Assuming the following explicit form, 
]1,0[0,][(.) 000  
 andbLbTa P , the modified solution for poaching effort is thus 
given by: 
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Most importantly, improvement in institutions might have significant impact on growth of the 
wildlife stock through its role in constraining behaviour, i.e., 0/*0  
pT . Thus, 
constraining poaching effort might drive the stock shared by the park agency and 
CAMPFIRE communities toward the social planner’s solution and avert a tragedy of the 
commons. The institutional variable   is a function of several other variables, such as 
governance, monitoring and enforcement, community level trust and endogenous punishment 
(see chapter 3). As a matter of policy, we want   to be a number which is low and very 
close to zero.  
 
One way to iron out all issues with the current CAMPFIRE setup is to give local communities 
autonomy and to empower the wildlife management committees, so that they are able to 
effectively discharge their duties. This entails building local level institutions that will, in 
turn, set the community agenda on new social norms which are pro-conservation. For 
instance, an improvement in governance structures at the community level, monitoring and 
enforcement, and community level trust might contribute toward the attainment of a healthy 
biodiversity outcome as well as contain poaching activities. This could also be achieved 
through capacity building (institutional capacity) or training and funding to equip 
CAMPFIRE communities with much-needed resources. Moreover, if the community is 
allowed to endogenize punishment, then poaching might subside to socially optimal levels. 
 
4.4.2 Numerical illustrations 
The theoretical model will now be illustrated using functional form assumptions and data 
which fit well with the exploitation of the African elephant population by communities 
around the Gonarezhou ecosystem. African elephants are threatened by local communities 
because they cause more damage to agricultural crops than do other wild animals (Fischer et 
al., 2011). Each year, quite a significant proportion of elephants leaves the national park and 
visits the nearby communal areas during the agricultural season. Using MATLAB51, we 
compute the optimal solutions from all the optimization problems presented above, and then 
proceed to show the stock dynamics as we vary anti-poaching effort and poaching effort and 
constrain the poaching effort while holding other variables constant. Model simulation was 
done using the following stock dynamic equation in discrete form. 
                                                                 
51 A MathWorks programming tool in MATLAB known as Simulink was used to do graphical programming, 
i.e., modeling or developing the algorithms, simulating and analyzing dynamic systems. 
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Following Johannessen and Skonhoft (2000), we normalize the catch-ability coefficient   to 
one so that the Schaefer harvesting function becomes )()( tXth ii  . The harvesting effort 
now belongs to the interval 10   so that the off-take cannot exceed the available 
resources. The natural growth function is specified as shown in the appendix, and again we 
normalise the size of the stock by setting the carrying capacity equal to one, i.e., 1K . The 
size of the wildlife stock (measured in biomass level) is thus expressed as a fraction of the 
carrying capacity and must be in the interval 1)(0  tX i . Furthermore, the intrinsic growth 
rate r is set equal to 0.3 (Caughley & Sinclar, 1994; Johannessen & Skonhoft, 2000). In line 
with other studies, we also force both poaching and anti-poaching effort to lie between 0 and 
1, i.e.,  10 and 10 ,10 01 
pe TTL .  
 
The model identifies three strategies (reducing taxation, reduce the price of illegal offtake and 
institutional reform) as part of the solution for sustainable wildlife management by 
CAMPFIRE communities. In an idea setting, we believe that the strategies should be 
deployed simultaneously. The model simulations are therefore based on the simultaneous 
deployment of these three strategies. If they were mutually exclusive and a choice of the most 
effective strategies was required, then the simulations would have to be conducted using a 
different model and data set. 
 
The model simulation results confirm the theoretical predictions in section 4.3. In 
equilibrium, the anti-poaching effort by the park agency is less than the level of effort 
recommended by the social planner, while anti-poaching effort exerted by the conservancy 
community is just the same as that prescribed by the social planner. The poaching effort 
employed by the CAMPFIRE community is twice as much as that required for social 
optimality. The equilibrium stocks under the market solution are less than the social planner’s 
solution.  
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Table 4.3: Numerical illustration – optimal solutions  
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Figure 4.1 shows the changes in the next period stock (i.e. for the shared stock) as we vary 
anti-poaching enforcement exerted by the park agency between 0 and 1 while holding other 
variables constant. The figure shows that size of the wildlife stock on communal land 
increases as the park agency increases anti-poaching effort up to a certain point, and later on 
stabilizes at a slightly lower level than the social planner’s recommendations. The gap 
between the market solution and the social planner’s prescription does not completely iron 
out due to resource limitations. The numerical illustrations show that anti-poaching 
enforcement might grow the stock on communal land up to a certain level of effort
that is socially optimal, beyond which the stock ceases to grow due to other factors beyond 
the park agency’s control.  
Figure 4.1: Market solution for the park agency versus the social planner 
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Figure 4.2 shows the changes in the next period stock inside the conservancy as we vary anti-
poaching effort exerted by the conservancy community between 0 and 1 while holding other 
variables constant. The diagram shows that if anti-poaching effort by the conservancy 
community is optimal, then the stock size prescribed by the social planner and the market 
solution will eventually coincide with each other. This is the case when market solution is 
equal to social optimality. The convergence of the two solutions is very fast in the case of the 
conservancy community. 
 
Figure 4.2: Market solution for the conservancy community versus the social planner  
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the changes in the next period stock (i.e., shared stock) as we vary the 
poaching effort exerted by the CAMPFIRE community between 0 and 1 while holding other 
variables constant. The figure shows that the stock size on communal land diverges from the 
social planner’s solution if poaching continues unabated. Initially, the wildlife stock outside 
the park increases with very low levels of poaching up to a certain point (about 0.26), then 
starts to decrease tremendously. If local communities continue to increase the level of 
poaching effort beyond this point, then this could drive the resource system toward economic 
or physical extinction. Beyond a certain level of stock, again, the wildlife stock will not be 
able to regenerate itself without human intervention. 
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Figure 4.3: Market solution of CAMPFIRE community versus the social planner 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the changes in the next period stock of wildlife (i.e., shared stock) as we 
introduce a variable for institutions and vary constrained poaching effort exerted by the 
CAMPFIRE community between 0 and 1 while holding other variables constant. Starting 
from a lower level, the stock size in the local community’s conservation area grows in a 
nonlinear fashion52 until the solution coincides with the prescriptions of the social planner, if 
the poaching effort is constrained. Ideally, we would want parameter   to be some number 
which is close to zero for faster convergence. The figure below shows that, starting with 
1  (i.e., with the situation in Figure 4 above), an improvement in institutions, such that the 
parameter rho is forced toward zero 0)..( ei , means that the shared stock will mimic the 
dynamics of the wildlife stock inside the conservancy. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates 
how stronger institutions help to bridge the divide between the market and social planner’s 
solution more quickly than do weaker institutions. The graph below is drawn for the different 
values of rho, i.e.,  =1.00, 0.65, 0.02, 0.09 and 3.0 .   
                                                                 
52 Non-linearity occur when the relationship between variables is not simply static, direct or exact, for instance, 
y = ax + b. This is a property of chaotic systems, characterized by random behavior and uncertainty such as in 
modelling extraction (growth) of natural resources or a social ecological system. If the resource b ase features 
non-lenearities, which is highly likely, that might also give rise to non-linearities in the growth path of the 
resource. Non-linearity and uncertainty requires pro-active and adaptive management rather than reactive 
management because we don’t know, a priori, what will happen if the resource system is subjected beyond its 
limit, e.g., harvested beyond its threshold. We also don’t know what will happen to the ecological balance if one 
or more species were to disappear from the system. 
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Figure 4.4: Market solution of local communities (with institutions) versus the social planner 
 
 
4.5. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects are central for future rural development in 
Southern Africa. However, the impact of benefit-sharing schemes, such as the CAMPFIRE 
programme in Zimbabwe, is limited by possible dilemmas in the actual design of the scheme 
or trade-offs inherent in linking development and conservation objectives. The objectives of 
this paper are to compare wildlife management and utilization under the CAMPFIRE 
communities and conservancy community, and to consider the possibility of wildlife tenure 
and institutional reforms that might replicate conservancies’ successful outcomes on 
communal areas implementing CAMPFIRE. Therefore, unlike previous studies, this paper 
seeks to establish the conditions under which a CAMPFIRE community can be incentivized 
to behave like the conservancy community, which is more successful in revenue generation 
and stewardship practice.  
 
To achieve the objectives above, we used a bio-economic model. We developed and 
compared the problems for benefit-sharing arrangements under CAMPFIRE and the 
conservancy communities operating adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park. Firstly, the 
chapter demonstrated that the conservancy community is superior to the pure benefit-sharing 
scheme in terms of employment of effort and the long-run wildlife stock. Secondly, the 
chapter analysed wildlife management and utilization under the assumption that the 
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communities in question are given a greater degree of autonomy so that they are able to 
invest in stronger CPR institutions.  
 
The results show that the level of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency could be 
lower than the social planner’s prescription. It might not be optimal for the park agency to 
provide anti-poaching enforcement inside the national game park and in communal areas. 
This result seems to support policy or institutional reforms that convey greater control of 
natural resources through devolution and decentralization of NRM functions, and decision-
making to the community’s grass roots level, since the community incurs lower cost of 
monitoring and enforcement. 
 
The social planner recommends higher levels of wildlife stock in the conservancy and on 
communal land, i.e., shared stock. If the conservancy community values wildlife to the same 
degree as does the social planner, then their level of anti-poaching enforcement achieves 
social optimality. This could drive the wildlife stock in the conservancy toward the social 
planner’s solution, starting from a lower stock level. CAMPFIRE communities exert more 
poaching effort than what the social planner would recommend. As a result, the size of the 
shared stock might diverge over time from the social planner’s prescription, starting from a 
lower level.  
 
Because both the CAMPFIRE and conservancy communities are carrying out similar 
activities, they should potentially be able to achieve similar results. The differences in 
observed outcomes between them could be a result of the differences in community 
institutions. The results confirm that an improvement in community institutions might have 
significant impact on growth of the wildlife stock through its role of constraining behaviour. 
Resolving the problem faced by CAMPFIRE communities will necessarily not require market 
based instrument alone, but also institutional reforms. This study calls for three main 
strategies to allow campfire communities to move from a seemingly inferior outcome to one 
that is optimal.  
 
Firstly, this result calls for policy instruments that will facilitate the development of sound 
CPR institutions that are tailored to suit local conditions and endogenous to the community. 
Specifically, to strengthen the incentives in CAMPFIRE communities, we propose that the 
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RDC should transfer wildlife management functions and benefits to sub-district producer 
communities. This also implies that government policy should aim at building local level 
institutions that will, in turn, set the tone for community agenda on new social norms which 
are pro-conservation. This could be achieved through capacity building, investment in 
institutional building blocks such as governance structures at the local level, democracy, 
monitoring and enforcement, and community level trust, and funding to equip CAMPFIRE 
communities with much-needed resources.  
 
Since wildlife is a fugitive resource, there is also need for CAMPFIRE communities to 
coordinate their effort and resources in order to supply the required habitat and effort to fight 
illegal harvesting of wildlife resource on a broader scale. This calls for CAMPFIRE 
communities to invest in collective action beyond the borders of each project or community 
in the form of multi-layered enterprises or organizations that are endogenous to the 
programme. The government should therefore allow CAMPFIRE projects to be innovative so 
that they can learn from each other, through their past experiences and mistakes, and to 
develop and experiment with different models of conservation.   
 
Secondly, CAMPFIRE communities suffer double taxation from the premium charged by the 
safari operators and a significant proportion of wildlife income that remains in the hands of 
the Rural District Council. From a policy standpoint, CAMPFIRE communities would benefit 
immensely if they could learn from the model of the conservancy community and operate 
with the same autonomy and self-sufficiency as the conservancy because both taxes could be 
avoided. This could be achieved by hiring a manager or building internal capacity to match 
that in the conservancy community. This implies a different model or an improvement of the 
current benefit-sharing scheme so that CAMPFIRE communities can mimic the business 
model or behaviour of the conservancy community and in the process receive full benefits 
from conservation and pay taxes to the state and levies to the Rural District Council, instead 
of receiving cash transfers. Innovative policy instruments are required to assist CAMPFIRE 
communities in various activities of wildlife conservation so that they can integrate into the 
main stream economy and fully commercialize their operations. 
 
Thirdly, designing policy instruments that increases the risk premium could decrease the 
effective price of the illegal off-take. Reducing the effective price of the illegal off-take 
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discourages the community from poaching by eroding the incentives. It is possible to 
integrate the risk premium into local institutions by carefully designing policy instruments 
that are adapted to local conditions. We recommend that these three strategies should be deployed 
simultaneously for an effective and fast solution to the challenges faced by CAMPFIRE projects.  This 
implies that policy makers should use a combination of both market-based instruments and 
institutional reforms since they seem to complement each other.   
 
Result show that the employment of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency is 
suboptimal. As a matter of policy, it is optimal for the park agency to withdraw anti-poaching 
effort from the local community and offer regulatory services. Withdrawing effort from the 
community will allow the park managers to use the limited resources effectively and 
efficiently on a relatively smaller area. The finding support policies that favour increased 
devolution or decentralisation of natural resource management functions, decision making 
and authority to the community’s grassroots level. We recommend that the park agency 
should leave the society to its own device so that it can develop its own solutions to the 
environmental problems faced. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
5.1. Summary of the findings 
 
This thesis examined the economics and institutional aspects of community wildlife 
conservation in the context of local communities living adjacent to the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe. Several challenges threaten conservation efforts at both local and higher 
levels. This impedes its ability to bring about development that might improve the welfare of 
poor rural communities participating in wildlife conservation. The most pressing issues in the 
wildlife sector include; i. the inability to extract resource rents from wildlife conservation that 
in turn affects household welfare in terms of total household income, and reduction in 
poverty and inequality, ii. the lack of capacity by local communities to solve collective action 
problems, and iii. the lack of comparable successful outcomes in CBNRM communities such 
as the wildlife conservancy communities. 
 
The thesis contributes to the broad research agenda on the human-environment relationship 
by analysing the issues highlighted above in three separate papers each corresponding to a 
thesis chapter. The first paper presented in chapter 2 analyses the effects of wildlife resources 
in the portfolio of environmental income on household welfare. The paper seeks to enhance 
our understanding of the relationship between wildlife income in the portfolio of 
environmental income versus poverty and inequality. The results show that the contribution 
of environmental income (including wildlife) to total household income is quite substantial. 
Wealthier households consumed more non-wildlife resources and wildlife products in total 
than relatively poor households. However, poorer households derived greater benefit from the 
consumption of both wildlife and non-wildlife resources than wealthier households. 
Excluding wildlife from the analysis compromised the relative contribution of environmental 
resources, while at the same time increased the relative contribution of farm and wage 
income. Environmental income (with and without wildlife) had more impact in terms of 
poverty reduction in the lower income quintiles than in the upper quintiles. Wildlife income 
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alone accounted for about 5.5% reduction in the proportion of people living below the 
poverty line. Furthermore, wildlife income had an equalising effect, bringing about a 5.4% 
reduction in measured inequality. 
 
The regression results revealed that the likelihood of belonging to a wealthier category of 
income increased with an increase in environmental income. However, the marginal effect of 
environmental income is very small. It suggests that only households that are positioned on 
the boundary will be able to move to the next income quintile because of the increase in 
environmental income. Its impact may be less pronounced for households that are located 
further away from the boundary. As expected, household wealth significantly and positively 
affect environmental income generated by households. Evidence of the relationship between 
benefits and quality of the resource system suggest that households generated more 
environmental income in areas with good biodiversity than in areas where there is an 
unhealthy population of wild animals. It is actually a good outcome that poor people benefit 
from wildlife conservation in the study area. However, conservation outcomes in the 
CAMPFIRE communities fall short of expectations. Therefore, there was need to investigate 
the drivers of conservation. 
 
The second paper presented in chapter 3 analyses the role of institutions in community 
wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe, based on Ostrom’s framework for analysing complex 
social ecological systems. The paper used two regression models to examine the association 
between institutions and cooperation (defined as the ability to self-organise) and the 
relationship between cooperation and success of biodiversity outcomes. Overall, the results 
demonstrated that institutions are indeed an important ingredient for cooperation and that 
cooperation is necessary for the success of biodiversity outcomes. Therefore, the story 
supported in this paper is that biodiversity conservation is forged by cooperation and 
cooperation is directly driven by institutions.   
 
Other important variables explaining cooperation in the first model were community level 
trust, number of stakeholders and punishment. Cooperation was higher in those communities 
where the level of trust was higher, in communities that had more stakeholders involved in 
wildlife conservation and in cases where punishment was endogenised by the community. In 
the second model; training, benefits, distance from the nearest urban centre, distance from the 
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park fence, social capital average age of household head, new fence and information sharing 
were also found to be important variables explaining the success of biodiversity.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, it is agreed that institutional attributes, such as monitoring 
and enforcement, fairness, governance and democracy, are important ingredients for the 
community’s ability to self-organisation and to manage natural resources sustainably. The 
third paper presented in chapter 4 uses bio-economic modelling with numerical illustrations 
to confirm theoretically the importance of institutions for community wildlife conservation in 
the context of poor rural communities living adjacent to the GNP in Zimbabwe. To be able to 
deal effectively with institutions in the model, there was a need to talk about a different type 
of community, other than the CAMPFIRE community. Thus, for the purposes of this study, 
we chose the the Save Valley Conservancy. Both communities are conserving wildlife in a 
community-based fashion, but their level of success is different – the performance of the 
CAMPFIRE community is much worse. 
 
The paper formulated bio-economic models for the park agency, the conservancy and 
CAMPFIRE communities that represent the baseline scenarios in terms of wildlife 
management, wildlife utilisation, poaching effort and anti-poaching enforcement, and 
compare the outcome with the social planner’s solution. We then proceed to suggest 
institutional reforms for the CAMPFIRE community so that they behave like the conservancy 
community in the Save Valley Conservancy (SVC). 
 
The results show that the level of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency is 
suboptimal, while anti-poaching enforcement exerted by the game farming community in the 
conservancy achieves social optimality. CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching effort 
than what the social planner would recommend. Our model shows that an improvement in 
community institutions might have a significant impact on growth of the wildlife stock 
through their role in constraining behaviour. Thus, institutional reforms in benefit-sharing 
schemes such as CAMPFIRE could see the local community behaving like the game farming 
communities such as the one in the Save Valley Conservancy.  
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5.2 Policy implications of the research findings 
 
The results of this study help to shed light on the link between wildlife income (in the context 
of environmental income) and welfare, the processes explaining complex social-ecological 
systems and suggest appropriate institutional reforms for the CAMPFIRE programme. The 
intended beneficiaries of the study are local communities, wildlife agencies, development 
practitioners and policy makers who will acquire relevant and empirically grounded evidence. 
Our research findings will allow them to interrogate their wildlife management strategies and 
policies while at the same time identifying areas that need to be improved. A number of 
policy implications obtain from the analysis in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: Effects of Wildlife on Community Welfare: Income Poverty and Inequality 
The main policy message to take home in Chapter 2 is that, wildlife conservation has an 
important role in mitigating poverty and income inequality in CAMPFIRE communities. 
Several other policy implications can be drawn from the analysis in this chapter. Reduced 
access to wildlife income could have substantial impact on welfare in CAMPFIRE 
communities and might potentially increase poverty and inequality in the study area. There is 
therefore a need to design policies that increase access to wildlife income by poor rural 
households living adjacent to national parks because this could have an impact on their 
welfare. To avoid further marginalization of the poor, attention to equity in resource 
management and access to resources should be a prime consideration, particularly with 
valuable resources such as wildlife. Increased devolution of wildlife management function 
from the Rural District Council into the hands of local communities could allow more access 
to wildlife income and potentially contribute towards reducing poverty and inequality. The 
relationship between environmental income and wealth has some interesting policy 
implications given that wealthier households accumulate more assets with which to harvest 
more environmental resources. This implies that wildlife-based land reform also needs to 
empower poor households in the area of capital accumulation while imposing restraint on 
harvesting by well-off households. 
 
In line with our goal of using wildlife resources to bring about community welfare, we 
believe that policy experiments of increasing wildlife income could highlight the importance 
of wildlife resources for redistributive policy targeting. The results illustrate that increases in 
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wildlife income can greatly impact poverty, but not inequality because inequality is less 
responsive to policy induces increments in wildlife income. Thus policies which seek to 
reduce poverty in rural communities should consider increasing access to wildlife income by 
these communities. The results demonstrate that a policy induced increment in wildlife 
income of slightly more than 15% is needed to reduce poverty in the whole population to 
zero.   
 
There is need for a policy shift away from the resource itself to encompass the broader local 
economy in order to enhance livelihoods. Quick policy interventions such as formal and 
informal employment in the craft industry are required to increase household earnings from 
wildlife conservation in the short to medium term. In the long-run, household welfare in 
CAMPFIRE communities could benefit through policies and programs that stimulate an 
increase in wildlife earnings from activities such as non-consumptive tourism, tourism 
business ventures such as hotels or accommodation, investment in infrastructure, filming and 
live animal sales. 
 
Chapter 3: The Role of Institutions in Community Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe 
A number of policy implications obtain from this analysis in Chapter 3. To begin with, the 
wildlife sector should be re-configured in order to favour the implementation of collective 
strategies that are endogenous to the community aimed at providing public goods such as 
wildlife through conservation. Government policy should recognize CAMPFIRE 
communities as important stakeholders with an important role to play, but not as mere 
beneficiaries of wildlife conservation simply because they live, interact with wildlife almost 
on a daily basis and suffer in the process. There is therefore need for future policy to define 
the roles of each stakeholder and delineate boundaries within which each stakeholder can 
operate.  
 
Future policy reforms should also consider further devolution of natural resource 
management function from the Rural District Council to CAMPFIRE communities or 
increased autonomy so that they community members can monitor each other and internalise 
enforcement, while the state maintains regulation functions. This will allow innovation 
among communities, while the government create an enabling environment for other 
stakeholders to operate. For example, the capacity of CAMPFIRE to develop their own rules, 
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rather than just following externally-imposed rules, should not be undermined. The results 
show that external enforcement of rules and regulations does not necessarily translate into 
sound ecological outcomes; rather, better outcomes are attainable when punishment is 
endogenized by local communities. This seems to suggest that communities should be 
supported in a way that promotes the emergence of robust institutions that are tailor-made to 
suit local needs. This will, in turn, facilitate good environmental husbandry. 
 
Since wildlife is a fugitive resource that roams freely on communal land, there is therefore a 
need for coordination among CAMPFIRE communities in order to supply the public good, 
the required habitat and to benefit from collective. The government, NGOs and private sector 
should act as catalyst of collective action to ensure that there are incentives for CAMPFIRE 
communities to self-organize into multiple layers of nested organizations through policies 
and programmes that allow resource users to participate in decision making process. 
Development programmes or policy interventions with both a welfare and a conservation 
component should not be designed as ‘one size fits all’ but should recognize and understand 
the differences in community characteristics and incentives to self-organize through policy 
and development programmes in order to promote conservation and safeguard the livelihood 
interests of pro-poor communities. 
 
Government programmes can target capacity building in terms of institutional capacity and 
skills development in order to have a positive impact on biodiversity conservation. Increase 
spending on training relevant to natural resource management, and particularly wildlife 
conservation, targeting not only community leadership or project committees but also 
ordinary community members as a path way to conservation. Therefore, the capacity building 
efforts of government agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders should complement each other 
to ensure that the necessary resources are mobilised and all communities receive the 
necessary training and resources.  State authorities should reconsider the way in which they 
engage with farmers under resettlement schemes, because biodiversity suffers more under 
this type of arrangement than in communal areas. There is a need for appropriate institutional 
reforms that allow park authorities to work closely with resettlement schemes, while at the 
same time giving incentives for plot holders to work together for the improvement of the 
common pool resource. For example, farmers in resettlement schemes could set aside land for 
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conservation by pooling resources instead of operating at plot level, which works against 
conservation efforts. 
 
Chapter 4: A Bioeconomic Model of Community Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe 
Resolving the problem faced by CAMPFIRE communities will necessarily not require market 
based instrument alone, but also institutional reforms. This study calls for three main 
strategies to allow campfire communities to move from a seemingly inferior outcome to one 
that is optimal.  
 
Firstly, this result calls for policy instruments that will facilitate the development of sound 
CPR institutions that are tailored to suit local conditions and endogenous to the community. 
Specifically, to strengthen the incentives in CAMPFIRE communities, we propose that the 
RDC should transfer wildlife management functions and benefits to sub-district producer 
communities. This also implies that government policy should aim at building local level 
institutions that will, in turn, set the tone for community agenda on new social norms which 
are pro-conservation. This could be achieved through capacity building, investment in 
institutional building blocks such as governance structures at the local level, democracy, 
monitoring and enforcement, and community level trust, and funding to equip CAMPFIRE 
communities with much-needed resources.  
 
Since wildlife is a fugitive resource, there is also need for CAMPFIRE communities to 
coordinate their effort and resources in order to supply the required habitat and effort to fight 
illegal harvesting of wildlife resource on a broader scale. This calls for CAMPFIRE 
communities to invest in collective action beyond the borders of each project or community 
in the form of multi-layered enterprises or organizations that are endogenous to the 
programme. The government should therefore allow CAMPFIRE projects to be innovative so 
that they can learn from each other, through their past experiences and mistakes, and to 
develop and experiment with different models of conservation.   
 
The results show that the employment of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency is 
suboptimal. As a matter of policy, it is optimal for the park agency to withdraw anti-poaching 
effort from the local community and offer regulatory services. Withdrawing effort from the 
community will allow the park managers to use the limited resources effectively and 
efficiently on a relatively smaller area. The finding support policies that favour increased 
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devolution or decentralisation of natural resource management functions, decision making 
and authority to the community’s grassroots level. We recommend that the park agency 
should leave the society to its own device so that it can develop its own solutions to the 
environmental problems faced. 
 
Secondly, CAMPFIRE communities suffer double taxation from the premium charged by the 
safari operators and a significant proportion of wildlife income that remains in the hands of 
the Rural District Council. From a policy standpoint, CAMPFIRE communities would benefit 
immensely if they could learn from the model of the conservancy community and operate 
with the same autonomy and self-sufficiency as the conservancy because both taxes could be 
avoided. This could be achieved by hiring a manager or building internal capacity to match 
that in the conservancy community. This implies a different model or an improvement of the 
current benefit-sharing scheme so that CAMPFIRE communities can mimic the business 
model or behaviour of the conservancy community and in the process receive full benefits 
from conservation and pay taxes to the state and levies to the Rural District Council, instead 
of receiving cash transfers. Innovative policy instruments are required to assist CAMPFIRE 
communities in various activities of wildlife conservation so that they can integrate into the 
main stream economy and fully commercialize their operations. 
 
Thirdly, designing policy instruments that increases the risk premium could decrease the 
effective price of the illegal off-take. Reducing the effective price of the illegal off-take 
discourages the community from poaching by eroding the incentives. It is possible to 
integrate the risk premium into local institutions by carefully designing policy instruments 
that are adapted to local conditions. We recommend that these three strategies should be 
deployed simultaneously for an effective and fast solution to the challenges faced by 
CAMPFIRE projects. This implies that policy makers should use a combination of both 
market-based instruments and institutional reforms since they seem to complement each 
other.   
 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
 
In terms of the direction for future research, the analysis in this thesis suggests that further 
understanding of the role of local institutions in community wildlife management requires a 
cross-country analysis – i.e., a comparison of common pool resource institutions in two or 
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more countries where communities are involved in wildlife conservation. Cross–country 
studies are also needed to enhance our understanding of the effects of wildlife income on 
household welfare, especially for those households living adjacent to national protected areas. 
In particular, it has become rather imperative to recognize the relative contribution of 
different income sources in the portfolio of environmental income in driving inter-household 
poverty and inequality. 
 
The issue of time preference affect the behaviour, decision making process and the planning 
horizon of local communities that are involved in managing common pool wildlife such as 
CAMFIRE communities. The future stock of wildlife depends on the current wildlife hunting, 
which in turn hinges on the agent’s time preference and planning horizon. The issue of 
benefits is closely related to the issues of time preference and planning horizon. These are 
topical issues currently receiving attention in behavioural economics. The issues of time 
preference and planning horizon are very relevant and deserve to be studied further. So we 
suggest these for future work. 
 
The success of CAMPFIRE projects and biodiversity conservation does not only depend on 
community characteristics but also on the external environment, which includes government 
policy, the economic environment (local, national and global) and other stakeholders. The 
external environment is a black box that needs to be unpacked. For future research we 
recommend studies to look at the role of these variables and how they simultaneously affect 
the behaviour of the community. 
 
It is still a challenge to operationalize Ostrom’s framework for analysing complex social-
ecological systems due to unavailability of data and lack of knowledge about how to collect 
information on some of the variables, for examples, variables such as institutions, 
cooperation social capital, collective action and information. There is no consensus among 
resource economists about the type of questions that should be ask to measure such variables. 
There is need for more research into this area in order to harmonize the different methods that 
are used by economists to measure such variables. Thanks to recent developments in 
experimental economics, it is now possible to solicit information for some of these variables 
using experiments.  
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There is also need to investigate some of the relationships among the variables suggested by 
Ostrom’s theory, i.e., those variables that are assumed to influence collective action on one 
hand, and those that are believed to affect biodiversity outcomes. For example, the 
knowledge of a resource system is believed to have a positive impact on biodiversity 
conservation, according to the theory. It is now possible to solicit such information through 
public goods experiments and then establish the relationship. Future research should consider 
such relationships from ostrom’s theory.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Description of the IV estimation with heteroskedasticity-based instruments  
 
Challenges in employing the standard IV methods 
 
The standard IV method is employed in linear regression models, e.g.,   XY , where we 
come across violations of the zero conditional mean assumption [E l 0]X . 
 
Dependence on IV methods generally entails that suitable instruments are available to 
identify the model via exclusion restrictions. 
 
The instruments, Z, must satisfy three conditions:  
a) they must satisfy the orthogonality conditions, i.e., 0][ ZE  ;  
b) they must be correlated with the Xs; and  
c) they must be properly excluded from the model, so that their effect on the response 
variable is only indirect. 
 
Textbook treatments of IV methods stress their usefulness in dealing with endogenous 
regressors. 
 
Finding suitable instruments which concurrently satisfy these three conditions are often 
problematic and one of the major obstacle to the use of standard IV approach in many 
studies. 
 
Lewbel’s Approach 
 
Consider observed endogenous variables 1Y  and 2Y , X a vector of observed exogenous 
regressors, and ),( 21   as unobserved error processes. Consider a structural model of the 
form: 
11201   YXY   
22102   YXY  
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This system is triangular when 02   (or, with renumbering, when 01  ). Otherwise, it is 
fully simultaneous. The errors 
21,  may be correlated with each other. 
 
If the exogeneity assumption, 0)( XE   holds, the reduced form is identified, but in the 
absence of identifying restrictions, the structural parameters are not identified. These 
restrictions often involve setting certain elements of 
1  or 2  to zero, which makes 
instruments available. 
 
Identification in Lewbel’s approach is achieved by restricting correlations of    with X. This 
relies upon higher moments, and is likely to be less reliable than identification based on 
coefficient zero restrictions. However, in the absence of plausible identifying restrictions, this 
approach may be the only reasonable strategy. 
 
The parameters of the structural model will remain unidentified under the standard 
homoskedasticity assumption: that  (E l )X  is a matrix of constants. However, in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity related to at least some elements of X, identification can be 
achieved.  
 
In a fully simultaneous system, assuming that 0),cov( 2 jX  ; j = 1; 2 and 0),cov( 21 Z  for 
observed Z will identify the structural parameters. Note that Z may be a subset of X, so no 
information outside the model specified above is required.  
The key assumption that 0),cov( 21 Z  will automatically be satisfied if the mean zero error 
processes are conditionally independent: 1 ┴ 2 l Z = 0. However, this independence is not 
strictly necessary. 
Source: Extracted from Lewbel (2012) 
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Table A.1: Quantity consumed by gender 
Variables Gender Total  
Female Male 
 
Quantity of major wild foods items consumed 
vegetables 10.37 3.73 7.056 
mushroom 0.28 0.84 0.586 
insects 13.21 5.41 9.310 
fruits 0.94 2.72 1.831 
honey 0.30 1.16 0.730 
Sub-total 25.10 13.86 19.51 
    
Wildlife products only 
bush meat 4.69 12.64 8.676 
small animals 4.25 4.45 4.355 
fish 4.07 8.23 6.148 
birds 1.34 1.56 1.457 
Sub-total 14.35 26.88 20.64 
    
Quantity of major non-food items consumed 
timber 23.76 30.90 27.33 
firewood 595.29 849.99 722.64 
thatch grass 52.65 50.45 51.54 
basket 1.89 3.61 2.750 
livestock fodder 5.23 16.81 11.02 
Sub-total 678.82 951.74 815.271 
    
Total consumed 
Total 718.27 992.48 855.437 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.2: Quantity consumed by farm land (F) 
Variables Farm size (ha) Total  
F 0.5 ha 0.5<F 1  1 <F 2.5 2.5 <F  5 F > 5 
 
Quantity of major wild foods items consumed 
vegetables 8.98 7.86 6.73 5.96 5.72 7.056 
mushroom 0.44 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.78 0.586 
insects 13.61 11.30 9.18 7.34 4.12 9.310 
fruits 3.42 2.07 1.72 1.53 0.41 1.831 
honey 0.24 0.67 0.75 0.84 1.15 0.730 
Sub-total 26.29 22.37 18.94 16.32 13.18 19.51 
       
Wildlife products only 
bush meat 5.57 6.74 8.62 9.47 12.94 8.676 
small animals 3.11 3.76 4.21 5.03 5.69 4.355 
fish 2.64 3.43 6.46 7.58 10.43 6.148 
birds 2.80 1.64 1.43 0.93 0.45 1.457 
Sub-total 14.12 15.57 20.73 23.01 29.51 20.64 
Quantity of major non-food items consumed 
timber 19.49 22.25 25.37 29.86 39.68 27.33 
firewood 576.51 651.28 726.54 745.50 913.37 722.64 
thatch grass 60.84 55.64 50.45 46.37 44.45 51.54 
basket 0.63 1.85 2.67 3.78 4.82 2.750 
livestock fodder 4.88 8.76 10.22 11.53 19.71 11.02 
Sub-total 662.35 739.78 815.25 837.04 1022.03 815.271 
Total consumed 
Total 703.16 777.72 854.92 876.37 1064.72 855.437 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.3: Percent household purchased or sold resources by environmental resource 
Type of environmental 
resources 
% Household purchased or sold environmental resources 
Purchased Sold  
wild food items 
wild vegetables 74.7 76.2 
mushroom 22.5 35.4 
insects 78.9 82.6 
fruits 28.1 43 
honey 27.8 36.5 
Subtotal 46.4 54.7 
   
Wildlife products 
bush meat 70.3 54.8 
small animals 43.6 89.6 
fish 58.4 54.3 
birds 55.2 62.1 
Subtotal 56.9 65.2 
   
Non-food items 
furniture 69.3 56.4 
timber 57.7 47.2 
firewood 70.5 66.5 
thatch grass 61.2 73.8 
Basket 52.9 45.5 
kitchen utensils 50.1 70.6 
agricultural implements 56.4 68.2 
door mat 46.3 54.9 
hat 48.6 59.1 
pottery 47.5 52.3 
Subtotal 56.1 59.5 
   
Grand total 
Total 53.1 59.7 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Table A.4: Poverty analysis results 
Alpha  Poverty 
line 
Standard 
income 
Total income without 
wildlife 
Total household income Effect of 
wildlife 
  Estimate Estimate % reduction Estimate % reduction % reduction 
α=0 360 0.476367 0.247451 48.1 0.221038 53.6 5.5 
450 0.643188 0.442539 31.2 0.369323 42.6 11.4 
       
α=1 360 0.165532 0.054980 66.8 0.042633 74.2 7.5 
450 0.246873 0.112226 54.5 0.093163 62.3 7.7 
       
α=2 360 0.074261 0.016523 77.8 0.011573 84.4 6.7 
450 0.122178 0.040607 66.8 0.031729 74.0 7.3 
       
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.5: Comparison of headcounts, poverty gap and poverty severity indices 
Poverty 
line 
Units of analysis  Mean 
income 
Headcount 
ratio (%) 
Poverty 
gap 
Poverty 
severity 
 Standard household income 
360 All households (N=336) 452.97 47.6 16.6 7.4 
1st quintile 204.62 100.0 42.5 20.1 
2nd quintile 301.06 100.0 17.1 6.2 
3rd quintile 367.75 9.5 9.2 4.2 
4th quintile 527.22 0 0 0 
5th quintile 867.93 0 0 0 
      
450 All households (N=336) 452.97 64.3 24.7 12.2 
1st quintile 204.62 100.0 54.0 30.8 
2nd quintile 301.06 100.0 31.8 12.9 
3rd quintile 367.75 100.0 16.9 7.2 
4th quintile 527.22 0 0 0 
5th quintile 867.93 0 0 0 
 Total household income without wildlife resources 
360 All households (N=336) 595.50 24.7 5.5 1.7 
1st quintile 279.95 100.0 22.7 6.9 
2nd quintile 405.59 100.0 0.5 0 
3rd quintile 502.44 0 0 0 
4th quintile 668.29 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1125.96 0 0 0 
      
450 All households (N=336) 595.50 44.3 11.2 4.1 
1st quintile 279.95 100.0 38.1 15.7 
2nd quintile 405.59 100.0 9.9 1.6 
3rd quintile 502.44 87.2 0.5 0 
4th quintile 668.29 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1125.96 0 0 0 
 Total household income with wildlife resources 
360 All households (N=336) 634.69 22.1 4.3 1.2 
1st quintile 300.12 100.0 17.9 4.8 
2nd quintile 432.59 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 542.76 0 0 0 
4th quintile 710.13 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1194.00 0 0 0 
      
450 All households (N=336) 634.69 36.9 9.3 3.2 
1st quintile 298.12 100.0 34.2 12.8 
2nd quintile 430.59 100.0 5.7 0 
3rd quintile 542.76 0 0 0 
4th quintile 713.13 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1193.88 0 0 0 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.6: Comparison of FGT indices assuming a poverty line of US$360.00 per capita 
Units of analysis  Mean income Headcount ratio (% ) Poverty gap Poverty severity 
Standard household income 
All households (N=336) 452.97 47.6 16.6 7.4 
1st quintile 204.62 100.0 42.5 20.1 
2nd quintile 301.06 100.0 17.1 6.2 
3rd quintile 367.75 25.9 9.2 4.2 
4th quintile 527.22 0 0 0 
5th quintile 867.93 0 0 0 
     
Total household income without wildlife resources 
All households (N=336) 595.50 24.7 5.5 1.7 
1st quintile 279.95 100.0 22.7 6.9 
2nd quintile 405.59 9.6 0.5 0 
3rd quintile 502.44 0 0 0 
4th quintile 668.29 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1125.96 0 0 0 
     
Total household income with wildlife resources 
All households 
(N=336) 
634.69 22.1 4.3 1.2 
1st quintile 300.12 100.0 17.9 4.8 
2nd quintile 432.59 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 542.76 0 0 0 
4th quintile 710.13 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1194.00 0 0 0 
     
Policy experiments      
Total household income with wildlife resources (increase by 5%)  
All households (N=336) 647.76 8.8 4.3 1.2 
1st quintile 296.25 85.6 11.7 2.3 
2nd quintile 443.48 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 543.65 0 0 0 
4th quintile 685.24 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1140.37 0 0 0 
     
Total household income with wildlife resources (increase by 10%)  
All households (N=336) 664.48 2.1 1.3 0.3 
1st quintile 458.36 61.4 4.8 0.7 
2nd quintile 443.48 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 567.74 0 0 0 
4th quintile 699.35 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1164.83 0 0 0 
     
Total household income with wildlife resources (increase by 15%)  
All households (N=336) 687.72 0.3 0.2 0.0 
1st quintile 471.52 29.5 3.3 0.1 
2nd quintile 464.36 0 0 0 
3rd quintile 586.74 0 0 0 
4th quintile 729.15 0 0 0 
5th quintile 1183.41 0 0 0 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.7(a): Test for significance difference between Gini coefficients 
Index Estimate Std.Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
GINI Dis1| 0.333 0.0165 20.21 0.0000 0.301 0.366 
GINI Dis2| 0.296 0.0150 19.67 0.0000 0.266 0.325 
diff.| -0.0376 0.00408 -9.203 0.0000 -0.0456 -0.0295 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
 
Table A.7(b): Test for significance difference 
Index Estimate Std.Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
GINI Dis1| 0.333 0.0165 20.21 0.0000 0.301 0.366 
GINI Dis2| 0.280 0.0137 20.47 0.0000 0.253 0.307 
diff.| -0.0535 0.00706 -7.584 0.0000 -0.0674 -0.0397 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Table A.7(c): Test for significance difference 
Index Estimate Std.Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
GINI Dis1| 0.296 0.0150 19.67 0.0000 0.266 0.325 
GINI Dis2| 0.280 0.0137 20.47 0.0000 0.253 0.307 
diff.| -0.0160 0.00454 -3.522 0.0005 -0.0249 -0.00705 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.8: Gini indices for standard income and total income with & without wildlife 
Original results 
Standard income Total income (without wildlife) Total household income 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
0.333176 0.016490 0.295609 0.015028 0.279633 0.013661 
 
Effect of including non-wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total income (without wildlife) % reduction 
0.333176  0.295609  11.28 
 
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income % reduction 
0.333176  0.279633  16.07 
 
Contribution of wildlife resources  
Total income (without wildlife) Total household income % reduction 
0.295609  0.279633  5.4 
 
Results when wildlife income increases by 5%    
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income @ 5% % reduction 
0.333176  0.26218  21.31 
     
Contribution of wildlife resources 
Total income (without wildlife) Total household income @ 5% % reduction 
0.295609  0.26218  11.30 
     
Results when wildlife income increases by 10% 
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income @ 10%  % reduction 
0.333176  0.24845  25.4 
     
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income @ 10%  % reduction 
0.295609  0.24845  15.9 
     
Results when wildlife income increases by 15% 
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income @ 10%  % reduction 
0.333176  0.22461  32.6 
     
Effect of including wildlife resources on total household income 
Standard income Total household income @ 10%  % reduction 
0.295609  0.22261  24.7 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.9: Comparison of the Gini indices by income quintile 
Group Standard income Total income (without 
wildlife) 
Total household income 
Index Std. Err Index Std. Err Index Std. Err 
1st quintile 0.156 0.0124 0.0992 0.00676 0.0921 0.00670 
2nd quintile 0.137 0.0129 0.0502 0.00358 0.0426 0.00215 
3rd quintile 0.144 0.0187 0.0493 0.00417 0.0403 0.00256 
4th quintile 0.132 0.0167 0.0558 0.00431 0.0479 0.00307 
5th quintile 0.275 0.0302 0.176 0.0255 0.168 0.0244 
Population 0.333 0.0165 0.282 0.0141 0.200 0.0137 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
 
Table A.10: Decomposition of Gini Index by Incomes Sources – Shapley decomposition 
Source With wildlife Without wildlife 
Income 
share 
Absolute  
Contribution 
Relative 
Contribution 
Income 
share 
Absolute  
Contribution 
Relative 
Contribution 
employment 0.194 0.0650 0.160318 0.258086 0.0739 0.279398 
agricultural income 0.401 0.133 0.493624 0.399289 0.148 0.500797 
capital income 0.0732 0.0157 0.058299 0.072833 0.0176 0.059284 
transfers 0.0194 0.00280 0.010360 0.019336 0.00226 0.007630 
remittances 0.0580 0.00988 0.036596 0.057723 0.00697 0.023516 
environmental 
income 
0.254 0.0433 0.240803 0.192732 0.0472 0.159375 
Total 1.000 0.270 1.000000 1.000000 0.296 1.000000 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
Table A11: VIF test results 
Model 1 - Ordered logit regression model Model 2 - Determinants of environmental income 
generation 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
age of household head 2.100 0.476 tenure 2.320 0.431 
education of the household head 1.860 0.538 age of household head 2.100 0.477 
household head employed 1.250 0.800 area under cultivation 2.040 0.491 
Tenure 1.180 0.849 household head live on the farm 1.510 0.660 
household size 1.160 0.864 household head  born in this area 1.360 0.734 
household head  born in this area 1.150 0.869 distance to the market 1.310 0.765 
environmental income 1.090 0.920 education of the household head 1.230 0.810 
household head is a Christian 1.040 0.958 household head employed 1.180 0.846 
Mean VIF 1.350 household head is a Christian 1.150 0.867 
   household size 1.140 0.877 
   number of dogs 1.130 0.886 
   biodiversity 1.230 0.725 
   Mean VIF 1.500 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.12: Brant test for the ordered logit regression model 
Estimated coefficients from regressions 
 
             Quintile 1    quintile 2   quintile 3   quintile 4  quintile 5       
environinc   0.00001       0.00049      0.00023      0.00215    -0.00282 
age         -0.00119       0.02837      0.00647      0.00014     0.00059 
educ         0.09538       0.03770      0.09545      0.12689     0.26755 
employ       0.06493       0.01581      0.13632      0.25321     0.13344 
hhsize      -0.03204      -0.04024     -0.05238      0.00706     0.00202 
bornarea    -0.01587      -0.00769     -0.02374      0.02718     0.00267 
religion     0.00954       0.00312      0.00440      0.00133     0.00453 
gender      -0.12646      -0.3445      -0.22923     -0.43772    -0.1372 
 
Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption 
 
    Variable      |      chi2   p>chi2    df 
------------------+-------------------------- 
         All      |      4.34    0.227     7 
------------------+-------------------------- 
       environinc |      0.13    0.716     1 
       age        |      3.44    0.064     1 
       educ       |      1.26    0.672     1 
       employ     |      0.18    0.590     1 
       hhsize     |      2.73    0.424     1 
       bornarea   |      1.39    0.771     1 
       religion   |      4.50    0.183     1 
       gender     |      0.08    0.235     1 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression 
assumption has been violated. 
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Table A.13: Ordered logit regression model 
Source: survey results 2013 
 
 
 
Ordered logit estimates Number of obs = 336 
 LR chi2(8) = 99.41 
 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = -491.2 Pseudo R2 = 0.0922 
   
Quintile Coef. Std. Err. 
environmental income 0.00217 0.0026*** 
age of household head 0.00729 0.0328 
education of household head 0.582 0.2652*** 
household head employed [0, 1] 0.466 0.1474* 
household size -0.324 0.0253*** 
household head born in area [0, 1] -0.143 0.0636 
religion of household head [0, 1] 0.0580 0.2203** 
gender [0,1] 0.0042 0.0436 
tenure [0, 1] -0.695 0.4577** 
chamabvuwani [0, 1] 0.04749 0.0227* 
chehondo [0, 1] 0.05270 0.0963 
chihosi [0, 1] 0.57344 0.3201 
chingele [0, 1] -0.96421 0.5237** 
chipachini [0, 1] -0.5300 0.3971 
chitete [0, 1] -5.69564 1.0517 
chitsanzeni [0, 1] 0.05587 0.0024 
chizvirizvi [0, 1] 0.0680 0.0080 
dhumisa [0, 1] 0.9941    0.3685 
dopi [0, 1] 3.15709 0.1775* 
gonakudzingwa Area 1 [0, 1] 2.6904 0.1024 
gonakudzingwa Area 2 [0, 1] 0.02580 0.0660 
gonakudzingwa Area 3 [0, 1] 0.00053 0.0019** 
gondweni [0, 1] 0.07411 0.0853 
hlarweni [0, 1] -0.8652 0.1396 
kotsvi/Sengwe [0, 1] -27.270 6.2931 
lisesa [0, 1] -0.8243 0.2498 
machiloli [0, 1] -1.0794 0.2817 
machindu [0, 1] -0.0872 0.2434 
mahenye [0, 1] -0.3822 0.5341*** 
malifumune [0, 1] 1.32451 0.1940 
malipati [0, 1] 0.07653 0.0985 
muchingwizi [0, 1] -0.4348 0.5831 
mugiviza [0, 1] 0.0529 0.0295* 
mutandahwe [0, 1] 0.6211 1.0622 
muthlanguleni [0, 1] 0.1073 0.4539    
nyangambe [0, 1] 11.4623 2.8081 
samu [0, 1] 0.74520    0.0911* 
sibizaphanzi[0, 1] 0.29211    0.0479    
tinhongeni [0, 1] -0.6195   0.3272** 
 cut1 -2.236 0.8283 
 cut2 -0.878 0.7505 
 cut3 0.0567 0.8564 
 cut4 1.485 0.8402 
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Table A.14: Determinants of environmental income generation 
Environmental income Ordinary Least Squares IV Estimation 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
wealth index 8.649*** 3.472 7.26*** 3.813 
age of household head 3.265** 7.516 3.678*** 7.354 
education of the household head -62.82** 87.84 -73.70** 77.58 
household head employed [0, 1] -287.4** 165.0 -256.2*** 179.0 
household head live on the farm [0, 1] 7.053 52.56 4.435 44.02 
household head  born in this area [0, 1] 89.0 43.02 20.18 51.76 
household head is a Christian [0, 1] -117.3* 60.35 -125.2** 72.34 
household size 54.34** 20.57 47.63*** 33.21 
distance to the market 4.381** 2.139 5.565** 3.411 
number of dogs 31.36 49.18 53.07* 48.42 
biodiversity 125.6* 77.57 87.3** 98.73 
tenure [0, 1] -531.7*** 225.4 -535.3*** 242.6 
constant 346.1 541.6 324.0 653.5 
chamabvuwani [0, 1] 0.5000    0.261     0.0374 0.074 
chehondo [0, 1] -1.632 0.963      -0.0527* 0.032 
chihosi [0, 1] 0.3538 0.191 0.5914 0.964 
chingele [0, 1] 0.1960 0.227 1.8530 1.076 
chipachini [0, 1] 0.0573 0.023 0.1933 0.043 
chitete [0, 1] 6.9517 0.537 8.6609 0.583 
chitsanzeni [0, 1] 0.6801 0.244 0.5587 0.695 
chizvirizvi [0, 1] 0.3685 0.157 0.6080 0.412 
dhumisa [0, 1] 0.0258 0.693 0.0107 0.017 
dopi [0, 1] -0.111 0.242 -0.1568 0.277 
gonakudzingwa Area 1 [0, 1] 0.0227** 0.036 2.5577** 0.314 
gonakudzingwa Area 2 [0, 1] -10.71* 4.223 -0.3417* 0.334 
gonakudzingwa Area 3 [0, 1] -0.968* 0.235 -3.0000** 1.005 
gondweni [0, 1] -0.075 0.142 -0.1568 0.314 
hlarweni [0, 1] 0.0662* 0.557 0.3423** 0.734 
kotsvi/Sengwe [0, 1] -0.714 0.223 -0.2277 0.036 
lisesa [0, 1] 0.0023 0.001 0.0053 0.010 
machiloli [0, 1] 0.2950 0.529 -0.6211 0.268 
machindu [0, 1] 0.4623 0.453 0.07317 0.066 
mahenye [0, 1] 0.0479 0.040** 0.0914 0.178*** 
malifumune [0, 1] 0.0619 0.019 0.3272 0.292 
malipati [0, 1] 3.0912 0.353 0.6374 0.100 
muchingwizi [0, 1] 0.0007 0.018 0.3963 0.632 
mugiviza [0, 1] 0.0814 0.182 0.6498 0.270 
mutandahwe [0, 1] 0.5341 0.087 0.2434 0.079 
muthlanguleni [0, 1] 0.0985 0.032 0.1947 0.003 
nyangambe [0, 1] 0.2921** 0.278 1.0653*** 0.647 
samu [0, 1] 0.0479 0.056 0.2952 0.096 
sibizaphanzi[0, 1] -1.7477 0.453 -0.621 0.235 
tinhongeni [0, 1] 0.0910 0.031 0.9291 1.000 
0bservations 336 336 
R-squared 0.655 0.774 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): Chi-square 
P-value 
27.827 
0.0065 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):   F-statistic 9.1053 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Chi-square 
P-value 
9.2462 
0.6170 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Table A.15: Marginal effects for the ordered logit model 
Average marginal effects  Number of obs = 336  
Model VCE: OIM  
Expression: environmincome b4_age1 b5a_educ1 b7_occup1 b_hhsize b11_born 
b12_religion a10_tenure dy/dx w.r.t: 
 Delta-method 
 Pr(quintile==1), predict() 
 dy/dx Std.Err. 
environmental income 0.0000167*** 0.00000385 
age of household head 0.00119 0.00151 
education of household head 0.0953** 0.0236 
household head employed 0.0649* 0.0343 
household size -0.0320*** 0.00684 
household head born in area -0.0158 0.0333 
religion of household head 0.00954** 0.0295 
tenure -0.126** 0.0565 
   
 Pr(quintile==2), predict() 
 dy/dx Std.Err. 
environmental income 0.00000049** 0.00000011 
age of household head 0.0283 0.0326 
education of household head 0.0377*** 0.0059 
household head employed 0.0158* 0.0225 
household size -0.0402*** 0.0034 
household head born in area -0.0076 0.0083 
religion of household head 0.00312** 0.0140 
tenure -0.344** 0.0071 
   
 Pr(quintile==3), predict() 
 dy/dx Std.Err. 
environmental income 0.0000023 0.00000463 
age of household head 0.0064 0.0034 
education of household head 0.0954*** 0.0230 
household head employed 0.1363* 0.0215 
household size -0.0523*** 0.0024 
household head born in area -0.0237 0.0013 
religion of household head 0.0044** 0.0027 
tenure -0.229* 0.0644 
   
 Pr(quintile==4), predict() 
 dy/dx Std.Err. 
environmental income 0.0000215 0.0000062 
age of household head 0.00014** 0.0021 
education of household head 0.1268*** 0.0166 
household head employed 0.2532** 0.0036 
household size 0.0070** 0.0022 
household head born in area 0.0271 0.0214 
religion of household head 0.0013* 0.0153 
tenure -0.437 0.0545 
   
 Pr(quintile==5), predict() 
 dy/dx Std.Err. 
environmental income 0.0000282 0.00000233 
age of household head 0.00059** 0.0007 
education of household head 0.2675*** 0.1345 
household head employed 0.1334** 0.0042 
household size 0.0020* 0.0146 
household head born in area 0.0026 0.0042 
religion of household head 0.0045 0.0113 
tenure -0.137 0.0338 
Source: survey results 2013 
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Bootstrapping results 
 
Table A.16: Ordered logit regression model 
Bootstrap replications (200)   
------1-------- --------2-------- --------3------- --------4----- --------5---- 200 
 OLS  
Number of obs 336     
Replications 200    
Wald chi2 (10) 412.2    
Prob>chi2 0.000     
Pseudo R-sq 72.50     
  
 
Quintile Observed Coef. Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
  
environmental income 0.01439 0.0004***   
age of household head 0.02774 0.1471   
education of household head 0.52727 0.2157***   
household head employed [0, 1] 0.67756 0.2629*   
household size -0.0277 0.5612***   
household head born in area [0, 1] -0.0146 0.1263   
religion of household head [0, 1] 0.45991 0.2955**   
gender [0,1] 0.11045 0.2147   
Tenure [0, 1] -0.1647 0.5786**   
Cons 1.4476** 0.9969   
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table A.17: Determinants of environmental income generation 
Bootstrap replications (200)   
------1-------- --------2-------- -----3------ ------4------ ------5----- 200 
 OLS IV 
Number of obs 336   336  
Replications 200  200  
Wald chi2 (10) 284.7  -  
Prob>chi2 0.000   -  
R-squared 0.792   -  
F (13, 322) -  300.37  
Prob>F -  0.0000  
Centered R2 -  0.7562  
Uncentered R2 -  0.8432  
     
     
environmental income Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
wealth index 7.773*** 2.375 10.326*** 8.113 
age of household head 1.1570** 1.335 4.564*** 2.541 
education of the household head -5.695** 7.233 -15.23** 7.258 
household head employed [0, 1] -2.212** 4.350 -5.223*** 5.240 
household head live on the farm [0, 1] 9.0741 52.56 6.346 3.021 
household head  born in this area [0, 1] 1.0762 0.432 2.217 1.763 
household head is a Christian [0, 1] -13.27* 6.735 -12.52** 7.343 
household size 23.076** 11.25 17.22*** 23.21 
distance to the market 2.353** 5.139 5.114** 9.217 
number of dogs 6.9648 4.184 9.727* 8.402 
biodiversity 42.345* 29.45 30.23** 28.13 
tenure [0, 1] -22.53*** 13.45 -35.23*** 42.62 
constant 3.2460 1.255 7.250 3.545 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 54.272 
 Chi-sq(10) P-val     = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 34.261 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 8.362 
 Chi-sq(9) P-val       = 0.5912 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                    = 47.195 
 Prob > chi2             = 0.0000 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Figure A.1: Lorenz curves for standard income and total household income 
 
Source: survey results 2013 
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix for Chapter 3 
Table B.1: List of variables identify as relevant for studying complex SESs   
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S) 
S1- Economic development.  S2- Demographic trends.  S3- Political stability. 
S4- Government resource policies.  S5- Market incentives.  S6- Media organisation. 
  
Resource Systems (RS) Governance Systems (GS) 
RS1- Sector (e.g., wildlife, forests, pasture, fish) 
RS2- Clarity of system boundaries   
RS3- Size of resource system* 
RS4- Human-constructed facilities 
RS5- Productivity of system* 
RS6- Equilibrium properties 
RS7- Predictability of system dynamics* 
RS8- Storage characteristics 
RS9- Location 
GS1- Government organisations 
GS2- Nongovernment organisations 
GS3- Network structure 
GS4- Property-rights systems 
GS5- Operational rules 
GS6- Collective-choice rules* 
GS7- Constitutional rules 
GS8- Monitoring and sanctioning processes 
  
Resource Units (RU) Users (U) 
RU1- Resource unit mobility* 
RU2- Growth or replacement rate 
RU3- Interaction among resource units 
RU4- Economic value 
RU5- Number of units 
RU6- Distinctive markings 
RU7- Spatial and temporal distribution     
     
U1- Number of users* 
U2- Socioeconomic attributes of users 
U3- History of use 
U4- Location 
U5- Leadership/entrepreneurship* 
U6- Norms/social capital* 
U7- Knowledge of SES/mental models* 
U8- Importance of resource* 
U9- Technology used  
  
ACTION SITUATIONS [Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)] 
I1- Harvesting levels of diverse users 
I2- Information sharing among users 
I3- Deliberation processes 
I4- Conflicts among users 
I5- Investment activities 
I6- Lobbying activities 
I7- Self-organising activities 
I8- Networking activities 
O1- Social performance measures  
       (e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability,  
        sustainability) 
O2- Ecological performance measures  
       (e.g., overharvested, resilience, 
biodiversity,   
       sustainability) 
O3- Externalities to other SESs 
Related Ecosystems (ECO) 
ECO1- Climate patterns.  ECO2- Pollution patterns.  ECO3- Flows into and out of focal SES. 
 
Source: Source: Extracted from Elinor Ostrom (2007: 15182) 
NB: *Subset of variables found to be associated with self-organisation. 
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Table B.2: Sample size by community 
Ward Name of community No. of interviews Target Households 
Ward 10 Gondweni 10 20 400 
Muthlanguleni 10 20 420 
Ward 12 Gonakudzingwa (Area 1) 1 2 6 
Gonakudzingwa (Area 2) 2 5 14 
Gonakudzingwa (Area 3) 4 10 23 
Ward 13 Chamabvuwani 9 30 625 
Malifumune 6 10 236 
Ward 14 Kotsvi/Sengwe 9 12 492 
Ward 15 Dhumisa 18 15 320 
Hlarweni 25 15 108 
Malipati 10 10 260 
Mugiviza 3 10 178 
Samu 8 10 89 
Ward 22 Chizvirizvi 10 10 81 
Ward 23 Nyangambe 13 15 181 
Ward 29 Mutandahwe 19 35 2000 
Ward 30 Mahenye 29 30 960 
Ward 4 Sibizaphanzi 10 10 350 
Ward 5 Chitete 10 20 1000 
Chitsanzeni 12 10 311 
Tinhongeni 10 10 278 
Ward 8 Chehondo 30 20 350 
Chihosi 8 10 250 
Chipachini 3 10 200 
Dopi 14 10 220 
Lisese 10 10 144 
Machiloli 10 10 71 
Ward 9 Chingele 9 15 360 
Machindu 15 25 557 
Total 336 419 10560 
     Source: Survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.3: Important stakeholders and their role in community wildlife conservation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Important stakeholders 
Rural District Council 336 0.961 0.193 0 1 
National Parks 336 0.875 0.331 0 1 
Professional Hunter 336 0.732 0.444 0 1 
Zimbabwe Republic Police 336 0.289 0.454 0 1 
Traditional leaders 336 0.262 0.440 0 1 
PARSEL 336 0.330 0.471 0 1 
Environmental Management Agency 336 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Veterinary Department 336 0.0595 0.237 0 1 
AGRITEX 336 0.0565 0.231 0 1 
Community Development Association 336 0.161 0.368 0 1 
Malilangwe Trust 336 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Hippo Valley Conservancy 336 0.0298 0.170 0 1 
Save Conservancy 336 0.0387 0.193 0 1 
Africa Wildlife Foundation 336 0.0387 0.193 0 1 
Mean number of stakeholders 336 4.280 1.698 2 9 
      
Role of the Rural District council in the CAMPFIRE project (RDC) 
RDC has the appropriation authority 336 0.732 0.444 0 1 
Monitoring & enforcement/patrols 336 0.390 0.488 0 1 
Major decision making organ 336 0.886 0.500 0 1 
Select PH and issue licenses 336 0.813 0.391 0 1 
Enact bylaws 336 0.881 0.324 0 1 
      
Who is involved in setting the rules? 
Local communities 336 0.461 0.499 0 1 
Rural District Council 336 0.789 0.409 0 1 
National Parks 336 0.548 0.498 0 1 
Wildlife Management Committee 336 0.310 0.463 0 1 
Traditional leaders 336 0.265 0.442 0 1 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.4:  Community involvement in wildlife management 
How community is involved? Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Anti-poaching activities 336 0.595 0.492 0 1 
Whistleblowing 336 0.363 0.482 0 1 
Employ game guards with guns  336 0.223 0.417 0 1 
Use resource monitors (volunteers) 336 0.244 0.430 0 1 
Veldt fire management 336 0.423 0.495 0 1 
Awareness campaigns 336 0.967 0.178 0 1 
Quota setting 336 0.324 0.469 0 1 
Live cropping 336 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
 
Table B.5: Community characteristics 
Variables No Yes Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Bundle of rights enjoyed by the community 
Use rights 206 61.3 130 38.7 336 100.0 
Decision making rights 223 66.4 113 33.6 336 100.0 
Ability to enter or exit and to exclude unentitled parties 
Are you able to enter or exist WMC 306 91.3 30 8.7 336 100.0 
Are you able to exclude unentitled parties 223 66.4 113 33.6 336 100.0 
Benefits from wildlife conservation 
Is the community entitled to benefits? 22 6.5 314 93.5 336 100.0 
Household received cash dividends  259 77.1 77 22.9 336 100.0 
Existence of a wildlife management plan and constitution 
Wildlife Management Plan 250 74.4 86 25.6 336 100.0 
Constitution 47 14.0 259 86.0 336 100.0 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
 
Table B.6: Number of rules, meetings and activities 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Number of WMC meetings  336 3.58 1.62 0 12 
Number of WMC activities 336 0.860 1.141 0 8 
Number of WMC major rules 336 13.89 10.90 0 32 
Number of WMC minor rules 336 33.04 27.44 0 78 
Total number of WMC rules & regulations 336 46.87 38.09 0 110 
Number of other NRM rules 336 6.846 5.304 0 19.25 
Number of NRM meetings 336 2.48 1.50 0 5.25 
Number of NRM activities 336 3.24 3.16 0 12.5 
Number of non-NRM rules 336 14.34 4.57 7.5 25 
Number  of non-NRM meetings 336 4.00 1.45 2 7 
Number  of non-NRM activities 336 8.59 3.83 2 15 
Extent to which rules are recognized by society 336 3.51 2.75 0 8 
Extent to which rules are recognized by authorities 336 6.10 4.32 0 10 
Number of poaching incidence 336 7.955 6.192 0 22 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.7: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity  
Model 1 - Cooperation and Institutions 
inst_res = 0 
F (1, 322) = 0.540 
Prob > F = 0.461 
Model 2 - Biodiversity and Cooperation 
cooperation_res = 0 
F (1, 322) = 11.53 
Prob > F = 0.0008 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
 
 
171 
 
Table B.8: VIF test result for the models below 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Model 1- with overall institutional index 
year of establishment 5.720 0.175 
Trust 4.340 0.230 
inst index 3.170 0.316 
number of stakeholders 2.520 0.397 
punishment [0 = Exo, 1 = Endo] 2.330 0.428 
group size 1.910 0.523 
Tenure 1.860 0.538 
resource size 1.350 0.740 
Ethnicity 1.310 0.763 
wealth index 1.150 0.869 
Mean VIF 2.570 
 
Model 1-  with disaggregated institutional index 
Governance 8.000 0.125 
Clarity 6.300 0.159 
Year of est. 5.700 0.175 
Monitoring 4.900 0.204 
Trust 4.490 0.223 
Fairness 4.100 0.244 
punishment 2.900 0.345 
number of stakeholders 2.680 0.373 
group size 1.900 0.526 
Tenure 1.860 0.538 
Ethnicity 1.550 0.646 
wealth index 1.360 0.735 
Mean VIF 3.750 
 
Model 2 – cooperation and biodiversity 
Cooperation 5.060 0.198 
Benefits-hat 4.650 0.215 
average number of years in school 2.980 0.336 
Fence 2.580 0.388 
number of poaching incidents 2.240 0.447 
average age of household head 1.950 0.512 
distance to nearest urban centre 1.850 0.541 
information sharing index 1.770 0.565 
Training [0=no, 1=yes] 1.630 0.613 
distance to the fence 1.600 0.625 
average number of years living in the area 1.120 0.891 
social capital index 1.080 0.926 
Mean VIF 2.430 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.9: Model 2 - Relationship between biodiversity and cooperation with age squared 
biodiversity OLS IV 
cooperation 0.00575*** 
(0.00346) 
0.00758*** 
0.00415 
training [0=yes, 1=no] 0.215*** 
0.0745 
0.208*** 
0.0762 
Benefits-hat 1.61e-05*** 
4.56e-06 
1.35e-05*** 
5.37e-06 
distance to nearest urban centre 0.0132*** 
0.00145 
0.0136*** 
0.00140 
distance to the fence 0.0145*** 
0.00342 
0.0133*** 
0.00254 
social capital index 0.00724*** 
0.00221 
0.00730*** 
0.00232 
average age of household head -0.347*** 
0.123 
-0.312*** 
0.135 
age2 0.00347*** 
0.00125 
0.00368*** 
0.00138 
average number of years in school -0.0825*** 
0.0216 
-0.0791*** 
0.0223 
average number of years living in the area -0.00527** 
0.00207 
-0.00586** 
0.00236 
Fence -0.00434*** 
0.00199 
-0.00582*** 
0.00172 
Information sharing index 0.252*** 
0.0408 
0.2302*** 
0.0443 
Cons 8.520*** 
3.034 
10.251*** 
3.456 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
NB: Standard errors shown in brackets  
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Bootstrapping results 
 
Table B.10: Model 1 - Relationship between cooperation and overall institutional index 
Bootstrap replications (200)   
------1-------- --------2-------- --------3------- --------4----- --------5---- 200 
 OLS IV  
Number of obs 336   336  
Replications 200  200  
Wald chi2 (10) 3533.93  -  
Prob>chi2 0.000   -  
R-squared 85.37   -  
F (10, 325) -  223.22  
Prob>F -  0.0000  
Centered R2 -  0.8485  
Uncentered R2 -  0.9479  
        
cooperation Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
institutional index 0.129*** 0.0501 0.595*** 0.109 
group size 0.00121 0.0016 0.00452** 0.00188 
Trust 3.120*** 0.5523 1.205*** 0.662 
Ethnicity -1.172 0.9825 0.223 0.849 
wealth index 0.0673** 0.0318 0.0364 0.0280 
year of establishment 1.672*** 0.2556 1.151*** 0.260 
punishment [0 = Exo, 1 = Endo] 12.99*** 1.7365 11.311*** 1.781 
resource size -0.000150** 7.58e-05 -0.000267*** 8.33e-05 
number of stakeholders  1.552** 0.7267 1.832** 0.730 
Tenure -8.657*** 1.9852 -7.046*** 1.663 
Cons -12.04** 5.0241 -12.25** 5.158 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 68.935 
 Chi-sq(10) P-val     = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 12.194 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 18.252 
 Chi-sq(9) P-val       = 0.3528 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                    = 18.543 
 Prob > chi2             = 0.0000 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.11: Model 1 - Cooperation and disaggregated institutional index 
Bootstrap replications (200)   
------1-------- --------2-------- --------3------- --------4----- --------5---- 200 
 OLS IV 
Number of obs 336   336  
Replications 200  200  
Wald chi2 (10) 5371.36  -  
Prob>chi2 0.000   -  
R-squared 0.8838   -  
F (13, 322) -  300.48  
Prob>F -  0.0000  
Centered R2 -  0.8671  
Uncentered R2 -  0.9543  
     
     
cooperation Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
clarity index 0.023* 0.0539 0.109 0.2753 
fairness index -0.185*** 0.0254 -0.524** 0.0411 
governance 0.381*** 0.1535 0.712*** 0.1323 
monitoring & enforcement 
index 
0.451*** 0.0182 0.336*** 0.2143 
group size 0.00428* 0.00126 0.00314* 0.1026 
Trust 0.740*** 0.5580 2.587*** 0.8456 
Ethnicity -0.535 0.8854 -0.493 0.9210 
wealth index 0.0647** 0.0236 0.0534** 0.0369 
year of establishment 1.346*** 0.1905 1.057*** 0.2442 
punishment [0 = Exo, 1 = Endo] 7.284*** 1.9253 10.726*** 2.4393 
resource size -0.000354** 0.0001 -0.000475** 0.0044 
number of stakeholders  0.823* 0.5330 0.648** 0.6874 
Tenure -7.526** 3.6375 -15.28** 4.7651 
 Cons -10.194*** 3.8330 -2.127 4.1830 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 43.361 
 Chi-sq(10) P-val     = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 25.372 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 7.473 
 Chi-sq(9) P-val       = 0.4804 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                    = 38.283 
 Prob > chi2             = 0.0000 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.12: Model 2 - Relationship between biodiversity and cooperation 
Bootstrap replications (200)   
------1-------- --------2-------- --------3------- --------4----- --------5---- 200 
 OLS IV 
Number of obs 336  336   
Replications 200  -  
Wald chi2 (10) 2804.46  -  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  -  
R-squared 0.7238  -  
F (13, 322) -  283.38   
Prob>F -  0.0000   
Centered R2 -  0.7217   
Uncentered R2 -  0.9221   
     
Biodiversity Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Err. 
Cooperation 0.00513*** 0.00195 0.00902*** 0.00300 
training [0=no, 1=yes] 0.224*** 0.0762 0.198*** 0.07650 
Benefits-hat 1.46e-05*** 3.58e-06 1.12e-05*** 4.43e-06 
distance to nearest urban centre 0.0120*** 0.00137 0.0129*** 0.00160 
distance to the fence 0.0140*** 0.00213 0.0126*** 0.00262 
social capital index 0.00720*** 0.00205 0.00705*** 0.00218 
average age of household head -0.343*** 0.10923 -0.403*** 0.00149 
average no. of years in school -0.0821*** 0.02745 -0.00934*** 0.02354 
average no. of years living in the area -0.00567** 0.00267 -0.00615** 0.00201 
Fence -0.00474*** 0.00210 -0.00499*** 0.00179 
Information sharing index 0.229*** 0.04992 0.198*** 0.04743 
 Cons 9.352*** 4.18635 10.92*** 3.62650 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 138.181 
  Chi-sq(10) P-val          = 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 24.338 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.0641 
  Chi-sq(9) P-val            = 0.7463 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                         = 21.94 
 Prob > chi2                  = 0.0000 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.13: Model 2 - Relationship between biodiversity and institutions 
Biodiversity OLS IV 
Number of obs 336 336 
Prob>F 0.7205 0.1027 
R-squared 0.4223 - 
F (7, 314) - 9.47 
Centered R2 - 0.507 
Uncentered R2 - 0.534 
 
institutions 0.00531 
(0.01490) 
0.00517 
(0.0105) 
training [0=yes, 1=no] 0.0243* 
(0.00836) 
0.317 
(0.06305) 
Benefits-hat 0.0000405** 
(0.00740) 
0.02505* 
(0.03706) 
distance to nearest urban centre 0.1236 
(0.00351) 
0.0364 
(0.00307) 
distance to the fence 0.0237*** 
(0.01323) 
0.0242*** 
(0.00126) 
social capital index 0.00615** 
(0.00310) 
0.00629* 
(0.00301) 
average age of household head 0.0306** 
(0.2456) 
0.274** 
(0.3520) 
average number of years in school -0.00817* 
(0.01362) 
-0.0764 
(0.03452) 
average number of years living in the area 0.00429** 
(0.01307) 
0.01473** 
(0.00056) 
Fence -0.00046 
(0.00308) 
-0.00381 
(0.00270) 
Information sharing index 0.2512** 
(0.03165) 
0.02137** 
(0.0645) 
Cons 5.742 
(2.00347) 
7.3054 
(4.2172) 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 5.2440 
  Chi-sq(9) P-val          = 0.2143 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 2.5308 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.7437 
  Chi-sq(7) P-val            = 0.0346 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1)                         = 0.0942 
 Prob > chi2                  = 0.2270 
Source: survey data August 2013 
NB: Standard errors shown in brackets  
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Table B.14: Correlation matrix for the variables in the first model 
(obs=336)               
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Biodiversity 1              
Capacity 0.350 1             
Training 0.446 0.346 1            
Benefits 0.592 0.444 0.414 1           
Distance to market 0.375 -0.157 -0.092 0.135 1          
Distance to fence 0.326 0.281 0.213 -0.018 -0.089 1         
Social capital 0.214 0.202 0.194 0.195 -0.042 -0.043 1        
Poaching incidents -0.143 -0.332 -0.050 -0.068 0.122 -0.175 0.032 1       
Age of household head -0.034 -0.073 -0.038 -0.082 0.134 -0.054 0.026 0.033 1      
Age2 -0.026 -0.076 -0.023 -0.085 0.124 -0.041 0.022 0.039 0.99 1     
No. of years in school 0.066 0.192 0.067 0.191 -0.113 0.068 0.116 0.045 -0.718 -0.704 1    
Residence status of head  0.00 -0.092 0.052 -0.087 0.010 0.061 -0.039 -0.062 0.210 0.207 -0.334 1   
Head born in this area -0.069 0.040 -0.033 -0.036 -0.136 -0.090 -0.013 -0.195 -0.283 -0.270 0.144 0.039 1  
No. of living in this area -0.093 -0.093 -0.091 -0.133 0.200 -0.104 0.009 -0.070 0.482 0.465 -0.371 0.082 0.094 1 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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Table B.15: Correlation matrix for the variables in the second model 
(obs=336)               
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Biodiversity 1              
Capacity 0.350 1             
Training 0.446 0.346 1            
Benefits 0.592 0.444 0.414 1           
Distance to market 0.375 -0.157 -0.092 0.135 1          
Distance to fence 0.326 0.281 0.213 -0.018 -0.089 1         
Social capital 0.214 0.202 0.194 0.195 -0.042 -0.043 1        
Poaching incidents -0.143 -0.332 -0.050 -0.068 0.122 -0.175 0.032 1       
Age of household head -0.034 -0.073 -0.038 -0.082 0.134 -0.054 0.026 0.033 1      
Age2 -0.026 -0.076 -0.023 -0.085 0.124 -0.041 0.022 0.039 0.99 1     
No. of years in school 0.066 0.192 0.067 0.191 -0.113 0.068 0.116 0.045 -0.718 -0.704 1    
Residence status of head  0.00 -0.092 0.052 -0.087 0.010 0.061 -0.039 -0.062 0.210 0.207 -0.334 1   
Head born in this area -0.069 0.040 -0.033 -0.036 -0.136 -0.090 -0.013 -0.195 -0.283 -0.270 0.144 0.039 1  
No. of living in this area -0.093 -0.093 -0.091 -0.133 0.200 -0.104 0.009 -0.070 0.482 0.465 -0.371 0.082 0.094 1 
Source: survey data Aug 2013 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
Table C.1: Summary of key differences and similarities  
Differences 
Communal  farmers in CAMPFIRE projects Private game farms in the conservancy 
- Degree of state interference is high  - Minimal state interference 
- Operating on communal (ancestral) land - Operating on private land 
- Land is owned communally - Pooled land together/removing internal fence 
- Appropriation rights belong to RDC - Appropriation rights belong to the conservancy 
- Revenue sharing plan is such that the RDC gets 
47%, 3% goes to CAMPFIRE association and 
50% goes to the producer community 
- The conservancy retains 100% of the revenues 
and pays tax and levies to the state and the 
RDC 
- Wildlife is managed by the RDC and ZNPWA - Wildlife is managed by the conservancy 
- Decisions about wildlife utilization are made by 
the RDC 
- The conservancy make some important 
decisions about wildlife management and 
utilization except harvesting  
- There is a relationship with the park, i.e., wildlife 
free to roam inside and outside the park 
- No relationship with the park because the 
conservancy is fenced 
- Contributions/shares are not well defined - Contributions and shares are well defined in 
terms of provision rules 
- Poaching in CAMPFIRE projects is perpetrated 
by CAMPFIRE communities 
- Poaching in conservancies is done by non-
CAMPFIRE communities 
- Anti-poaching enforcement is done by 
community/ unpaid volunteers who lack 
incentives (anti-poaching not effective) 
- Anti-poaching enforcement is done by trained 
and armed game guards (anti-poaching is 
effective) 
- Marketing is done by safari operators on behalf 
of local communities 
- Marketing activities are carried out at both 
individual farm level and as a group 
- Most CAMPFIRE communities are not 
involved in non-consumptive tourism 
(potentially they can benefit through 
tourism, research, filming, live animal sales 
and meat cropping) 
- Income is generated from non-consumptive 
tourism (accommodation, research, filming, 
live animal sales and meat cropping) 
Similarities  
- Same geographical region and located adjacent to GNP 
- Similar activities (i.e., agricultural production and wildlife conservation) 
- Decision about how much to harvest are made at national level by ZNPWA 
- Wildlife in Zimbabwe is property of the state and no one individual or group owns it 
- Wildlife is managed as a Common Property Resource (CPR) due to the absence of internal boundaries 
- Wildlife is harvested both legally and illegally 
- Anti-poaching enforcement is done at group level 
- The clients who eventually utilize the quota are the same 
- Income from trophy hunting  
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Table C.2: Summary of definitions of symbols used in this paper  
(.)G  Public goods value 
0X  Stock of wildlife roaming on communal land (shared stock)  
1X  Stock of wildlife in the conservancy 
0h  
Hunting quota for the CAMPFIRE community 
1h  Hunting quota for the conservancy 
(.)i  Poaching function 
R(.)  Revenue from tourism activity 
L  Anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency 
iT  Total production effort 
a
iT  Amount of effort toward agricultural production 
e
1T  Anti-poaching enforcement by the conservancy 
p
iT  Poaching effort  
i  Probability of being caught 
  Effectiveness parameter/lack of cooperation/institutional variable 
i  Net benefits 
  Shadow value of the stock of wildlife roaming on communal land (shared stock) 
  Shadow value of the stock of wildlife in the conservancy 
  Proportion of income going into the hands of CAMPFIRE communities 
0  
Fixed per unit cost of poaching effort 
iv  Per unit cost of anti-poaching effort 
ic  Fine imposed on poachers 
iA  Agricultural technology 
  Nuisance parameter 
*P  Average fixed marginal valuation (price) of legal off-take  
aP  Price of agricultural produce 
s  Premium charged by the safari operator for their services 
  Risk premium charged on illegal off-take 
M  Budget/income from the state 
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Maths C.3: The Park Agency’s problem 
The First Order Conditions (maximum principle) are given by 
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Maths C.4: Conservancy community 
The First Order Conditions are given by: 
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Maths C.5: The CAMPFIRE community 
The First Order Conditions are given by: 
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(.)(.)(.)
0
(.)(.)(.)
0
c
T
v
T
A
P
T
c
T
v
TT
A
P
T
pPap
ppPaP


























 
 
Solving for 
*
0
PT  
































 













1
1
0000
*
0
1
1
0000*
0
00001
0
0000
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
][
][
(.)(.)(.)
cgAP
a
T
a
cgAP
T
a
cgAP
T
cgAPTa
c
TT
A
P
T
a
p
ap
ap
a
p
pPap
 
 
Maths C.6: Introducing the institutional variable 
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Maths C.7: The social planner 
First Order Conditions 
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Maths C.8: Functional forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maths C.9: Numerical illustration of stock dynamics 
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APPENDIX D 
 
A. HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
B. GUIDELINE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
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Introduction  
Good morning/afternoon. My name is Herbert Ntuli, and I am currently studying for a PhD in Economics at the 
University of Cape Town. As part of my degree programme, I am currently carrying out  a research study on 
Community Wildlife Management involving local communities and private game farms around South Africa’s 
Kruger National Park and Gonarezhou in Zimbabwe. The major objective of this study is to enhance our 
understanding of the role of local institutions in promoting sustainable management of social -ecological systems, 
compare the performance of wildlife management under private and common property systems and to learn 
from private systems, how local communities can adapt to commercial park activities. Villagers from this area 
have been randomly selected to represent other members of the community in this study. From this area, a 
small sample of households have been selected and I am now in the process of discussing with people like you to 
get information about household participation in community-based wildlife management and many other 
activities including agricultural and non-agricultural activities. This information is confidential and will only be 
used by myself for the purposes of this study which will not make reference by name to any one respondent. I 
will be grateful if you could assist me in filling out this questionnaire in as honest a manner as possible.           
 
Section A: Questionnaire Identification 
A1 Date of Interview A5 Enumerator code 
A2 Household ID A6 Country      1 = South Africa       2 = Zimbabwe 
A3 District A7 Village 
A4 Ward A8 Name of Game park 
 
Section B: Household Demographics and Village Characteristics 
B1 What is your household composition and characteristics? 
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B2 B3 B4 B5(a) B5(b) B6 B7 B8(a) B8(b) B9 B10 
1.             
2.             
3.             
4.             
6.             
7.             
8.             
9             
10.             
 
Codes 
B2 1 = Sel f 2 = Spouse 3 = Chi ld 4 = Relative 5 = Labourer 6 = Other _____________ 
B3 0 = None 1 = Primary 2 = Secondary 3 = Tertiary 4 = Vocational 6 = Other _____________ 
B6 1 = Single 2 = Married 3 = Divorced 4 = Widowed   
B7 0 = None 1 = Farmer 2 = Casual 3 = Sel f 4 = Employed 5 = Other _____________ 
B11 1 = nearby farms 2 = urban 3 = other rura l areas 4 = Abroad 5 = Other _____________ 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Number__________ 
 
189 
 
B11 Was household head born in this area?        0=No        1=Yes   
B12 Religion of the household head? 
 0=None       1=Christianity       2=Traditional       3=Muslim       4=Other (_____________________________)  
B13 Major family language? 
 1=Shangani             2=Venda             3=Shona               4=Other (______________________) 
B14 Type of toilet facility used by the household? 
 0=None/bush       1=Flash toilet      2=Blair toilet       3= Pit latrine       5=Neighbour     6=Other (__________)  
B15 Walling material of household’s main residential house? 
 1=Burned bricks     2=Unburned bricks     3=Stones     4=Pole and dagga      5=Other (__________________)  
B16 Roofing material of household’s main residential house? 
 1=Grass thatch       2=Asbestos      3=Iron sheet      4=Tiles        5=Other (_________________________) 
B17 What is the household’s main source of drinking water? 
 1=Piped             2=Borehole           3= Protected well           4=Unprotected well           5=Stream           6=River        
 7=Dam/lake      8=Ponds                9=Other (________________________) 
 
Section C: Land holding and general crop production 
C1 What was the household’s land holding during the 2012/2013 agricultural season?  
C2 Farm size (ha) 
                                                            __________________________ 
C4 Rented out (ha) 
                                                            __________________________ 
C3 How land acquired? 
________________________________________________________ 
C5 Rented in (ha) 
                                                            __________________________ 
C6 Farming experience of the household head (number of year) _____________________________________ 
C7 Did you grow any summer crop(s) during the 2012/13 agricultural reason? 
Crop(s) 
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Maize          
Sorghum          
Millet          
Groundnuts          
Dry beans          
Soybean          
Sunflower          
Rapoko          
Sweet potatoes          
Cotton          
Cassava          
Cowpea          
Round nuts          
Watermelon          
Other (________)          
Other (________)          
Other (________)          
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C8 Production costs for the summer crop(s) during the 2012/13 agricultural reason? 
Crop 
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Millet            
Groundnuts            
Dry beans            
Soybean            
Sunflower            
Rapoko            
Sweet potatoes            
Cotton            
Cassava            
Cowpea            
Round nuts            
Watermelon            
Other (________)            
Other (________)            
Other (________)            
 
C9 Labour and storage costs for the summer crop(s) during the 2012/13 agricultural reason? 
 Land Preparation Planting Weeding Harvesting Protection 
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Maize                
Sorghum                
Millet                
Groundnuts                
Dry beans                
Soybean                
Sunflower                
Rapoko                
Sweet potatoes                
Cotton                
Cassava                
Cowpea                
Round nuts                
Watermelon                
Other (________)                
Other (________)                
Other (________)                
Other (________)                
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C10 Did you grow any vegetable crop(s) during the 2012/13 agricultural season? 
Crop(s) 
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Leafy vegetables          
Tomatoes          
Pumpkin          
Okra          
Onions          
Carrots          
Cabbage          
Fruit trees***          
Other (______)          
Other (______)          
Other (______)          
*** Frui ts include bananas, pine apples, mangoes, paw paws, oranges e.tc 
 
C11 Production costs for vegetable crop(s) during the 2012/13 agricultural reason? 
Crop(s) 
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Leafy vegetables           
Tomatoes           
Pumpkin           
Okra           
Onions           
Carrots           
Cabbage           
Fruit trees           
Other (______)           
Other (______)           
Other (______)           
 
Section D: Information about livestock and other household assets 
D1 What were your livestock holding for the past twelve months (e.g., since July last year)? 
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Cattle           
Draught power           
Sheep           
Goats           
Donkeys           
Pigs           
Chicken           
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Turkeys           
Guinea fowls           
Ducks           
Rabbit           
Local bee hives           
Other (_________)           
Other (_________)           
*** Maintenance costs include the estimated costs of veterinary services, drugs and labour 
 
D2 What type of dwelling does household own, number of rooms, year built and estimated value?  
Type of dwelling 
Type of 
dwelling 
Own 
0=No   1=Yes 
Number of 
rooms 
Year built Est. cost of 
construction 
Burned brick under asbestos/iron sheets       
Unburned brick under asbestos/iron sheets       
Burned brick under grass       
Unburned brick under grass       
Pole and dagga under asbestos/iron sheets       
Pole and dagga under grass      
Other (____________)      
 
D3 Which types of farm mechanization or assets does household own? 
Type of asset Own 
0=No   1=Yes 
Number owned Condition 
(see codes) 
Year bought Estimated value 
(US$) 
Cars      
Trucks/lorry      
Tractor      
Trailer      
Plough      
Cultivator      
Planter      
Harrow      
Cart      
Wheelbarrow      
Pick      
Machete      
Knapsack sprayer      
Axe      
Hand hoes      
Spade/shovel       
Water pump/hand pump      
Other (________)      
Condi tion: 1 = Obsolete 2 = Very bad 3 = Bad 4 = Good 5 = Very good 6 = Excel lent 
 
D4 Animal handling facilities and grain storage facilities 
Facility Own (0=No   1=Yes) Number owned Year built Est. cost of construction 
Paddocks     
Cattle kraal      
Pigsty     
Fowl run     
Granary      
Shade/storeroom     
Other (_______)     
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D5 household assets owned 
Asset Own 
0=No   1=Yes 
Number 
owned 
Condition 
(see codes) 
Year bought Estimated 
value (US$) 
Kitchen utensils       
Television      
Radio      
Motorbike      
Bicycle      
Bed      
Sofa      
Table      
Chairs      
Wood stove      
Kerosene stove      
Stone grain mill       
Grinding mill       
Cell  phone      
Gun      
Solar panel       
Other (_______)      
Condition: 1 = Obsolete 2 = Very bad 3 = Bad 4 = Good 5 = Very good 6 = Excel lent 
 
Section E: Livelihoods strategies of the household 
E1 What were the household’s sources of income for the past 12 months?  
Income sources 
Estimate for the 
past year (US$) 
Please rank the top ten income 
sources during the past 12 months 
Fulltime employment 0=No   1=Yes   
Pension, Government & NGO Transfers  0=No   1=Yes   
Income generating projects** 0=No   1=Yes   
Agriculture 0=No   1=Yes   
Rented out land 0=No   1=Yes   
Rented out oxen for ploughing 0=No   1=Yes   
Livestock sales (cattle, goats e.tc) 0=No   1=Yes   
Animal products (e.g., mi lk, eggs e.tc) 0=No   1=Yes   
Remittances 0=No   1=Yes   
Wildlife conservation & tourism activities  0=No   1=Yes   
Gold panning 0=No   1=Yes   
Brick making 0=No   1=Yes   
Construction/builder/brick layer 0=No   1=Yes   
Craft 0=No   1=Yes   
Casual labour 0=No   1=Yes   
Drought relief/food for work 0=No   1=Yes   
Cross border/buying and sell ing/Shops  0=No   1=Yes   
Gifts (including marriage gifts) 0=No   1=Yes   
Manure/dung cake/crop residues/hay 0=No   1=Yes   
Interest from deposits  0=No   1=Yes   
Other (________________________) 0=No   1=Yes   
Other (________________________) 0=No   1=Yes   
** Include community projects, gardens, women’s groups e.tc 
*** Includes bush meat 
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E2 Household estimated expenditure for the past 12 months? 
Expenditure item (should include own production) Quantity bought (kg) Unit price (US$) Total (US$) 
Maize grain 0=No   1=Yes    
Mealie meal 0=No   1=Yes    
Other grain 0=No   1=Yes    
Grain mill ing 0=No   1=Yes    
Groceries (bread, cooking oil, salt, sugar, tea leaves…) 0=No   1=Yes    
Meat (chicken, beef, pork e.tc) 0=No   1=Yes    
Animal products (skin, milk, eggs, …) 0=No   1=Yes    
Clothing (including blankets) 0=No   1=Yes    
Hospital bil ls 0=No   1=Yes    
Paraffin 0=No   1=Yes    
Electricity bil ls  0=No   1=Yes    
Rent (house, ox plough, land e.tc) 0=No   1=Yes    
Debt payments (including input loan) 0=No   1=Yes    
Construction (material, labour, repairs..) 0=No   1=Yes    
Household furniture/appliances/kitchen utensils 0=No   1=Yes    
School fees (including books, transport ….) 0=No   1=Yes    
Vegetables (leafy vegetables, onions, tomatoes ...) 0=No   1=Yes    
Fruits (mangoes, oranges, e.tc) 0=No   1=Yes    
Ceremonies (including marriage gi fts) 0=No   1=Yes    
Recreation (beer/cigarettes/hair saloon …) 0=No   1=Yes    
Purchase of vehicles and farm machinery 0=No   1=Yes    
Repairs (vehicles, farm machinery, fuel …) 0=No   1=Yes    
Public transport 0=No   1=Yes    
Mobile phone air time 0=No   1=Yes    
Contribution to wildlife associations  0=No   1=Yes    
Contribution to farmer associations 0=No   1=Yes    
Other contributions (e.g., church, burial society…) 0=No   1=Yes    
Other (_____________________) 0=No   1=Yes    
Other (_____________________) 0=No   1=Yes    
 
Section F: Environmental resource utilization (past 12 months)  
Type of resource Harvest Purchases Sold 
Technology* Frequency** Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Wild vegetables         
Mushroom         
Bush meat (specify ____________)         
Small animals         
Insects         
Fish         
Birds         
Flavours/cinnamon         
Wild fruits/berries         
Honey         
Medicines         
Pesticides and drugs for l ivestock         
Timber/construction material         
Firewood         
Furniture         
Household utensils         
Agricul tural implements         
Leaf l itter as manure/mulch         
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Thatch grass         
Fibres/ropes         
Glue/Adhesive/ Gum/ resins         
Baskets         
Mats          
Hats          
Pottery         
Sculpture carving         
Livestock fodder         
Common pastures         
Watering points         
Other (_____________________)         
Other (_____________________)         
* Tech: 1 = Machete   2 = Cart   3 = Basket   4 = Gun   5 = Bucket   6 = Bow & arrows     7 =  Catapult    8 = 50kg bag   9 = Sickle    10 = Snare 
** 1M = once a  month, 1Y = once a year, 2M = twice a month, 2Y = twice a  year and so on. 
 
Section G: Wildlife and Natural Resource Management (NRM) Organisations 
G1 Is there a wildlife management committee?        0 = No         1 = Yes          2 = DK 
 Is the committee functional? ____________________________________________________________ 
G2 Does household head or any member of the family belong to a wildlife management organisation or 
committee?            0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 
 a) Current position  ___________________ 
         1 = Chairperson 2 = Vice Chairperson 3 = Secretary 4 = Vice secretary 5 = Treasurer 
         6 = Committee member 7 = Ordinary member  8 = Security 9 = Other ____________________ 
G3 Is household entitled to benefits from wildlife management? 0 = No             1 = Yes 
 Nature of benefits ______________________________________________________________________ 
 Value of benefits (US$) ______________________ 
G4 Did you suffer any loss to wildlife during the past 12 months?        0 = No            1 = Yes  
 Area of crop destroyed (ha) ___________________ Estimated vale (US$) __________ 
 Number of domestic animals killed _____________ Estimated value (US$) _________ 
G5 Were you compensated for the loss?           0 = No      1 = Yes 
 a) What was the mechanism of compensation? __________________________________ 
 b) Estimated value of the compensation (US$) ___________________________________ 
G6 Do you consider poaching of wildlife resources to be a problem in this area?         0 = No          1 = Yes  
 Explain _______________________________________________________________________________ 
G7 Has household consumed game meat within the past 12 months?          0 = No          1 = Yes 
 Number of times ________ Problem animals (kg) ________ Own (kg) _________ 
 Trophy hunting  (kg) ________ Buying (kg) ________   
G8 How does household create and capture value through wildlife conservation and tourism activities? 
(Please indication income by activity)    
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
G9 How frequent does the community hold meetings in a year? _______________ 
 How frequent did you attend such meetings? ____________________________ 
G10 How many activities within the past 12 months? _________________________ 
 How many activities did you attend within the past 12 months? _____________ 
G11 How would you rate the following issues? 
(Please use a scale from 0 to 10) Rating 
a) Extent to which household enjoy use rights (right to harvest)   
b) Existence of clearly defined boundaries/effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties  
c) Collective choice arrangements that allow resource users to participate in decision making process  
d) Extent to which decision makers are accountable to the community  
e) Existence of structures/organisations in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises   
f) Extent to which the process of making rules is fair and transparent  
g) Community structures/organizations and rules recognised by higher level authorities  
h) Effectiveness of rules in managing wildlife resources and allowing access  
i) Existence of punishment/sanctions for members who violate rules   
j) Effective monitoring by people who are part of or accountable to community  
k) Extent to which village elites or groups members influence these rules in their favour  
l) Extent to which people responsible for punishing offenders are accountable to the community   
m) The mechanism of conflict resolution is fair and transparent  
n) The mechanism of conflict resolution is cheap and accessible to all members  
o) The mechanism of compensation for losses due to wildlife intrusion is fair and transparent   
p) Level of confidence with community leadership and committee (skills, trust, e.tc)  
q) The criteria for selecting committee members is transparent and fair  
r) Extent to which the disadvantaged members are represented adequately in wildlife committees   
 
G12 Are there any NRM organizations or committees (other than wildlife management committees) in your 
community that you know of? 
 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 
G13 Does household head or any member of the family belong to any NRM organisations or committee?  
 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 
G14 Provide details of the NRM organisations 
  1st Organisation 2nd Organisation  3rd Organisation 
Description (name, function, activities, 
year established e.tc) 
 
 
 
 
  
Existence of Rules and regulations     
Joining fee    
Constitution 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes    2 = DK 0 = No   1 = Yes   2 = DK 
No. of meeting past 12months     
No. of Meetings attended    
No. of activities past 12months     
Activity participation rate    
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Section H: Social capital and networking 
H1 Have you or any member of the household joined any community group (whether formal or informal 
organisations) in the past three years other than NRM organisations?           0 = No      1 = Yes      2 = DK  
H2 Provide details of the non-NRM organisations 
 1st Organisation 2nd Organisation  3rd Organisation 
Description (name, function, 
activities, year established e.tc) 
 
 
 
 
  
Existence of Rules and regulations     
Joining fee    
Constitution 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 0 = No     1 = Yes     2 = DK 
No. of meeting past 12months     
No. of Meetings attended    
No. of activities past 12months     
Activity participation rate    
    
H3 Numbers of year living in the area ____________ 
H4 On a scale of 0 – 10, to what extent could you say that most members of your community/village are 
trustworthy? ________ 
H5 Number of people that you can rely on for critical support in times of need? 
 a) Inside this village b) Outside this village 
  Relatives  _______________________  Relatives  _______________________ 
  Non-Relatives ___________________  Non-Relatives ___________________ 
H6 Are any of your relatives or friends in leadership positions in formal or informal institutions inside this 
village?           0 = No      1 = Yes     2 = DK 
H7 Are any of your relatives or friends in leadership positions in formal or informal institutions outside this 
village?           0 = No      1 = Yes     2 = DK 
H8 Have you or any member of your household exchanged gifts, labour, borrowed money or production 
inputs with other members of the community within the past 12 months?     0 = No      1 = Yes      2 = DK  
  In out 
 What was the nature of this transaction?       
 Number of times transaction occurred       
 Labour days/time allocated to collective activities       
 Quantity       
 Value        
 Nature:   1 = Food i tems   2 = Clothes    3 = Draught power    4 = Labour    5 = Ferti lizer    6 = Manure    7 = Money    8 =  Other _____   
 
H9 Number of grain traders that you know in this village who could buy your grain _______ 
H10 Number of grain traders that you know outside this village who could buy your grain _______ 
H11 Generally speaking, can you say that most traders in your village can be trusted   
 1=Strongly disagree        2=Disagree        3=Agree        4=Strongly Agree 
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KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW 
 
Introduction 
Good morning/afternoon. My name is Herbert Ntuli, and I am currently studying for a PhD in Economics at the 
University of Cape Town. As part of my degree programme, I am currently carrying out a research study on 
Community Wildlife Management involving local communities and private game farms around South Africa’s 
Kruger National Park and Gonarezhou in Zimbabwe. The major objective of this study is to enhance our 
understanding of the role of local institutions in promoting sustainable management of social ecological systems, 
compare the performance of wildlife management under private and common property systems and to learn from 
private systems, how local communities can adapt to commercial park activities. From this area, key informants 
(resource persons) have been selected and I am now in the process of discussing with people like you to get 
information about wildlife management in your community. This information is confidential and will only be used 
by myself for the purposes of this study which will not make reference by name to any one respondent. I will be 
grateful if you could assist me in filling out this questionnaire in as honest a manner as possible.           
 
Section A: Identification  
A1 Date of Interview A6 Identification code 
A2 Country      1 = South Africa       2 = Zimbabwe A7 Enumerator code  
A3 District A8 Name (optional) 
A4 Ward  A9 Capacity/Institution  
A5 Village    
 
Section B: Wildlife Management  
B1 How is your community/group/ward involved in wildlife management? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________  
B2 Is there a joining fee to participate in wildlife management?      0 = No        1 = Yes      Amount____________ 
B3 Number of ethnic groups in the community/ward/group (please identify them)  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B4 Are individuals or members of the community able to enter wildlife management committee (group) and/or 
exit voluntarily?          0 = No   1 = Yes   2 = DK 
B5 Is community able to exclude external or untitled parties?          0 = No        1 = Yes        2 = DK 
B6 Which bundle of rights does the community/group possess? ______________________________________ 
 a) Use rights       0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 b) Management (decision making) rights 0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 c) Both use rights and management rights 0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
B7 Is the community/ward entitled to benefits from wildlife management?           0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 Nature of the benefits 
Number ___________ 
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 Value of benefits in 2012/2013     
 
     
Hunting 
 
Tourism 
Other  
 
B8 Do you have a wildlife management plan as a group?              0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 a) How was wildlife management plan developed? _____________________________________________ 
 b) Are members of your community/ward/group bound by a constitution to adhere to a wildlife 
management plan?             0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
B9 How do you normally communicate important information regarding wildlife activities? 
 1=Meetings        2=Word of Mouth or face-to-face         3=Other (___________________) 
B10 a) What type of information is normally communicated 
during meeting? 
b) What type of information is difficult 
access and why? 
 Information about past actions           0 = No        1 = Yes  _______________________________ 
 Financial reports 0 = No        1 = Yes  _______________________________ 
 Progress reports 0 = No        1 = Yes  _______________________________ 
 Knowledge of the SESs 0 = No        1 = Yes  _______________________________ 
 Other (________________________) 0 = No        1 = Yes   
B11 How frequent does the community hold meetings in a year? 
 Meeting participation rate withing past 12 months  
B12 Number of activities within the past 12 months 
 Meeting participation rate withing past 12 months 
B13 Who makes the vital decisions about the utilization and management of wildlife? 
 0 = DK    1 = Local communities 2 = Government/State agencies 3 = Private sector 
 4 = NGOs    5 = RDC 6 = Committee 7 = All stakeholders 8 = Other __________ 
 a) Decisions about tourism development in the community 
______________________________________ 
b) Who is involved in negotiating tourism business ventures 
______________________________________ 
 c) Harvesting levels or allocation of hunting licences 
____________________________________________ 
 d) Decisions about how revenue is shared among stakeholders 
___________________________________ 
 e) Decision about how wildlife income is used in the community 
__________________________________ 
 f) How much was allocated to the community last year (US$) _______________ 
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B14 How are decisions made/what processes are used for choosing actions? __________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
B15 Tell me about the rules/regulation that the committee has developed for managing wildlife resources 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 a) Number of rules and regulations  
 b) Are rules recognised by all members of the community?           0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 c) Are rules recognised by higher level authorities?                         0 = No        1 = Yes         2 = DK 
B16 Who is involved in setting the rules for access and management of wildlife within the community?  
 0 = DK    1 = Local communities 2 = Government/State agencies 3 = Private sector 
 4 = NGOs    5 = RDC 6 = Committee 7 = All stakeholders 8 = Other ________ 
B17 How are rules regarding access and management of wildlife resources set and who is responsible for 
monitoring & enforcing the rules? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B18 Is there punishment to people who violate wildlife management rules? 0 = No   1 = Yes   2 = DK 
 a) Who is responsible for monitoring and sanctioning offenders? __________________________________ 
 b) What is the nature of punishment? ________________________________________________________ 
B19 Does community have mechanisms in place for conflict resolution? 0 = No   1 = Yes   2 = DK 
 Explain __________________________________________________________________________________ 
B20 How do you deal with offenders who are not members of your community, group or outsiders (not involved 
in wildlife management)?  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Section C: Organisational structures and the role of other stakeholders  
C1 How is the community actually organised? 
 a) Structures at village level 
 Number of people in the committee 
 Positions/offices  
1. ___________________________    2. _______________________   3. ________________________ 
4. ___________________________    5. _______________________   6. ________________________ 
7. ___________________________    8. _______________________   9. ________________________ 
 Number of Men __________________, Women ________________ and Youths __________________ 
 b) Structures at ward/district level 
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 Number of people in the committee 
 Positions/offices  
1. ___________________________    2. _______________________   3. ________________________ 
4. ___________________________    5. _______________________   6. ________________________ 
7. ___________________________    8. _______________________   9. ________________________ 
 Number of Men __________________, Women ________________ and Youths __________________ 
C2 What role does the committee play in community wildlife management? 
 a) At village level 
 Functions ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Activities ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 b) At ward/district level 
 Functions ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Activities ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 How are community members selected? ______________________________________________________ 
C3 Do you think local communities have the capacity to manage wildlife efficiently? 
(Please comment on the institutional capacity, organizational skills and information processing capabilities)  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C4 Please identify all the important stakeholders and how they are involved in community wildlife 
management (CWM) 
Stakeholder Their role (function) in CWM Main activities How does their involvement 
affect the community? 
1.   
 
 
 
  
2.   
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3.   
 
 
 
  
4.   
 
 
 
  
C5 Identify the major institutional and legal constraints facing local communities in the wildlife sector?  
Nature of constraint How does this affect local communities? What could be done? 
1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section D: Business models, investments and community infrastructure 
D1 How does the community create and capture value from wildlife conservation? 
(e.g., lodge, hotels, hunting, types of tourism products, business venture, e.tc) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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D2 What type of investments have the community made so far?  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
D3 Description of assets and infrastructure belonging to the community _______________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
D4 How did you finance these investments? ______________________________________________________ 
 Does community have access to credit?  _______________________________________________________ 
D5 Does the community have the means to advertise their products, attract and track tourists from overseas 
markets?              0 = No         1 = Yes         2 = DK 
Explain  _________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Section E: Enumeration of organisations in the community 
(other than wildlife management organisations) 
E1 Natural resource management (NRM) organizations/committees in the community 
 Org 1 Org 2 Org 2 Org 3 Org 4 
Type of organisation (name, 
function, year registered) 
 
 
 
 
    
How was organisation created?  
 
 
    
Membership  
 
 
    
Management structure  
 
 
    
Rules and regulation   
 
 
 
    
Activities  
 
 
 
    
No. of meetings past 12 months      
Meeting participation rate      
No. of activities past 12 months      
Activity participation rate      
Constitution  0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 
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E2 Non NRM organizations/committees in the community 
 Org 1 Org 2 Org 2 Org 3 Org 4 
Type of organisation (name, 
function, year registered) 
 
 
 
 
    
How was organisation created?  
 
 
 
    
Membership  
 
 
 
    
Management structure   
 
 
 
 
    
Rules and regulation   
 
 
 
 
    
Activities  
 
 
 
    
No. of meetings past 12 months      
Meeting participation rate      
No. of activities past 12 months      
Activity participation rate      
Constitution  0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 
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Section F: Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) and harvesting levels 
F1 How big is the area under the community/ward/village’s jurisdiction or resource system?  
 Area (ha) 
 Is the boundary clearly defined?             0 = No         1 = Yes         2 = DK 
 Has the areas under your jurisdiction reduced, remained constant or increased over the past five years?  
 1 = Reduced      2 = Remained constant       3 = Increased 
 By how much has the area reduced or increased?     ha 
F2 What is the distance to the nearest game park?         km 
F3 What is your perception of the value of the resource system to the community/ward/village?  
 Use the scale  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
F4 Which commercial species or animals are very common in this area? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F5 Which species or wild animals are more productive? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F6 Generally speaking, can you say these species have exceeded the carrying capacity of the resource system 
or the resource system is in equilibrium? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F7 Which species or wild animals are less productive? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F8 Which animals can you classify as endangered species in this area? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F9 What is the subjective probability of extinction for each species identified by respondent and endangered?  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F10 Do you consider illegal harvesting of wildlife resources to be a problem in this area?  0 = No    1 = Yes   2 = DK 
Explain _________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 a) Number of incidences past 12 months 
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 b) What type of wild animals are normally killed by poachers and why? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 c) Has illegal harvesting of wildlife resources decreased, remained constant or increased over the past five 
years? 
        1 = Decreased      2 = Remained constant     3 = Increased 
 d) Are the people involved members of the community or not     0=No       1=Yes       2=DK 
e) What mechanism does the community have in place to curb illegal harvesting of wildlife 
resources? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F11 When we consider animals that are killed through tourism activities and poaching, do you think the current 
harvesting levels are sustainable for different species? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F12 Which species are more resilient to shocks such as overharvesting and climatic variables? 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F13 What has been happening to commercial wildlife species in your area/community/ward/village over the 
past five years? 
 Species General Observation Animal Population % Change 
 2009 2013  
 Elephants     
 Black Rhino     
 White Rhino     
 Buffalo     
 Giraffe     
 Zebra     
 Wildebeest     
 Eland     
 Kudu     
 Antelope     
 Waterbuck     
 Bushbuck     
 Springbok     
 Warthog     
 Lion     
 Leopard     
 Hyena     
 Cheater     
 Wild dogs     
 Other     
 General observation:                 0=Don’t Know                     1=Increased                       2=Decreased                       3=Constant 
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F14 Harvesting levels of diverse users past 12 months 
 
Species 
tourism activities Illegal harvesting by 
community members** 
Illegal harvesting by 
outsiders 
 No. ki l led Technology No. ki l led  Technology  No. ki l led  Technology  
 Elephants       
 Black Rhino       
 White Rhino       
 Buffalo       
 Giraffe       
 Zebra       
 Wildebeest       
 Eland       
 Kudu       
 Antelope       
 Waterbuck       
 Bushbuck       
 Springbok       
 Warthog       
 Lion       
 Leopard       
 Hyena       
 Cheater       
 Wild dogs       
 Other       
 Technology:   1=Gun    2=Bow & arrow   3=Wire snares    4=Trap nets    5=Pitfall traps   6=foothold traps   7=Spears     8=Other _____ 
** Including problem animals killed by the community 
F15 Other comments __________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
